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7INTRODUCTION
Competitiveness is one of the most popular 
terms in the economic and business litera-
ture, and it has several different definitions 
depending on the context of analysis and 
the subjects of competition. 
Competitiveness can be investigated 
for companies or other levels of economic 
units such as sectors or national economies. 
Krugman (1994) points out, that while cor-
porate competitiveness has a clear meaning, 
the competitiveness of national economies 
can be a wrong and dangerous obsession 
when the word is related to carelessly used 
economic figures and the related political 
and economic suggestions.  
The business competitiveness is the abil-
ity to grow and strengthen the position of the 
particular company – this is always done on 
the expense of the other competitors. The 
case of national economies is not a zero-sum 
game, the competitiveness of a nation can, 
in fact contribute to the growth and wealth 
accumulation of others.    
A major difference between the com-
petitiveness of business units and national 
economies is in the ultimate objective. In 
the first meaning it is the success or in 
severe cases the very survival of a compa-
ny, while in the second meaning the objec-
tive is to raise living standards. This latter 
concept was manifested in OECD’s defini-
tion according to which competitiveness 
is "... the ability of companies, industries, 
regions, nations or supranational regions 
to generate, while being and remaining 
exposed to international competition, 
relatively high factor income and factor 
employment levels on a sustainable basis" 
(Hatzichronoglou, 1996, p. 20). 
The determining factors of competitive-
ness of nations have identified and inves-
tigated since 1977 by the world economic 
forum. The Global competitiveness report 
has been published on a regular basis. Their 
definition of competitiveness is “... the set 
of institutions, policies, and factors that de-
termine the level of productivity of a country. 
The level of productivity, in turn, sets the 
level of prosperity that can be reached by 
an economy.” (Schwab 2013, p. 4). The 
twelve pillars for national competitiveness 
include among others the infrastructure, ed-
ucation, macroeconomic and financial fac-
tors, market size, technological readiness 
and innovation. Countries in the world are 
scored and ranked based on their strength 
of pillars supporting past and future com-
petitiveness. 
Although the prosperity of nations may 
be attributed to a wide and complex set of 
determinants, the economic aspects, such 
as determinants and drivers of competitive 
advantages experienced on the markets 
has been the subject of economic literature. 
1.1 The concept of competitiveness
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8The effects of many other factors, 
though, such as the operational and busi-
ness environment, transactions costs, the 
patterns of commodity and information 
flows, vertical integration or power relations 
among the segments of the chain are either 
harder to quantify or would require the use 
of confidential corporate data. Furthermore, 
business culture, traditions, attitudes of 
consumers, policy makers and other parts 
of society imply a great deal of intangible 
(e.g., psychological) factors which affect 
the final performance of the particular 
chain.  
In addition, comparing the competitive-
ness of several countries’ supply chains 
remains a challenging subject due to 
cross-country differences in data availability 
and the difficulties to collect and compare 
qualitative but important factors. One of 
the rare exceptions is the comparison of 
the competitiveness of the dairy supply 
chains in 12 new member states and eight 
candidate or potential candidate countries 
(van Berkum, 2009)1. Another difficulty is 
to form a commonly applicable framework 
for the comparison, since the range of 
available information differs from country to 
country.  
Competitiveness of the European agri-
food sectors has received growing attention 
in the recent years from policy makers and 
the business itself. It is essential to have 
a clearer understanding of our own status 
and competitive positions in the common 
EU and the world’s food markets particu-
larly now under the pressure of liberalising 
trade patterns, stricter international trade 
agreements, volatile prices and global re-
cession.  
In the mid 2000s the European 
Commission ordered a broad analysis on 
Competitiveness has also been investigated 
for particular sectors of national economies. 
Porter (1990) realised that “with striking 
regularity, firms from one or two nations 
achieved disproportionate worldwide suc-
cess in particular industries.”  
Despite the popularity of the term of 
competitiveness in the literature, there 
is not a consensus on the ways it should 
be measured. Latruffe (2010) provides a 
thorough overview of the methodology and 
measurement techniques usually associat-
ed with competitiveness. She also discusses 
the methods and findings of over a hundred 
empirical studies which have addressed the 
issue of competitiveness in the agrifood 
sector. Those techniques usually apply 
either the trade or strategic management 
measures of competitiveness, with the latter 
set of measures being primarily used to 
analyse the development and comparison 
of farms in various countries.  Investigating 
the performance of food industries is more 
seldom the subject of competitiveness 
studies. In a way, analyses that develop 
trade measures of competitiveness capture 
the performance of both farming and the 
food industry, provided the product group 
includes both agricultural and processed 
food products.  
Analysing the performance of entire food 
supply chains, however, remains rare in 
the competitiveness literature. One reason 
is that there is not a commonly approved 
methodology to approach this complex 
issue. Yet, it is the organisational and struc-
tural features of the chain that ultimately 
determine the success of its products both 
on the domestic and foreign markets. Some 
of these characteristics can be expressed in 
the form of exact indicators like raw material 
procurement or industry structures. 
1 The study of van Berkum is the synthesis report of a large EU- financed project, in which national research teams 
were responsible for the collection of data/information and contributed their insight views and understanding on their 
countries’ dairy chains. Similar international projects were organised earlier to compare the meat and cereal sectors 
of the new and candidate countries, for more information see www.agripolicy.net 
9the European food industry. The report 
(Poppe et. al, 2007) revealed a rather 
modest overall competitiveness for most 
European countries and food industry 
branches relative to the main competitor 
countries, namely the USA, Canada, Brazil 
and New-Zealand. Following the release of 
those disturbing results, the federation of 
European Food and Drink Industry initiated 
regular and systematic monitoring of com-
petitiveness indicators (CIAA, 2008, 2010 
and FDE 2011, 2012).  
1.2 The European dairy sector
The global demand for dairy products has 
grown faster than global supply (IFCN, 
2013). Middle and long term projections 
around the world count on the rapidly ex-
panding demand of China and other devel-
oping countries. The OECD-FAO agricultural 
outlook (2013, p. 206) forecasts a growth 
rate of 2 % per annum for developing coun-
tries in the next decade. Milk production is 
anticipated to expand in the world by 168 
million tons by 2022 from the present level 
of 740 million tons. Although three-quarter 
of the increase is expected to originate from 
the developing countries – and 29 % alone 
in India – even this growth will satisfy part 
of the increase in demand.  
The rest of the rising demand will be met 
by the traditional dairy exporting countries, 
which will continue to play a major role in 
global dairy trade. It is important to note 
that most of the milk is consumed in the 
countries where it is produced, so global 
trade in dairy products in milk equivalent 
accounts for only 12-14  % of the world’s 
milk production. Consequently, global dairy 
product prices have also been affected 
largely by the changes in supply and 
demand of traded volumes, in fact a fraction 
of world production. 
The OECDA-FAO outlook reckons that 
quota abolition in Europe will not induce a 
shock on the supply side, partly because the 
national quotas have recently been expand-
ed by one percent every year. Production 
volumes are expected to rise by 0.8  % in 
the first two years after the quota abolition 
and will flat out afterwards to around 0.3 % 
per annum.  
Despite the modest outlook a distinct 
growth for EU exports is forecast for dairy 
products, in particular for cheese and skim 
milk powder, in which the EU is the largest 
exporter in the world. The EU is anticipat-
ed to have a dominant share of 44  % in 
the global cheese export by 2022 slightly 
growing from the current 43  %. Similarly, 
the global SMP export is estimated to reach 
35 % from the current 34 %. Although these 
growth rates appear very modest, the 
overall volume of global cheese exports 
is expected to expand by 21  % and SMP 
exports by 27 % over the next decade. In 
butter and WMP New Zealand is expected 
to preserve its leading positions (OECD-FAO, 
2013, p. 214). 
Europe has recently been more compet-
itive on the global markets and it will have 
an opportunity to expand by satisfying some 
of the growing demand in emerging markets 
such as China, Russia and Arabic countries 
in the next decade. The room for growth in 
New Zealand is getting more and more lim-
ited by public opinion, as illustrated by the 
environmental considerations bearing on 
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extensive dairying. In New Zealand there is 
a low production cost of milk, mainly due to 
very low feeding and building costs, which 
means that milk farmers can survive with a 
price of 27¢/kg of milk. Farmers do not milk 
cows in the winter, a period during which 
most cows are dry, so that there is a large 
seasonality in milk production. The US has 
potential for growth, but they have at the 
same time a huge internal market to satisfy 
as well. 
The weight of Northern Europe or – as 
we call the group of countries in this study 
– the Baltic Sea region in EU’s dairy sector is 
remarkable, it accounted for 37.4 % in the 
volume of milk deliveries to dairies in 2012 
and 31.5 % in dairy industry sales revenues 
in 2011. 
Within the food industry around the Baltic 
Sea region, dairy manufacturing is one of 
the most significant industries. It is the big-
gest in the Baltic countries and Finland and 
the second biggest after meat processing in 
Germany, Poland, Denmark and Sweden. In 
the combined figures of the eight countries, 
the dairy industry sales revenues amounted 
to 45  billion € or 15.7  % of the total food 
and beverages industry, which as a whole 
ranked dairy manufacturing second after 
meat processing (24 %).  
1.3 The chain approach
Food supply chains consist of four major 
segments: agricultural input supply, ag-
ricultural production, food manufacturing 
and, finally, the food wholesale and retail 
sector, which ensure the distribution of final 
products to consumers. Economic power is 
hardly ever allocated evenly in the chain, 
which raises a number of questions on the 
division of roles. Economic and financial 
strength may grant some actors the ability 
to develop the chain, while at the same 
time giving them the possibility of control or 
influencing other participants.  
Although interests may conflict in many 
aspects, it is ultimately a common concern 
of all segments to make the chain operate 
as efficiently as possible. The organisational 
setting of the supply chain usually varies 
from country to country, but the major 
questions concerning the division of roles 
are the same everywhere: 
1. Who owns the chain? 
Ownership structure is a fundamental 
characteristic, which has a strong impact on 
the operation of food supply chains. Farms 
are usually owned by the farmers them-
selves (i.e., families and private persons in 
Europe), except for an increasing number of 
agricultural companies in which ownership 
is more complex and potentially divided 
among managers, other private investors, 
and/or companies. Food manufacturers can 
be owned by farmers – usually in a coop-
erative form – or by any other investors 
such as private capital, banks, pension or 
insurance funds etc. The type of ownership 
determines the long term development 
strategy of the particular company, be-
cause the interests of owners largely differ 
between domestic and foreign investors, or 
professional and financial investors. Based 
on the interests of owners, the strategy of 
food manufacturers can vary from mod-
ernisation and technology development to 
market consolidation, geographical expan-
sion, profit maximisation and high or rapid 
returns on the invested capital.  
2. Who coordinates/integrates the chain?
The performance of the chain can be 
improved by vertically coordinating its 
operation and transactions among seg-
ments. It is essential that there are strong 
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Figure 1. Segments of the basic dairy supply chain.
players in the chain, who initiate supply 
chain development. Such coordination 
may address organisational issues, infor-
mation flows, traceability, quality stand-
ards and hygienic requirements. Vertical 
integration is a deeper form in which the 
goals of efficient operation of the chain 
stem from common ownership. 
3. Who controls the chain? 
Economic power can allow companies 
to force their will on others - the stronger 
the company, the more negotiating power 
it has in the chain. In this aspect industry 
structures are of utmost importance. The 
various segments such as farms, pro-
cessing and retail have different levels of 
concentration, and large players of con-
centrated industries would be able to keep 
the other segments under control. Power 
relations also imply the issue of income 
distribution among the segments.  
4. Who bears risk in the chain? 
Risk management has received increas-
ing emphasis due to the highly volatile 
commodity markets over the recent years. 
It has been seen that price fluctuations 
can seriously damage the viability of 
agricultural producers and processors. 
Risk management techniques are still not 
utilised widely within the European food 
supply chains. It is important how sudden 
price changes in inputs, agricultural com-
modities or in major cost items can flow 
through the chain, which raises the issue of 
price transmission. Other risks associated 
specifically with the food supply chains 
are e.g. weather risk in agriculture and the 
risk of unsold food products in retail units. 
In each country the concrete framework 
concerning the above division of roles pre-
determines the prospects and capability of 
the dairy supply chain to improve its com-
petitiveness. 
1.4 The dairy supply chain
The segments of the dairy supply chain 
can be easily identified. As captured in 
the popular definition of “farm to fork”, 
the dairy supply chain would include dairy 
farms, dairy processing companies, whole-
salers, retailers and final consumers. This 
basic chain concept could be extended with 
the segment of agricultural input produc-
ers in the beginning phase.  
In the dairy supply chain market actors 
interact with each others across the seg-
ments. They make contracts and organise 
the flow of commodities and goods from 
inputs to raw materials and processed prod-
ucts until it gets to consumers. While com-
modities and goods flow usually forward, 
payments backward, the flow of information 
is in both directions.  
Agricultural 
inputs
Milk 
production
Dairy 
industry
Food whole-
sale & retail Consumption
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In reality the dairy supply chain is much 
more complex than depicted in Figure 1. 
Various services are provided by specialised 
companies in order to make the functioning 
of the chain smoother (e.g., milk collection, 
transportation or trading companies). There 
has been a tendency for food processing 
companies in general and dairy manufactur-
ers in particular to outsource a great number 
of activities such as logistics, accounting 
etc. to external companies.  
In addition to grocery purchases, end 
users consume milk and dairy products in the 
myriad of Horeca (hotel, restaurant and cater-
ing) units, which can be defined as eating-out 
or eating away from home. The Horeca sector 
is a major segment of the detailed dairy 
supply chain, as it represents the second 
major channel for consumption.  
There are numerous forms of secondary 
processing of milk and dairy products both 
within and outside the food industry. The 
ice cream, bakery, confectionery and ready-
meal manufacturing industries are the most 
obvious secondary processors. Dairy man-
ufacturers have developed a range of food 
ingredients such as whey and casein deriv-
atives, protein, milk minerals etc. which can 
be used to produce various functional and 
special nutrient products.   
The ways to amend the flowchart of 
goods and business relations with deeper 
and more detailed inter-connections are 
endless. However, the understanding 
and monitoring of such a complex set of 
relations, and its economic analysis, would 
become far too complicated and face chal-
lenges of data availability. A prominent ex-
ample of poor data availability relates to the 
operation of the Horeca sector. Therefore, 
the assessment of the general set-up and 
efficient functioning of the each country’s 
dairy supply chain will be based on the more 
straightforward basic dairy supply chain 
scheme (Figure 1).  
Although an increasing volume of goods 
and even services originates from or is sold 
abroad, the dairy supply chain essentially 
functions within the national borders of a 
specific country. The market actors of the 
national dairy supply chain can be distin-
guished by the place of operation even if 
ownership relations would stretch over the 
borders. The majority of the milk, which is 
produced within the national boundaries, 
is processed and sold in the same country. 
Similarly, consumption of the dairy products 
usually relies on the output of the national 
dairy supply chains. 
There are certainly differences, however, 
in imported volumes of raw milk and import 
dependency of dairy products just as there 
are significant differences in export intensi-
ty and specialisation for exporting milk or 
dairy products.   
Competitiveness will also be compared 
among the national dairy supply chains by 
using the basic scheme. The range of anal-
ysis concerning the economic performance 
is largely determined by the availability of 
statistical data. Market structure will be 
compared for milk farms, dairy processing 
and retail sector across countries. Levels of 
concentration relate to the power relations in 
a national dairy chain. Highly concentrated 
industries would also have large companies 
and their size and the exploitation of econ-
omies of scales also matter in international 
competition.  
Ownership structure is also an important 
factor indirectly influencing competitive-
ness of the dairy supply chain. Cooperative 
ownership by farmers has a long tradition in 
the countries of this study and it is the most 
common form of vertical integration in dairy 
supply chains. Other important structural 
characteristics are the dairy industries’ pro-
duction mix and the consumption structure 
of countries.  
In addition to structural indicators, the 
basic financial performance trends are 
presented in aggregate forms for milk farms 
and the dairy industry. Milk procurement 
and milk prices are compared as well as 
contracting practices among processors 
and retailers. Furthermore, a long list of 
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factors, which indirectly influence the eco-
nomic performance of market actors and 
eventually the competitiveness of the chain, 
is also discussed in this section.  
In further sections, productivity is 
monitored for the two major production 
segments in the chain, milk farms and dairy 
industry. Foreign trade performance indica-
tors encompass the activities of companies 
across the chain, primarily dairy manufac-
turers and traders, but even farmers and 
their cooperatives. Traded goods are usually 
the production chain’s final output, to which 
input suppliers, farmers and manufacturers 
make contributions. In this respect, foreign 
trade performance indicators point to the 
competitiveness of the entire chain. Growth 
is analysed again for the two major produc-
ing segments; the dynamics of their output, 
milk production for milk farms and sales rev-
enues for dairy industry is compared across 
the countries. Finally, innovation is detected 
at the stage of processing, where it has the 
highest impact on value added and future 
competitiveness.2  
2 Innovation here is defined as own innovation generated by the actors of the chain. Innovation of external companies 
such as farm or food industry equipment suppliers is not considered, despite the fact that it results in technology or 
process improvements for the actors of the chain.
Figure 2. Extended relations of dairy supply chain.
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1.5 Background and structure of the report
This report is the final output of a pro-
ject “Comparison of the competitiveness 
of dairy supply chains in the Baltic Sea 
region” that was implemented in 2011-
2013. The report consists of a qualitative 
comparison of the dairy chains and a com-
parison of a set of indicators, all which are 
related to competitiveness.  
The statistical data were collected 
from public sources such as the dataset 
of Eurostat. Custom-tailored data were 
ordered from national statistics institutes 
particularly for the productivity calculations. 
Data needs and data sources are explained 
in more detail in sections 3.2.  
In addition to statistics, first-hand infor-
mation was collected via over one hundred 
interviews at the stakeholders in the dairy 
chains of the eight countries. They were 
based on a semi-structured questionnaire 
which consisted of a large set of open ended 
questions.  
The interviews were carried out among 
over 30 dairy farms, plus dairy manufac-
turers, farmers’ and dairy industry associ-
ations, research institutes, universities and 
ministries. The authors would hereby like 
to express their gratitude to all the actors 
and experts of the dairy chains who kindly 
contributed with their views and expertise 
to this broad comparison. 
The set comprising fifteen indicators were 
identified for monitoring, these are either 
the driving forces, determinants or manifes-
tation of competitiveness. The indicators 
were classified into five major groups as the 
contributing factors to a dairy chain’s com-
petitiveness:  
(1) economic performance,  
(2) productivity, 
(3) foreign trade performance, 
(4) growth and 
(5) innovation. 
Factor of competitiveness Indicators
Economic performance, 
market and ownership 
structures
Profitability ratio (net profit to sales revenues) 
Concentration in the dairy industry (CR4)
Dairy farm structure, average milk farm size 
Milk use structure: Ratio of milk deliveried to processing
Milk prices
Share of foreign vs. domestic ownership capital 
Share of cooperative based ownership
Productivity 
Labour productivity 
Total factor productivity (TFP)
Milk production per cow
Foreign trade performance 
Balassa indices (RCA)
Export share in sales revenues
Growth 
Growth of dairy industry sales revenues 
Growth of milk production value
Growth of dairy exports
Innovation R&D expenses/sales revenues
Table 1. The set of indicators used in the report.
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The above set of indicators is reviewed 
in the study for the applicable segments of 
the dairy supply chain. The focus has been 
put on the farm and industry segments, i.e. 
milk production and dairy manufacturing. 
Figure 3 enlightens the structure of the 
report and the utilisation of indicators in the 
segments. 
Figure 3. The structure of the report.
Sections 2.2-2.4: General overviews of the segments in the Baltic Sea 
region (farm structure, milk use structure, milk prices, raw milk trade, 
key figures of dairy industry and retail sector)
Sections 2.5.1-2.5.8: Country reviews
(milk collection, industry structure, ownership structure, vertical 
integration, manufacturers relations to retail, retail trade structure)
Section 3.1
(farm level – 
labour productivity
TFP, milk yield per 
cow, average milk 
farm size)
Section 3.2
(industry 
level – labour 
productivity
and TFP)
Sections 4.1-4.2
foreign trade balance of milk and 
dairy products, Revealed comparative 
advantage, (RCA)
Section 5.1
growth rate 
of milk 
production 
Section 5.2
dairy industry 
growth rate 
of sales
Sections 6.1-6.2
R&D expenses in 
value added
Chapter 2
Economic 
performance
Chapter 3
Productivity
Chapter 4
Foreign trade 
performance
Chapter 5
Growth
Chapter 6
Innovation
16
17
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
2.1 Agricultural input supply
2
The economic and financial performance of 
players in the chain is a substantial indicator 
of competitiveness. In order to sustain the 
competitive position on domestic and export 
markets, the chain has to be organised 
well and work smoothly. Economic actors 
in each segment have to be viable and 
profitable, while income has to be allocated 
in a balanced way throughout the chain.
The most important inputs for milk farms 
are their fixed assets and equipment, 
land, labour, dairy cows and the services 
and materials – such as veterinary and 
feed – associated with the herd and inputs 
needed for own feed production. 
The level of input costs differs greatly 
in the eight countries of the comparison. 
One of these major inputs is labour force. 
Cheap labour is a cost advantage in favour 
of the new member states, but the share of 
external labour force in the cost structure of 
milk farms – except for the case of Estonia 
– has been rather low. Milk farms in Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland rely predominantly on 
the family’s own labour. 
Other inputs such as energy and fuels for 
heating and working machines do not follow 
the polarised patterns of land and wages 
between the new and old EU members since 
both energy and fuel prices are heavily in-
fluenced by the local policy through taxation 
and subsidies.  
Feed prices have followed the fluctu-
ations in grain and oilseed prices on the 
world market in all countries. Dairy farms, 
however, have been less exposed to the 
radical price changes compared to meat 
farms, because they use silage or hay and 
typically produce grain themselves. Feed re-
lated costs – both purchased feed and own 
production – constituted between 55-75 % 
of variable costs in the eight countries in 
2011.3  
Figure 4. Labour costs at dairy farms 
around the Baltic Sea.
Denmark
Sweden
Germany
Estonia
Finland
Latvia
Poland
Lithuania
0     2     4      6     8     10   12   14   16   18   20   22   24
Source: European Commission, FADN database.
euro/hour
3 Figures are based on the results of the Standard Output (SO) database of FADN for specialised milk farms.
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The agricultural input supply companies 
tend to provide farmers with a full spectrum 
of inputs including mineral fertilisers, pesti-
cides, machinery, seeds and feed. In the old 
member states several companies operate 
in cooperative ownership form, while in the 
Baltic countries and Poland they are private-
ly owned businesses.   
The price of agricultural land, which is 
needed badly for farm expansion, varies 
within an extremely broad interval among the 
countries starting at around 35-40 000 €/ha in 
Germany to about 2 000 €/ha in Poland and 
Lithuania. Rent fees also range across the 
countries, although the scope of deviance is 
smaller.  
Land is valued at two distinctly different 
levels in the old and the new member states. 
Cheap land gives cost advantage and pro-
vides farmers in the new member states 
with opportunity to expand their farms. Due 
to the large difference between old and new 
member states, upon the EU enlargement 
in 2004 nearly all acceding countries set a 
moratorium on land purchase by foreigners. 
The transition period lasted until 2011 but 
several countries applied for an extension 
e.g. the moratorium will end in 2014 in 
Lithuania and 2016 in Poland. Land prices 
and land rent fees may vary significantly 
within the same country and even within the 
same micro-region due to the different level 
of competition for land including crop and 
other livestock farms and industry. 
Feeds, seeds and 
chemicals make up most 
of the variable costs for 
milk farms.
Agricultural input 
suppliers provide milk 
farms  with a wide range 
of products and services.
19
2.2 Milk production
2.2.1 Milk farm structure
Milk farm structure is a key factor that deter-
mines the effective management of the dairy 
supply chain. It is obvious by the number of 
contracts, the management of commodity 
and information flows, that a fragmented 
farm structure inevitably increases the 
transaction costs in the chain, while a con-
centrated one decreases them. Dairy com-
panies attempt to minimize their transaction 
costs by shifting their group of suppliers to 
larger units wherever it is feasible. Although 
it is hard to estimate the exact sum of these 
transaction costs, the Lithuanian dairies’ 
case gives a rough estimate: the transaction 
costs have to be higher for a truckload of milk 
to collect from the scattered small farms in 
Lithuania than to get it 500 kilometres away 
from one big farm in Estonia. 
The evolution of the milk farm structure, 
the pace of concentration and the share of 
large-scale farms in production are factors 
that contribute notably to the performance 
of the chain. In other words they form a bot-
tleneck or a serious impediment to growth 
for the rest of the chain, however produc-
tive and efficient the other segments may 
be.   
Milk sectors around the Baltic Sea show 
a diverse picture. The eight countries can be 
classified into three typical groups based on 
their dairy farm structure in 2012:
1. dominance of large-scale farms 
(Denmark and Estonia), 
2. dominance of mid-scale farms 
(Germany, Sweden and Finland), 
3. dominance of small-scale farms 
(Latvia, Lithuania and Poland).
Despite similar farm structures in 
Denmark and Estonia, milk farms in the two 
countries have followed distinctly different 
evolutionary routes to arrive to the current 
structure. The starting point for the Danish 
milk sector was a family farm oriented 
structure: 57  % of the cows were held in 
middle-sized farms with 10-50 cows in 1990. 
Since then an extraordinary process of farm 
concentration has taken place, with which 
no other European milk sector has kept 
pace. By 2010, the share of aforementioned 
middle-sized farms shrank to just below 3 %, 
whereas 85 % of the cows were in units of 
over 100 cows.  
The Danish restructuring story is a 
unique one. The most spectacular phase 
of growth for the large farms dates back to 
the years between 2000 and 2007, a time 
of economic boom. Farm structure had 
also concentrated in the other agricultural 
sectors by that time, which created an 
acute demand for land and capital, as both 
production factors are needed for expan-
sion. Land prices rocketed, but the banking 
sector did not impede the process. In the 
contrary, banks offered ever bigger loans 
to expanding dairy farmers. With the 2009 
recession, the land price bubble eventually 
burst bringing hundreds of dairy farms to 
the verge of bankruptcy. Banks, once so 
keen to offer big loans to farmers, have 
now put credits on ice. Some small regional 
banks went bankrupt. 
Currently it is extremely hard for dairy 
farmers to get access to any kinds of loans. 
The Danish milk production dominated by 
large-scale farms roars and production has 
increased every year. However, the balance 
is very delicate, built upon the low interest 
rates and favourable milk prices. A slightly 
stronger shock in either of these factors 
would instantly trigger a wave of bankrupt-
cies. 
Estonia’s milk sector has a far different 
history, as under the soviet regime Estonian 
farms used to be collectivised into giant pro-
duction units. Once the country regained its 
independence in 1991, Estonia first followed 
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an unusually liberal agricultural policy. The 
country did not opt for politically popular 
decentralising restitutions, instead keeping 
many of the collective farms intact and 
privatising them as large units.  
Despite the fact that the pace of con-
centration in Estonia has been the extreme 
opposite to the Danish one, the outcome 
in terms of farm structure is very similar in 
Denmark and Estonia. In the latter country, 
over 75 % of the dairy cows were on large 
farms (i.e., those with over 100 cows) in 
2010, although Estonian big farms are much 
bigger than their Danish counterparts in the 
same size class. In Estonia numerous dairy 
farms have over 600 cows and the average 
size of large farms in 2010 was 345 cows as 
opposed to 163 cows in Denmark. Another 
difference is the corporate form of the farm, 
which tends to be an agricultural company 
with a few joint owners and managers in 
Estonia. In Denmark most farms are still 
managed or directed by a family or a single 
person, even though the farm might operate 
in a corporate form and employ several 
workers.  
 Milk production structure is dominated 
by mid-scale farms in Germany, Sweden and 
Finland as a result of several decades of his-
toric development. A gradual shift occurred 
from the dominance of small-scale farms to 
a more mid-scale farm dominated structure 
as family farms started to expand in the 
1960s and 1970s. The concentration pro-
cess has accelerated since the 1990s. It has 
been reinforced by the EU membership for 
Finland and Sweden since 1995.  
Despite a similar dominance of mid-
scale family farms, the three countries have 
followed paths of structural development 
at different paces, and have achieved, as 
a result, different levels of concentration. 
Although average farm size has grown rap-
idly due to the expansion of farms in recent 
years, the dairy farm structure in Finland 
was still dominated by farms with 10 to 
50 cows in 2010: those farms accounted 
for 70  % of all dairy cows. Sweden joined 
the EU in 1995 with a milk farm structure 
similar to that of Finland in 2010, so the 
Swedish concentration process has been 
about fifteen years ahead and has reached 
a higher stage. By 2010 already 73  % of 
cows were held in farms with over 50 cows 
in Sweden.  
Germany is a special case of regional 
discrepancies concerning milk farm struc-
ture. First, milk production has been region-
ally concentrated into two distinct areas in 
the North-West and South of Germany. This 
regional specialisation is illustrated by the 
special allocation of cows among the feder-
al republics. North-West Germany, includ-
ing Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westfalen 
and Schleswig-Holstein, accounts for 
36.7 % of the dairy cows, while Bayern and 
Baden-Württemberg in the South account 
for 38.4 %. Altogether three-quarters of all 
Danish milk farms have invested a lot into farm expansion in the 2000s. The average farm size reached 163 
dairy cows in 2013.
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dairy cows in Germany are kept in only five 
republics.
As far as the milk structure is concerned 
there is a remarkable difference in Southern 
and North-West Germany. Milk farms are 
middle-sized family operations in the South. 
The structure has changed rather slowly, so 
that the concentration level is close to that 
of Finland. As an example 63 % of the cows 
were in farms with 10 to 50 cows in Bayern, 
the largest milk producing republic in 2010. 
North-West German republics have concen-
trated at a much higher pace. The region 
belongs to the quickly developing milk 
belt. The proximity of the Netherlands and 
Figure 6. Milk farm structure in Germany by federal states, 2010.
Source of data: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 3, Reihe 2.1.3 
Denmark, where a striv-
ing entrepreneurship 
attitude in milk farming 
has driven expansion 
for the past fifteen 
years, has definitely 
had a high impact on 
the willingness to invest 
in the North-West re-
publics of Germany. This 
area – the Netherlands, 
North-West Germany 
and Denmark – also 
has powerful dairy 
companies with large 
economies of scales, 
which is another driv-
ing factor for rapid 
concentration in milk 
farming.  
The middle republics 
of Western-Germany 
have a much smaller 
share of the country’s 
milk production and their 
farm structure represent 
a transition between 
the North-Western and 
Southern German milk 
farm structures.  
The milk farm struc-
ture in Eastern-German 
is an interesting case 
of its own. Altogether the five republics had 
less than a fifth of all dairy cows in Germany 
in 2010, but the farm structure is extremely 
concentrated: over 90  % of the cows are 
kept in farms with over 100 cows and over 
40 % of the cows are in huge farms with over 
500 cows. The structure was inherited from 
the previous regime. Prior to the unification, 
East-German dairy farming units were not 
split into pieces but preserved intact just like 
in Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The farms continued primarily in a corporate 
form on their inherited premises with the 
existing assets, but they were bought by 
private investors who have brought sub-
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stantial capital to modernise some of the 
facilities. 
The milk farm structure in Poland, 
Lithuania and Latvia are still dominated 
by small-scale farms. The Baltic countries 
inherited a large-scale farm structure from 
the previous regime: at the turn of 1980s 
and 1990s over two-thirds of the milk in that 
region originated from large state- or coop-
erative farms. While in Estonia, the majority 
of large farms were directly transferred into 
private ownership, and only some of the 
farms were divided into smaller pieces, in 
Latvia and Lithuania the land restitution 
reforms put a priority on small-scale family 
farms, which resulted in a fragmented farm 
structure: by the mid 1990s the majority of 
dairy farms had 1-2 cows. Less than 50 % of 
these subsistence farms delivered some milk 
to dairy processing companies.  
Milk farms have concentrated into larger 
units over the recent years. The growth of 
farms has been fast primarily in Latvia and 
Lithuania, where the farm structure used to 
be rather fragmented. As late as in 1998 
farms with over 10 cows accounted for 
only 14  % of the dairy cows in Lithuania 
and 25 % in Latvia. By 2010, these middle 
and large-scale farms accounted for 43  % 
of all dairy cows in Lithuania and 55 % in 
Latvia. Expanding and strengthening mid- 
and large-scale farms take over the market 
shares of thousands of exiting 1-2 cow farms 
every year. Yet, the concentration process 
lags far behind that in other countries in 
Northern Europe, and any catching up will 
take a long time due to the initial fragment-
ed structure. 
Polish farms have never been subject 
to forced collectivisation as they remained 
family based even under the previous 
regime. A deeply fragmented farm struc-
ture characterised much of Poland with 
the exception of some regions in the north 
and west where plenty of large farms also 
emerged. In the 1990s the milk farm struc-
ture was very similar to that of Lithuania 
and Latvia, but the development paths were 
different. While in Poland fragmentation was 
a heritage of the earlier decades, in the two 
Baltic countries it was achieved through a 
quick disaggregation of the former large 
collective farms.  
Thousand of milk farms still have less than 10 cows in the Baltic countries. Milk production has contributed to 
home supply and income generation in the rural areas, where employment prospects remained scarce.
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Milk farms in several countries have resource buffers, or additional resources which 
are attached to the farms but not directly associated with milk production. Some 
of these resources are potentially available when the financial or economic con-
ditions of the farms necessitate it. Hence, in Poland, milk farms occasionally use 
those extra resources to extend their activities to include meat production. In the 
new EU member states, the farm can often draw on the workforce provided by 
additional family members or relatives. For Swedish and Finnish milk farms, an 
economic buffer has been provided by the forests located on the farms.  
The buffer opportunity mobilised by German milk farms, however, is probably the 
most unique and attractive in this comparison as it is a source of secure, stable and 
long term additional income. Germany’s strategic objectives to increase the share of 
renewable resources in energy production and eliminate the use of nuclear power by 
year 2022 (Breidthardt 2011) have drawn milk farmers to energy production since the 
early 2000s. The economic terms of energy production have been very favourable and, 
as a result, farmers have invested into electricity production units. Electricity is usually 
produced on farms by separate legal entities (i.e., firms), so the resulting income and 
related investments do not appear in the bookkeeping of the farm. 
Biogas production is convenient to attach to a dairy farm, because it utilises manure 
and biomass, both of which are readily available on farms. In the biogas production units, 
manure is mixed with green maize or alternatively sugar beet, and the mixture is heated 
to generate methane gas. Electric power, the final product, is derived by burning the gas 
in an engine attached to a generator. The heat can be used again in the process or for 
heating buildings or drying grain. 
The most usual biogas stations produce 100-500 kw/hour and include one to four 
tanks. There are some bigger stations with the capacity of 2000 kw/hour. These can be 
found e.g. in large farms in Eastern Germany because they require a bigger investment 
and need much more manure and biomass.  
Another type of investment into renewable energy has been solar panels. This invest-
ment does not need much space and is scalable by varying the number of panels. The 
roofs of milk sheds have provided a natural place for the solar modules, and in some 
cases of farm expansion, considerations linked to solar panels have been determinant in 
the choice of the spatial organisation (e.g., direction) of the new buildings.  
An investment of about 150-200 solar panels can produce a daily amount of electric-
ity ranging from 10 kW on a rainy day to as much as 150 kW on a sunny day. Farmers 
have taken advantage of the discounts that they get as a business for the bulk use of 
electricity and the feed-in tariffs paid for the produced energy. In the beginning, when 
feed-in tariffs were introduced in 2000, a generous rate of 51 euro cents was paid for 
a kWh, which was reduced to 41 cents by 2009, and even 
much more after 2011. Currently it 
Text box: 
Renewable energy production on German milk farms
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ranges between 10 and 15 cents 
depending on the size of the estab-
lishment. Feed-in tariffs are fixed 
for 20 years and depend on the 
investment year. The first ones to 
invest into solar energy achieved 
the highest profits, but investment 
costs were also the highest for them. 
Solar panel manufacturers enjoyed 
extremely high prices in the early 
2000s, but they faced financial 
problems later on as feed-in tariffs 
substantially decreased and competition for new investments intensified. Some of the 
solar panel manufacturers have even gone bankrupt or are on the verge of bankruptcy.  
Feed-in tariffs were also reduced for biogas plants, albeit not as radically. Biogas in-
vestments suffer from the high prices of green maize silage, due to an increase in demand 
from milk farms and biogas establishments, especially in North-Western Germany. This, in 
turn, has induced competition for land. In specific areas rent fees for land went up in 10 
years from 350 €/ha to 1000 €/ha and the purchase price of good quality land doubled 
from 20 000 €/ha to 40 000 €/ha over the past four years. Due to the activities of biogas 
plants, maize silage has also become a cash crop. The price in 2013 was about 45-50 €/
ton harvested or 33-35 €/tons on field.  
The third most popular type of renewable energy investment is wind turbines. Windmills 
still represent a profitable investment. They have to be located to a certain distance from 
populated area for safety reasons and because of the noise pollution that they generate. 
Nowadays it is more and more difficult to get permission for installing new windmills, 
because of stringent regulations and the lack of suitable locations. Windmills are located 
mainly in the Northern and Central parts of Germany, where there are wide unpopulated 
areas and the wind conditions are suitable. This, however, also creates a challenge for 
the grid due to the distance to the largest end users, i.e. the industrial regions. As of June 
2013, there were over 23.2 thousand wind turbines in Germany providing about 8 % of 
national electricity consumption. Some farmers have invested into their own turbines, 
but most typically they lease their land to large wind power farms.  
Energy policy and development of renewable energy are important factors determin-
ing the economic well being of German farms. Farmers have set up wind, solar energy or 
biogas production units. About 20-30 % of the farms are estimated to have installed at 
least one form of renewable energy production recently. The electricity producing units 
are regarded as secure investments for farmers. The government guarantees the price 
for the electricity paid to farmers for 20 years. Eventually 
end users, i.e. consumers, pay the subsidies in the 
form of high electricity prices. Even 
though feed-in tariffs have recently 
declined, renewable energy 
investments will support 
German farmers financially 
for years ahead.  
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In Poland large-scale farms with over 
100 cows have long accounted for only 
5  % of the dairy cows, which was due to 
the coexistence of previously state-owned 
large farms and small family farms. The 
concentration process started around the 
turn of the millennium with the expansion of 
thousands of tiny farms from a few cows to 
10 to 20 cows. Many of these farms started 
a second expansion by the end of the 2000s, 
when the share of cows in the farm size of 20 
to 50 cows was already 30 %. Fifteen years 
ago this farm size category was practically 
non-existent in Poland.  
The countries in the comparison feature 
different history of milk farm structure 
development prior to the 1990s. History 
largely determined developments for the 
past two decades. Farm structure is mostly 
the outcome of a long and gradual devel-
opment, although some radical and rapid 
changes have been seen in some countries 
such as Denmark or the decentralisation 
in Latvia and Lithuania. One feature is 
the same throughout the entire region: 
milk farm structure has concentrated 
and average milk farm size has increased 
everywhere. Productivity development and 
the preferences of dairy companies have 
constantly driven the expansion of viable 
milk farms and the elimination of smaller 
ones.  
2.2.2 Milk supply
No matter how competitive the dairy indus-
try is, a shortage of milk supply creates a se-
rious bottleneck for even the best dairy com-
panies. Therefore, the access to sufficient 
high quality raw material is a key issue and 
a fundamental indicator with regards to the 
competitiveness of the entire dairy supply 
chain. Milk production volumes manifest the 
effects of numerous factors, both quantita-
tive and qualitative. These factors explain 
Milk farms in Poland are predominantly in family ownership. Milk production is geographically concentrated in 
the central and north-western provinces.
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Figure 7. Profitability ratio of milk farms around the Baltic Sea.
Source: European Commission, FADN database.
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the downward or upward trends of national 
milk production, which will be analysed in 
more detail in Section 5.1. These same fac-
tors explain the farmers’ motivation to con-
tinue, expand or quit their activity. 
(1) Economic viability of dairy farms 
Profitability results suggest stronger vi-
ability for dairy farms in the new member 
states than in the old ones. The profitability 
ratio in Figure 7 also takes into account the 
farmers own labour cost and the interest 
rate demand on the farmers own invested 
capital. A particular farm reaches the 
breakeven point when the ratio is 1, in 
other words the farmer gets a salary which 
equals the wage rate paid to the external 
labour force and gets the return on invested 
capital based on the average interest rate 
on the market. All costs are covered by farm 
income when the ratio is 1. Real profitability 
starts above the value of one. 
Milk farms on average achieved good or 
reasonable profitability in the new member 
states Estonian and Lithuanian farms 
performing the best, whereas the ratios 
remained between 0 and 1 for milk farms 
in the old member states. This is not sur-
prising considering the fact that especially 
Lithuanian, Latvian and Polish farms use 
much less external labour force and pur-
chased feed than their counterparts in the 
old member states. Even when their own 
labour and capital input is taken into con-
sideration the level of those costs are much 
lower. Therefore this comparison does not 
facilitate far reaching conclusions in terms 
of economic viability. 
Nevertheless, Figure 7 verifies two inter-
esting facts concerning the financial perfor-
mance of milk farms. One is the detrimental 
effect of the low milk prices throughout 
Europe in 2009. It hit all farms around the 
Baltic Sea equally. Second, the severely 
indebted Danish milk farms are very vulner-
able to changes in the world market, milk 
price or interest rates, a fact very visible in 
the Danish curve between 2008 and 2010. 
(See also Text box on Denmark on page 110). 
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(2) Milk farm concentration and farm 
expansion
A growing proportion of milk production 
tends to be in the hands of expanding 
farms as farm structure has concentrated 
in all countries. Conditions for the conti-
nuity and growth of milk production such 
as generational take-over programs, the 
threshold for new entries into dairying, 
access to loans for investment or various 
subsidies are of utmost importance in 
motivating farmers to continue pro-
duction in ever growing units. 
 
(3) Openness for new technologies 
Farmers’ adaption rate of new technology 
is first of all a function of their financial 
abilities and their attitude. Financial abilities 
encompass their income levels both from 
the market and subsidies and an access to 
external financing. Modernisation implies 
investments to largely different equipment 
for farmers in various stages of technical 
status and development. For small Baltic 
and Polish farmers investments into proper 
milking and cooling equipment was a great 
technology heap in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, whereas at the same time in 
Denmark and elsewhere in the old member 
states the installation of milking robots 
were considered one of the next steps of 
technology modernisation. 
(4) Well-being and perseverance at work 
Dairy farming, a work which ties up farmers 
for seven days a week and 365 days a year 
demands a lot of persistence (stamina). 
This special “life-style” keeps the farmer 
on continued alert due to animal health 
issues, calving and overall responsibility 
etc. It involves early morning and evening 
shifts all year round, wearing out a person 
both mentally and physically. This burden is 
heaviest for farmers with herds of under 60 
dairy cows. They still cannot afford to hire 
external workers, the workload is heavy and 
continuous with no or very short breaks. In 
most of the countries farmers even have to 
finance replacing caretakers on their own, 
should they wish to take holidays. Even if 
several family members are engaged in the 
farm, it does not help to have a family vaca-
tion. The farm interviews revealed that most 
farmers in the small and middle-scale cat-
egory suffer from this permanent workload 
stress regardless of the country.  
Well-being and perseverance at work 
is not paid as much attention as it would 
deserve due to its crucial influence on 
milk farm structural changes and the 
continuity of milk production. Particularly 
in those countries where small and medi-
um-scale farms account for a dominant 
part of the production, there is a constant 
risk that the share of aging, quitting and 
exhausted farmers is not entirely compen-
sated by the expanding production of the 
young ambitious investing farmers. If in 
a certain country the production volume 
of quitting farms is not exceeding or at 
least taken over by expanding ones, the 
domestic milk production inevitably turns 
to a decline. 
The size of the farm is crucial in deter-
mining farmers’ persistence. Once the farm 
has jumped over 80-100 cows – depending 
on the country – it starts employing exter-
nal labour force. Thus the workload of the 
farmer levels off and a division of labour 
alleviates the constant physical demands of 
the farm. 
(5) Management skills
 
Farm expansion over the critical limit 
may ease the alert on farm and improve 
well-being and the quality of life in terms 
of free-time, but it sheds a great deal of 
increased responsibility on the farmer. A 
large farm calls for the high competence of 
complex management skills including busi-
ness, marketing, technology and agronomy. 
As one of the Danish farmers expressed it 
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“the growth of requirements from driving a 
tractor to be a general manager of a big 
thriving business is tremendous”.  
It may be puzzling that the economic per-
formance of farms in the same region with 
the same size and same conditions for pro-
duction can differ a lot. One example is the 
restructured state farms in the Baltic States, 
of which some survived and succeeded in 
the market but many went bankrupt. Since 
their fixed assets, land, herd size and genet-
ic material did not show notable differences, 
management is the single most important 
explanatory factor for their different destiny. 
Competence was identified as one of the 
success factors for dairy farms in several 
countries (de Lauwere 2014).  
Within specific local areas positive ex-
amples of successful farm expansions and 
well functioning networks of dairy farms 
can motivate young farmers to invest am-
bitiously into dairy farming. A positive and 
inspiring business environment for dair-
ying is the outcome of numerous factors 
among which the attitude of municipality 
authorities, local advisors, new develop-
ment projects and own initiatives of the 
farmers play important role. As a result, 
business activity and farming enthusiasm 
may be of substantially different level even 
across neighbouring micro-regions, a fact 
illustrated among others by the examples 
of Jönköping in Sweden (Olsson 2010) or 
the Savo region in Finland (Ovaska et. al, 
2004).   
In all countries the financial indicators of 
the worst and best 25 % of the large farm 
size category show large differences. A 
part of this divergence can be attributed to 
recent investments and indebtedness, but 
management skills again explain much of 
the differences.  
 The management requirements at 
a 20-cow farm in the 1990s also differ 
considerably from the requirements of a 
140-cow farm today and in the future. The 
infrastructure of education and advisory 
services plays a key role in providing farm-
ers and the managing directors of the ever 
growing companies with all the necessary 
competence for the successful operation 
of a milk farm business. The supporting 
infrastructure is an important element 
contributing to the competitiveness of milk 
farms, albeit one that is hard to quantify. It 
is not the number of business schools or 
staff of advisory services that counts, but 
the quality of education and support, which 
itself has to be constantly upgraded and 
renewed according to changing needs. It is 
also hard to quantify what part an educa-
tional and advisory support system plays in 
the survival of individual milk farms, but it is 
clear that a well-designed and high quality 
network of support improves the chances of 
successful businesses. 
Whiteboard showing the work 
allocation in a large Danish farm. 
Work is organised and allocated 
among the employees for a 
week in advance in a meeting. 
Assignments can be checked later 
on any time in the meeting room. 
Organising human resources is 
one of the crucial management 
responsibilities of owners in the 
enlarged farms.
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2.2.3 Raw milk trade and milk prices
Since the early 1990s Polish, Lithuanian and 
Latvian processors have coped with the addi-
tional costs attributed to the small amounts 
and heterogeneous quality of milk collected 
from small farms. In the late 1990s over 78 % 
of dairy cows were kept in farms of under 
10 cows in Latvia, while the corresponding 
figure was 85  % for Poland and Lithuania. 
Dairy companies overcame the challenge of 
sourcing milk from tens of thousands of minor 
farms by establishing a two-stage procure-
ment system. Milk collection stations were 
set up in the villages and municipal centres 
with cooling and storage equipment. Small 
farms used to take their milk to these collec-
tion points, from which dairy companies col-
lected the milk in larger quantity. 
Processors were reluctant to bear the 
additional costs of the fragmented structure 
of suppliers and they passed on these ex-
penses to the small milk farms in the form 
of lower milk prices. This pricing policy of 
processors explains the low milk price level 
in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. What the 
price curves do not reveal, though, is the 
discrepant price range paid to small and 
large suppliers. Over the years, the price 
paid to small producers could be as much 
as 20-30 % lower than average, while the 
price paid to large-scale producers could be 
notably higher than average.  
Processors are eager to buy milk particu-
larly from large farms in order to ensure large 
shipments and homogenous high quality. 
Given the fragmented milk farm structure in 
the three countries and the fierce competi-
tion for milk produced in large-scale farms, 
cross border trade of milk exploded a few 
years after the countries joined the common 
EU market in 2004. 
Three drivers have emerged for cross 
border trade of milk: (1) seasonal balance of 
supply (2) price differences (3) milk flowing 
from big farms to dairies in other countries, 
where local milk farm structure is more frag-
mented. Examples for the latter two reasons 
are exports from the Czech Republic to 
Germany, from Estonia to Lithuania or from 
a number of Central European countries 
(Hungary, Germany, Austria, Slovenia) to 
Italy. 
Cross border trade has always existed 
among the old member states prior to the 
EU enlargement. Companies located close 
to the border occasionally sourced some of 
their raw material from the neighbour coun-
tries in order to balance seasonal shortage 
in their supply. Germany has long had a spot 
market of about one to 1.5 million tons which 
is freely traded on the domestic market and 
part of it finally exported.  
A special case of cross border trade 
is Denmark, where Arla – having subsidi-
aries and cooperative farm members in 
Germany and Sweden – exports and im-
ports milk within the company to respond 
promptly to the needs of its production 
plants.  
It was however the EU’s eastern enlarge-
ment that made the trade of milk rocket both 
between the new and old member states 
and among the new members. Differences 
in milk prices have been the main driving 
force. The price level in the Baltic States 
and Poland was hardly half of that in the 
Nordic countries and Germany in 2003, 
before the EU accession of the first group of 
countries.  
Prices in the new members raised 
rapidly upon accession, and have followed 
the fluctuations of the EU average ever 
since. Yet, there remained a 15-30  % gap 
between the Polish and Baltic prices and 
the EU average up until now. Over the past 
two years Estonian milk price level has 
approached the EU average, pointing to the 
fact that the main reason for lower prices 
in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland can still be 
explained with their fragmented farm struc-
ture.  
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On average milk prices in the EU-10 new 
member states have been 10-15  % lower 
than prices in the EU-15. Price differences 
also apply to those countries, where most 
of the milk is produced in large-scale farms 
such as Czech Republic, Slovakia or Hungary. 
The constant price difference suggests the 
long term prevalence of cost advantages 
in the milk production of the new member 
states. Labour, land and own feed are some 
of the main inputs of production giving cost 
advantage compared to the old member 
states.  
 Throughout the ten years of price devel-
opment, Germany’s milk prices went hand 
in hand with the EU average. It is not sur-
prising, since the country is a price maker 
with its substantial weight in production, it 
accounted for over 21 % of collected cows’ 
milk in the EU in 2012. The German dairy 
sector is also sensitive to changes in the 
world market price since it contributes more 
than 15  % of the EU dairy export to third 
countries.  
The higher milk price levels in Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland are attributable to 
the cooperative ownership of the largest 
dairy companies in these countries. Arla, 
the largest dairy in Denmark and Sweden 
had to adjust its procurement prices to the 
prices prevailing in Germany, the UK and 
the Netherlands, since the company has 
thousands of farm members in those coun-
tries and it follows the cooperative principle 
of offering the same price to all members. 
Valio has members only in Finland, which 
allows the company to set procurement 
prices in line with the interests of its 
owners.  
Wijnands et. al (2007) found that the 
price of raw material is an essential element 
to determine the competitiveness of the 
food industries. Milk can form 30 to 60 % of 
a dairy industry’s expenses, so even small 
deviation in price will have a great effect 
on the companies’ costs and, eventually, 
profitability.  
2.3 Dairy industry
Dairy industry is a key segment in the chain, 
since the ultimate international competition 
is fought with processed dairy products. The 
competitiveness of a country’s dairy indus-
try is determined by the industry structure, 
the number, size and distribution of the 
companies, the ownership structure and the 
cost level of production resources.  
Additionally, competitiveness is deter-
mined by a number of other factors, which 
Raw milk can be transported hundreds of kilometers over the borders in Europe. 
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are more difficult to quantify. These are the 
general business culture, the management 
of the dairy companies, consumption pat-
terns and consumers’ attitude to domesti-
cally produced dairy products. The society’s 
attitude to the dairy chain is decisive- for in-
stance, a broad consensus prevails in sever-
al countries that the dairy sector is the most 
important or at least a very significant part 
of the food chain due to its export earnings 
and multiplier effects in the economy. Such 
a consensus may involve politics, the media 
and public opinion in general, which forms a 
basis for psychological and – if need be – fi-
nancial support to the dairy chain.  
The competitiveness of dairy industry 
can be detected in its market performance 
on two major “battle fields”, the domestic 
and export markets. Maintaining market 
positions on the domestic market may be 
regarded as a sign of successful competi-
tion against imports concerning prices and 
product assortment. Usually the bigger the 
domestic market the better preconditions it 
grants to companies to achieve adequate 
size and financial strength for the interna-
tional arena. For dairy manufacturers oper-
ating in smaller countries a constant strive 
for growth and critical mass of production 
will result in forceful industry concentra-
tion or expansion over the national bor-
ders. 
Countries around the Baltic Sea have 
rather stagnant dairy markets. They are 
especially mature in the old member states 
and in the new ones consumption growth 
was cut by the 2009 global crisis. Therefore, 
dairy manufacturers have had to seek 
growth in export markets. The eight coun-
tries’ dairy industries represented 29 % in 
the combined sales revenues of the EU dairy 
industry in the first years of 2000s.4 This 
share had risen to over 32 % by 2011, which 
gives a strong indication of the growing 
significance of the sector from a European 
perspective. 
Dairy chains in the eight countries differ 
from each other in many respects. Market 
structure tends to be more concentrated 
in the smaller countries’ dairy industries. 
Economic performance in individual coun-
tries is a function of costs related to raw 
material purchases (milk prices, milk farm 
structure, logistics) and other costs of op-
eration (labour, energy etc.). Costs of the 
major production resources differ substan-
tially in the eight countries.  
Ownership and vertical integration are 
also factors that influence the functioning 
of the chain. Despite several differences 
among these countries’ dairy industries, 
one characteristic is apparently common 
in Northern Europe: the noticeable share of 
cooperative-based processing capacity in 
the dairy industry. It is based on a century 
long tradition in Germany and in the Nordic 
countries. The milk farmers’ cooperative 
movement has strengthened considerably 
in the Baltic States in recent years, which 
leads to strong endeavours to build own 
processing capacity in all three countries 
(see more details in the country sections of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
Apart from industry structures, own-
ership and costs, economic success is 
determined by the sales performance of 
the dairy industry including marketing and 
management, business relations, both do-
mestically and abroad, and the goodwill of 
manufacturing companies.  
Dairy products are basic foodstuffs 
forming an important part of everyday con-
sumption. Dairy manufacturers can have 
two distinctly different lines of production, 
one is the group of conventional products, 
such as regular liquid milk, butter, basic 
cheese types and fermented products, while 
the other extreme is highly processed, high 
4 Shares were calculated by using nominal dairy industry sales revenues of 27 EU members, Romania and Bulgaria 
were included retrospectively to the EU aggregate prior to 2007.   
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2.4 Food wholesale and retail
Wholesale and retail companies have inter-
nationalised and concentrated rapidly over 
the past two decades. The significance of 
specialised wholesaling has declined as the 
leading retail companies tend to integrate 
wholesale and distribution activities into 
their chains all around Europe. At the same 
time the regular clientele of traditional spe-
cialised wholesalers, the individual shops 
or small local chains have quickly lost their 
share. Therefore, wholesale companies have 
shifted their emphasis to the Horeca sector, 
which still feature a suitably fragmented 
structure of individual actors.  
Retailers have gained more market power 
in nearly all European countries as the sector 
has more concentrated. Foreign chains es-
tablished their network in the neighbouring 
countries as early as in the 1970s. The 
volumes of foreign direct investments have 
multiplied in the retail sector since the 
beginning of 1990s. The main reason was a 
rush of Western-European chains to conquer 
the Central and Eastern European retail mar-
kets. At the same time, investments among 
Western-European countries also intensi-
fied. Cross border investments lead to the 
emergence of pan-European corporations, 
which operate retail chains in numerous 
countries.  
The other evidence of increased power of 
retailers is the strategic purchase alliances. 
These have been formed by various retail 
chains from different countries to facilitate 
higher volumes of the same product and 
lower prices from the suppliers. 
The recent economic recession has low-
ered the income of consumers since 2008. 
This megatrend has favoured and accelerat-
ed two trends, both of which in fact started 
decades ago: the progress of discount store 
chains and retailers’ private labels. Both 
have gained increasing popularity by offer-
ing the price sensitive consumers cheaper 
product alternatives. The recent march 
of the discount chains can be observed in 
many countries and is well reflected in the 
boosting sales figures. The discount store 
concept originates from Germany, and as 
the leading concerns have spread across 
Europe competitors responded with set-
ting up their own corresponding discount 
chains. 
Private label has also existed long 
before but the consumers’ lower income 
in the recession years apparently gave it a 
strong impetus. The growth is particularly 
well observed in the dairy product group in 
several countries in this comparison. Many 
dairy manufacturers consider private labels 
a threat, because they directly compete 
with industrial brands. Other suppliers see 
private labels as an opportunity. It is a fact 
that contract conditions of private label 
products are more strictly dictated and 
controlled by the retailers. It also involves a 
constant risk of discontinuation for the sup-
plier. Private label production can be an ap-
propriate strategy for dairy manufacturers 
with a cost effective strategy and/or high 
economies of scales and conventional bulk 
products. Most recently, though, retailers 
have expanded the range of private label to 
higher processed or special dairy products, 
such as organic, lactose-free or functional 
goods.  
value added products such as drinking milk 
and fermented products with functional 
characteristics, spreads, various processed 
cheese, quark and desserts. The latter 
group involves constantly new flavours, 
added nutrients, vitamins, minerals, fibre or 
protein, lactose free production etc. As re-
flected in their product mix, dairy manufac-
turers may follow different strategies, either 
a cost-effective production or a value-adding 
strategy.  
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 360 295 453 379 416 401 420 498 495 ..
Sales (billion EUR) 23.6 24.0 23.0 22.4 27.8 27.8 22.0 23.2 25.6 25.4a
Gross operating surplus 
(million EUR)
1 054 1 216 1 046 1 059 884 825 887 777 .. ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)
44.9 41.8 39.3 37.2 39.8 38.9 36.2 36.5 37.1a 37.3a
Processed milkb 
(billion kg)
27.5 26.8 27.3 26.9 27.4 27.9 28.0 29.5 30.3 30.3
Table 2. Main indicators of the German dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Statistisches Bundesamt; b Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade. 
2.5 Country reviews
2.5.1 Germany
In the previous sections of Chapter 2 we 
have reviewed the general characteristics 
of the milk supply chain segments around 
the Baltic Sea. Milk production including 
milk farm structure development, prices 
and the foreign trade of raw milk were pre-
sented by using plenty of country specific 
examples. In the following country reviews 
the special characteristics of the dairy 
industry and retail sector, their market 
structure with the leading actors, their re-
lations to the other segments in the chain 
are discussed in more detail. 
The German dairy industry is the biggest 
in Europe with sales revenues exceeding 
25 billion EUR. Geographically it is concen-
trated into two distinct areas following the 
regional distribution of milk production. The 
North-Western cooperative-based dairies 
usually feature high processing volumes 
but deliver low-price, standard products 
e.g. UHT milk, cheap standard cheese. The 
Bavarian dairies are often owned by pri-
vate persons or families. They more often 
manufacture and export branded products 
of higher price, a wide range of cheeses 
such as ripened moulded or other special 
cheeses. Their suppliers, the Bavarian milk 
farms, have higher costs (Jürgens et. al. 
2013), smaller farm size and the average 
dairy processing factory size is also smaller 
in Southern Germany than in the North of 
the country. 
The structure of the industry is rather 
fragmented which is due to historic reasons 
and the vast domestic markets. Although 
the number of dairy manufacturers de-
creased sharply over the past decades, the 
concentration in the industry did not change 
significantly in the 2000s as the largest four 
companies accounted for about one fourth of 
the sales revenues in the market. 
Perceptible consolidation started as late 
as 2010 with a merger between Nordmilch 
and Humana Milchunion resulting in the 
cooperative Deutsches Milchkontor (DMK). 
Around 10 000 member farms from the seven 
39
federal regions in North-Germany supply over 
6 billion kilos of milk to DMK.  
The second case of consolidation is the 
market expansion of Arla through a series of 
acquisitions. Since 2011 the Danish-Swedish 
dairy has acquired Hansa Milch, Allgäuland-
Käsereien and Milchunion Hocheifel making 
it at once the second largest dairy group 
on the German market. Arla has approved 
about two-thirds of the German suppliers as 
full cooperative members. The rest of the 
farmers are regular suppliers mostly located 
in the south. 
There are four companies offering the full 
spectrum of consumer dairy products: DMK, 
Müller, Arla and Bayerische Milchindustrie 
(BMI), the rest of the companies usually 
have some sort of specialisation such as 
cheese or fermented products. Liquid milk 
is the product group excluded from the spe-
cialised companies’ assortment. 
Consolidation in the German dairy 
industry has proceeded slowly compared 
to what has happened in many other 
European countries (Weindlmaier 2012b). 
Foreign direct investment, a factor which 
has driven dairy industry consolidation in 
several countries, have had – at least until 
recently – limited influence in Germany. In 
such a huge market only the global leaders 
of the dairy industry would be financially 
strong enough to accelerate concentration. 
Yet, competition gets extremely fierce in the 
German dairy industry. Processors often find 
themselves in a cost-price squeeze of milk 
prices and depressed output prices. There is 
 No  Company Sales (million EUR) Milk (million kg)
1 DMK Deutsches Milchkontor 4 600 6 800
2 Arla Foods (MUH, Hansa Milch, Allgäuland) 1 303 2 489
3 Hochwald 1 194 2 047
4 Bayernland 1 146 700
5 Hochland 1 110 483
6 Theo Müller 1 000 2 000
7 Meggle 900 750
8 Zott 815 852
9 Ehrmann 685 465
10 FrieslandCampina Germany 600 700
11 Danone 589 325
12 Fude+Serrahn Milchprodukte 508 300
13 Omira Oberland Milchverwertung 503 952
14 Molkerei Ammerland 491 1 077
15 Bayerische Milchindustrie 481 807
16 Käserei Champignon Hofmeister 480 400
17 Uelzena 442 439
18 Rücker 435 800
19 Frischli Milchwerke 379 735
20 Goldsteig Käsereien Bayerwald 357 735
Table 3. The leading dairy companies in Germany, 2011.
Source: Milchindustrie-Verband, Molkerei Industrie Spezial, IFE.
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a heavy price pressure within the chain from 
the side of retailers and consumers (Sossna, 
2012), so profitability remains modest. This 
factor has probably kept the global dairy 
companies from proceeding with rapid 
megamergers in Germany. 
Consolidation is also challenging for the 
domestic leaders. It is difficult for coopera-
tives to merge, because it should eventually 
result in streamlining and rationalisation, i.e 
reduction in labour force, closure of some 
factories and concentration of the process-
ing capacity in fewer locations.  
Despite the recent mergers and ac-
quisitions of the leading companies, the 
emergence of DMK, and the mergers and 
acquisitions of Arla, the market structure 
is still fragmented. The concentration ratio 
CR4, calculated as the largest four compa-
nies’ share of the industry’ sales revenues, 
reached 32 % in 2011 from 27 % in 2006. 
Currently even the 30 largest compa-
nies account for only about 60  % of the 
dairy industry’s output. Concentration is 
notably higher if measured by shares in 
milk collection: the first four companies 
accounted for 45  % of milk intake in 
2011 (38 % in 2006). This is because the 
largest companies are cooperatives that 
buy all milk from their members, and the 
redundant volumes can always be sold 
further.  
Milk purchase
Dairies tend to ensure the appropriate 
supply of raw materials with supplier con-
tracts. Milk is usually collected within a 
100-150 km radius, but cooperative-based 
companies and privately-owned manufac-
turers have different supply contracting 
practices. The cooperatives usually guar-
antee the purchase of all milk from full 
member farms, and the terms of the supply 
contract are fixed for a period of two years. 
The private dairies enter supply contracts 
whose length can vary from one to five 
years or even 10 years. Most often the 
contract requires exclusivity, i.e. the farmer 
cannot sell his milk to anyone else, and 
contract violations are very rare.  
Farmers are quite loyal and abide to the 
agreement, but switches from one dairy to 
another also occur, especially in regions 
where farmers have several options to 
sell their milk. During the 2008 crisis, 
some farmers left their cooperatives (for 
instance, DMK did not pay a competitive 
price) and redirected their production 
towards private dairy companies. This 
proved to be risky, because some of 
the small private dairy companies went 
bankrupt and farmers eventually had to 
seek a return to the cooperative. Often, 
those farmers were accepted but not as 
DMK's plant in 
Edewecht, North-
Western Germany is 
one of the biggest 
cheese factories 
in Europe. With a 
production capacity 
of over 100 thousand 
tons of cheese, the 
plant processes 1.3 
billion kg of milk 
annually.
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full members, hence playing the role of 
second-class members. 
Price is revised monthly in the contracts. 
In terms of pricing, cooperative and private 
dairies again employ slightly different rou-
tines. Cooperative-based manufacturers 
first sell dairy products and, at the end of 
the period, calculate a related milk price 
applicable in the following month. Hence, 
milk purchase prices are changed based on 
the dairies’ retrospective cash-flow. About 
one third of the cooperatives (among others 
Molkerei Ammerland, FrieslandCampina 
and Arla) also apply a retrospective bonus 
payment on milk. Private companies mon-
itor the price levels of cooperatives and 
use them as reference for their own pricing, 
but they freely negotiate their prices with 
suppliers.
The cooperatives pay the same price to 
all members but private companies usually 
set prices differently for small and large 
milk farms. DMK, although it is a coopera-
tive, also pays a so-called logistic bonus or 
milk collection premium to large farms. In 
Bayern, milk prices have traditionally been 
relatively higher, and privately owned dair-
ies pay more to fragmented farms, which 
usually also have higher costs. In North-
Western Germany milk prices have been 
1-2 euro cents lower, in line with the lower 
costs of milk production in larger farm units.
There are regional differences in the 
frequency of milk collection. In Southern 
Germany milk is collected every day, about 
500-700 kg/day from an average farm, 
while in northern Germany milk is collected 
every second day 1500-2000 kg at a time. 
Southern German farms usually do not have 
extra storage capacity for milk. Regional dif-
ferences prevail also in the milk use struc-
ture: the percentage of production delivered 
to dairies is bigger in the north, where farms 
use milk powder for feeding calves (i.e., in 
the south, farms use more milk for feeding). 
Dairy companies take care of the milk 
collection by themselves with their own 
fleet of trucks. In response to relatively high 
logistics costs and labour costs (including 
salaries and social security payments), 
several dairies have recently outsourced 
milk collection. Their trucks have been sold 
to private entrepreneurs or former drivers. 
As an employer, a truck driver used to work 
eight hours a day, as an entrepreneur the 
working days have often stretched up to 
14 hours. The optimisation and logistics 
planning of milk collection routes is still 
carried out by the dairy company.5 Drivers 
take a milk sample, which is then sent to 
laboratories. 
Laboratory analysis has also been out-
sourced, partly for cost reasons but also to 
avoid conflicts of interest and ensure the ob-
jectivity of the analysis. Farmers like having 
the analysis of fat and protein contents 
carried out by a third party with no stakes in 
the results. Laboratory activities are central-
ly organised in the federal regions, but the 
dairies also accomplish their own analytical 
tests. 
Germany is the biggest milk producer in 
the EU and a peculiarity of the German milk 
chain is a fairly big spot market, which is 
estimated to be between 1 and 1.5 million 
tons annually. The foreign trade of milk con-
stitutes part of this spot market (Table 4).
There are also trading companies spe-
cialised in the purchase and resale of milk. 
The biggest is B.M.G. (Berliner Milcheinfuhr-
Gesellschaft mbH) which collects annually 
about one billion kg of milk and sells it to 
German and foreign dairy companies for 
processing. B.M.G. used to purchase milk 
from Eastern Germany for the consumption 
of West Berlin when Germany was divided, 
and it still entertains good relations with 
big Eastern German milk farms. Meanwhile 
5 Nonetheless, both independent entrepreneurs and dairy companies have to take into account German labour and 
social security legislation which limits the outsourcing of activities to outside entrepreneurs who only pretend to work 
independently.
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Exports 1 115 1 312 1 178 1 196 1 134 1 192 1 122 1 126 1 112 941
Imports 1 303 974 1 096 1 262 1 260 1 618 1 631 1 509 1 648 1 549
Table 4. Germany’s foreign trade of milk, 2003-2012, thousand tons.
 Source: EUROSTAT, foreign trade database.
B.M.G. has also expanded its activities to 
Western Germany. It also maintains good 
relations with the other segments of the 
chain, both upstream and downstream.
Ownership and vertical integration
The majority of dairies are owned by German 
capital, with farmers and other private in-
vestors forming the two biggest groups of 
owners. Cooperatives buy about 62 % of the 
milk produced in Germany (Friedrich 2010). 
The rest is purchased by dairies having 
other corporate forms, (ltd, co or private 
entrepreneurs). Cooperative-based dairies 
tend to be located in Northern and Central 
Germany, while privately owned manufac-
turers are typically situated in Southern 
Germany. The cooperative dairies have 
recently become more professional in their 
management and corporate strategy. They 
have also increased their export revenues 
notably.
The farm cooperative membership 
fee is usually determined as a function of 
yearly milk production. It costs 4¢/kg, so 
for 100  000 kg it is 4  000€. An average 
farm has about 20 000€ capital tied up in 
the cooperative as a membership fee. New 
members or expanding members can pay 
their membership fee in the form of price 
deductions gradually over the years. The 
upper ceiling for capital contribution is one 
million kg or 40 000€.
Foreign ownership has been rather low. 
Two of the global dairy giants Nestle and 
Unilever invested into Germany at the end 
of the 1990s, but left the country after a 
few years having realised the challenges 
on both cost and sales sides. Nestle sold its 
three factories to Hochwald and Unilever to 
Edelweiss. 
Currently there are three big foreign in-
vestors in Germany: Arla (DK/SE), Friesland 
(NL), and Danone (FR). Firesland’s and Arla’s 
investments can be considered only partly 
foreign due to the involvement of German 
farmers into the ownership structure of the 
companies. Altogether foreign companies 
account for about 12  % of milk purchases 
in Germany.
FDI is important because foreign compa-
nies challenge the German dairy manufac-
turers. It is both the size of a factory and the 
combined market shares of the company 
that contributes to competitiveness of the 
industry. The industry is very fragmented 
as a whole, but in certain sub-segments of 
the market, shares are already considerable, 
e.g. 30 % of the fresh cream market is held 
by one company. This type of concentration 
strengthens the negotiating power of dairy 
companies against large retail chains.
Relations to the retail sector
The German dairy industry operates with a 
low profit margin when compared to dairy 
processors in other countries.6 The low prof-
itability of the German dairy industry can 
be explained by the power relations within 
the chain and the structure of the German 
retail sector. Hard discount chains such as 
Lidl, Aldi, Edeka (Plus chain now changed 
6 A proxi for profitability is gross operating surplus shown in the summary tables of national dairy industries. Germany 
has the lowest figures among the eight countries. 
43
to Netto) and Rewe (Penny Market) are 
especially strong in the German food retail. 
Discount chains account for 39 % of German 
food retail, traditional retail chains such as 
hypermarkets account for 24 %, traditional 
supermarkets account for 28  %, and inde-
pendent retailers cover the rest. Aldi and 
Lidl are more or less evenly spread over the 
country and are present in every large and 
medium-sized municipality. Edeka and Rewe 
are present in urban areas but also cover 
the countryside with their units.  
The strongest industry brands of manu-
facturers can be found in Southern Germany, 
mostly in the Bayern 
region. On the other 
hand cooperatives 
are the biggest man-
ufacturers by volume 
and produce the ma-
jority of private label 
products in Germany. 
PL products account 
for approximately 
40-45  % of the 
German dairy sector. 
The contract for PL 
products can be de-
fined for the German 
market or directly 
for Germany plus 
export markets. If 
only a small amount 
of cheese (e.g. one 
small container) is in-
volved, the retailer organises the logistics of 
export, otherwise (e.g., for a full truckload 
of UHT milk), the manufacturer takes care 
of transport to the final destination (e.g. 
France).
The white line of private label products 
is negotiated twice a year and the supply 
contract is in force for six months at a time. 
The yellow line (cheese) is contracted for 
one year. Butter-related contracts form an 
exception as they can be renegotiated every 
month. The butter business is influenced by 
international trade. There are specialised 
trading companies, which have experience 
Figure 12. Market structure in the German food retail sector, 2012.
Source: Handelsverband Deutschland. 
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Discount store chains are operated by all the 
leading retail concerns. Competition keeps the 
price level of foodstuffs at a lower level than in 
countries in Northern Europe.
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in buying cream in the international markets 
and tendering for butter (in the times of 
butter mountains). Traders take the cream to 
dairies, which make butter that is then sold 
under private labels – about one-third of all 
butter sold in Germany is done this way. 
German consumers are very price 
sensitive, and tend to prefer cheap dairy 
products. At the same time there is an 
increasing range of lactose-free products 
on the market. A big share of high-priced 
dairy products, such as premium yoghurts 
or cheese, is in the hands of foreign compa-
nies (Swiss, French) either through imports 
or through subsidiary companies. 
Consumption patterns
Corporate social responsibility issues in the 
dairy sector have not been the subject of 
much public debate for quite a long time. 
This has started to change very recently, 
influenced by more vivid public debates, 
for instance on animal welfare, and CSR 
strategies of major foreign competitors, 
mainly Arla and FrieslandCampina. All in all, 
about 10-20 % of consumers are interested 
in fair trade and other responsibility issues. 
Nevertheless, the dairy industry is giving 
consideration to those issues, because 
animal welfare is becoming important, 
although still more in relation to the meat 
chain than the dairy industry.  
Water footprints are not discussed at all, 
whereas carbon footprint and greenhouse 
gas emissions of the sector have been sub-
ject of some public scrutiny. 
GM-free production methods have been 
endorsed by a retail chain, Rewe, which 
probably sees it as a means of differentiat-
ing itself from its competitors. Rewe initiat-
ed a program called pro planet in which they 
commit to checking the production methods 
of the foodstuffs they sell. Dairy products 
form a pilot group in the segment of food 
products of animal origin, and the use of 
GM feeds is banned from the production 
process of products sold in the low-price, 
private label segment. The idea is to provide 
some added value to the consumer without 
raising the final price of the product. So far, 
the GMO-free project is still a pilot project 
and has not been rolled out to the whole 
supply chain.
Organic milk consumption accounts 
for about 4 % of total milk consumption in 
Germany in value terms. Sales of organic 
dairy products amount to 659 million EUR, 
divided into 408 million EUR for white prod-
ucts and 259 million EUR for yellow products. 
About 3.8 % of the market volume is organic, 
so these macro-level figures suggest that 
there is only a slight price premium for 
those organic products.
Geographic indication of the origin of 
dairy products (e.g., regional or local) has 
not been identified as an important factor in 
the dynamics of the sector, although there 
are certain initiatives to reintroduce the 
concept. Even strong loyalty for domesti-
Cheese disk in a German supermarket.
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cally produced dairy 
products cannot be 
observed.
Foreign trade
Germany is the big-
gest milk producer in 
the EU and an influ-
ential player on the 
markets of processed 
dairy products. Dairy 
exports have expand-
ed dynamically pri-
marily due to the in-
creased sales of cost 
efficient companies. 
They have achieved 
high production 
scales and offer basic 
processed products 
at competitive prices. Exports have been 
accelerated by the headway of giant 
German discount store chains throughout 
Europe. German suppliers often win the 
tenders of their private label dairy products, 
which is hardly a result of a conscious na-
tional aim, rather the outcome of long term 
traditional business 
relations and the 
ability of German pro-
cessors to meet the 
tough price targets of 
discount stores. 
Germany’s export 
structure is, there-
fore, dominated 
by processed bulk 
products, a strate-
gy that best suits 
dairies with the 
largest economies 
of scales in Europe. 
The German cheese 
trade illustrates this 
peculiar structure. 
Cheese exports have 
doubled in volume 
Figure 13. Germany's cheese export and import volumes.
Source: Eurostat, foreign trade database.
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Figure 14. Unit value of Germany's cheese export and import.
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat foreign trade database.
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terms between 2002 and 2012, whereas 
imports increased only 38  %. However, 
Germany exports cheap ordinary cheese, 
and imports special high value cheese, 
so the unit value of imported cheese has 
exceeded that of the exported cheese over 
the past ten years. 
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2.5.2 Denmark
The current Danish dairy industry structure 
finds its roots in the thriving cooperative 
movement that started over a hundred 
years ago in the country. By the 1960s there 
were still well over a thousand cooperative 
dairies, so the starting point of the devel-
opment of the sector was an extremely 
fragmented structure. The establishment 
of Mejeriselskabet Danmarks (MD) in 
1964 was a milestone in the history of the 
Danish dairy industry, as it launched a 
steady path of consolidation for the subse-
quent decades (Hansen, 2005). 
The manifested objective of MD from the 
beginning was to consolidate the fragment-
ed Danish dairy industry and this goal was 
completed through a series of acquisitions 
within less than four decades. The expansion 
strategy and sometimes the means to pre-
pare and accomplish the acquisitions were 
rather aggressive, generating a great deal 
of criticism by competitors. The final merger 
was preceded by a long and bitter price war 
with the last big competitor Kløver that had 
been established to offset the increasing 
power of MD Foods. After the merger of the 
two cooperative dairies in 1999 over 90 % 
of the milk deliveries were concentrated in 
the hands of just one company (Nilsson and 
Ollila, 2006).
MD foods merged already the follow-
ing year with the largest Swedish dairy 
which resulted in the largest cooperative 
dairy in Europe, whose size was also very 
significant by global standards (only Dairy 
Farmers of America, (US) was a bigger 
cooperative at that time). By 2005 Arla 
became the fifth largest dairy in the world. 
Positions have changed slightly in recent 
years and in 2012 the company was the 
seventh largest dairy company and fourth 
largest dairy cooperative in the world (see 
Attachment 1). 
Arla has unquestionably become the 
most significant dairy of the Baltic Sea 
regions over the past decade. Its creation 
was the first cross-border merger of dairy 
cooperatives, since it involved Danish and 
Swedish farmers as owners. The company 
pursued this unique strategy of cooperative 
expansion by spreading into Germany, the 
UK, Belgium and Luxembourg. Member 
farms of the acquired cooperative dairies 
were offered a membership in Arla, but in 
several countries the company also has 
contract suppliers. Growth and capital 
expansion remain a critical issue to resolve 
in a cooperative dairy, so shifting into a 
shareholding model has been considered. 
The membership, however, decided in 2010 
to increase the equity capital significantly 
in order to facilitate the ambitious growth 
strategy of the company by 2015 (Hansen, 
2013 p. 297).
Arla has practically maintained its over 
90  % share of milk deliveries in Denmark 
(the share has only slightly risen by the ac-
Figure 15. The share of Mejeriselskabet 
Danmarks (MD) and Arla Foods since 2000 
in Denmark’s milk deliveries.
Source: Hansen 2005, p. 83.
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 61 66 71 78 74 76 69 69 70 70 
Sales (billion EUR) 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.8
Number of employees 
(thousand)
9.8 9.2 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.2 7.5 7.4 7.8 .. 
Processed milka 
(billion kg)
4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.8
Table 5. Main indicators of the Danish dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat and Statistics Denmark; a Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade.
quisition of some additional small dairies in 
the 2000s). The concentration indicator CR4 
measured by milk deliveries did not sub-
stantially change over the past years: it was 
94.1 % in 2005 and nearly the same, 94.3 %, 
in 2012. Currently, an unusual “status-quo” 
characterises the dairy industry structure 
including about 70 small-scale dairies and 
one giant. As one Danish dairy industry 
expert stated “the bigger the company, the 
bigger shade it gives”. Small dairies com-
plement the assortment, fill niches in the 
market with their specialties and, in some 
product categories such as organic milk, 
they even challenge the hegemony of the 
leading company.
Mammen mejeri is a privately owned 
dairy, which produces 14 thousand tons of 
cheese annually for both the domestic and 
export markets. Thise and Naturmilk both 
specialise in organic products. The organic 
drinking milk share in Denmark is very high, 
nearly 30 %, and Arla accounts for approx-
imately 50 % of this segment, while these 
two companies account for much of the 
remaining share. Organic dairy products are 
fully manufactured by the domestic dairies, 
as the import of organic products is negli-
The headquarters of Arla Foods in Aarhus.
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gible. The cooperative dairies of Them and 
Bornholm produce a wide variety of cheeses 
(about 5 000 tons annually). 
Organic milk production started to grow 
significantly when cooperatives started their 
promotion. Nowadays there is strong loyalty 
for Danish organic milk and dairy products, 
but less loyalty for domestically produced 
conventional milk and other dairy products. 
Recent market development shows that 
there is room for more consolidation even 
in the extremely concentrated Danish 
dairy industry. In January 2014 Naturmælk 
took over the small organic cheese maker 
Osterie Hinge (Birk, 2014). 
Milk and whey protein powder are sig-
nificant products of the chain. Additionally, 
there are two dry cheese powder manu-
facturers with considerable export sales: 
Lactosan and Cremo cheese, which is a sub-
sidiary of Carry group (Ireland). The cheese 
is bought from cheese factories (not usable 
for consumer packaging) and the powder is 
used as food ingredients by food companies 
in various countries.
 
Vertical integration and ownership 
structure
The vast majority, over 97 % of the Danish 
dairy industry is cooperative-based, so the 
processing capacity is owned almost fully 
by farmers. Arla has over 3 300 members 
in Denmark, and nearly 9 000 in five other 
countries, so the challenge for the company 
is to maintain the collective ownership inter-
est by various channels of communication. 
The brief Owners’ magazine is published 
regularly in English, Danish, German, and 
Swedish. Meetings are organised between 
the board of representatives and local 
councils of dairy farmers to discuss the 
results of the previous annual report, 
future strategy, milk prices and investment 
plans. The attendance rate in these meet-
ings has been about 40 %.  
Should a member want to leave, it has 
to be announced by August in order to come 
into effect from the beginning of the following 
year. Arla decided to let members go and 
Company ownership
Milk purchase 
(million kg) Farmers Plants Staff
2005 2012
Arla cooperative 4 053 4 320 3 354 20 7 000a
Mammen mejeri private 52 150 60 3 90
Thise mejeri cooperative 23 91 87 2 120
Them andelsmejeri cooperative 36 54 34 1 60
Bornholms andelsmejeri cooperative 39 50 45 1 60
Naturmælk cooperative 12 32 33 2 70
Nørup mejeri private 13 17 12 1 20
Table 6. The leading companies in the Danish dairy industry
Source: Nilsson & Ollila, 2006; Mælkeri tidende 19.4.2013, p.6.; companies’ homepages. a Arla Denmark staff, headquarter is 
included.
Organic milk farms are also big in Denmark.
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return according to their free choice. The own-
er’s capital is paid back to a quitting farmer 
within three years. In the case he rejoins the 
cooperative, a farmer has to pay 15 000 DKK 
(2 000 EUR) in administration costs.
Out of the 12.1  billion  kg of mik pro-
cessed in 2012 over 10 billion kg originated 
from member and approximately 2 billion kg 
came from contracting suppliers. Arla has 
been the textbook example of a cooperative 
continuously expanding to new countries by 
absorbing cooperatives and accepting their 
members (Hansen 2013, p. 291). Due to the 
special nature of cross-border cooperative 
expansion, Arla has developed the rule of 
double stipulation for would-be members. 
Farmers of an acceding cooperative have to 
bring in milk deliveries and contribute with 
capital.7 This mode of participation in the 
company gives members the real possibility 
of influencing decisions as well as a sharing 
of the risk. 
If the company needs additional cap-
ital for expansion, a regular loan is taken 
from banks. Danish banks have been used 
exclusively until last year, but this year in-
7 In the joining cooperative of UK there were numerous members with capital share only and no milk production. The 
active members were required to buy plain capital owners out, before they were accepted to be members of Arla.
8 While the first two chains own all their units, many retail shops associated with Dagrofa are run by individual 
entrepreneurs, who cooperate in terms of purchases of goods and marketing.
ternational financial markets –mainly large 
European banks – are also considered. 
Arla has followed the cooperative pricing 
policy i.e. the same price is offered to all its 
members regardless of their size and coun-
try. Contracted suppliers are paid based on 
the prevailing market price of their country, 
a fact that irritates members in the same 
country if Arla’s unified price falls under, 
which was the case in the UK in the spring 
of 2013. From January 2014 over 80 % of 
the current contract suppliers in UK have 
become members of Arla Foods Amba.    
The year-end payments are similar to 
dividends calculated on the basis of the 
company’s performance in the previous 
years. In Germany, the extra payment is 
made to the subsidiary cooperative in one 
sum, based on the supplied volume, and 
the subsidiary then distributes the money 
further. 
Relations to the retail sector
The value of Danish grocery sales was approx-
imately 15 billion EUR in 2011. The Danish 
Small dairies specialise in niche products, such as special cheeses or organic products. Despite their size, 
several of them have achieved success on export markets.  
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retail sector is one of the most concentrated 
in Europe. The three leading chains are the 
consumer cooperative chain COOP, Dansk 
Supermarked and the wholesale company 
Dagrofa/SuperGros,8 which also runs a 
number of chains with different concepts in 
the retail business. Altogether, those three 
companies accounted for about 89 % of the 
retail food market in 2010. 
There are also three foreign chains and, 
quite interestingly, all three in the discount 
store category. Aldi from Germany opened 
its first outlets as early as in the late 1970s, 
Norwegian-owned Reitan with its Rema1000 
chain arrived in 1994, and German Lidl 
started its Danish operation in 2005. Their 
combined market share was over 9  % in 
2010. Grocery sales have increasingly con-
centrated into these leading chains, since 
other smaller chains and independent shops 
accounted for 15 % of the market in 2001 
but only 2 % ten years later. 
The Danish retail sector is characterised 
by a high store density and a much smaller 
average shop size compared to other coun-
tries. The category of hypermarkets with 
a considerable food share in their sales is 
completely missing from the Danish market. 
Small retail units cannot achieve the same 
economies of scales as large stores. The 
fragmented store structure explains the 
lower labour productivity figures compared 
to those in the other Nordic countries, where 
hypermarkets account for a sharply growing 
proportion of food sales (Konkurrence- og 
Forbrugerstyrelsen, 2011).  
The report reveals that the largest manu-
facturers did not consider producing private 
label products due to the disadvantages and 
direct competition that it would create for 
their own branded products. Recently this 
attitude has changed. Private label products 
have gained an increasing market share. It 
has been realised by the largest suppliers 
that it is better to participate in the produc-
tion of private label 
products not to lose 
too much of their 
overall market share. 
The small suppliers 
have even noticed 
that in some cases 
their private label 
production facilitated 
the access of their 
branded products 
to the retail chains 
(Konkurrence- og 
Forbrugerstyrelsen, 
2011). 
In the case of 
dairy products there 
also used to be 
reluctance towards 
private label prod-
ucts in the beginning when in the mid 2000s 
Aldi initiated their sales. The products orig-
inated partly from small Danish suppliers 
and partly from Germany. The price level 
deepened competition and the other retail 
chains have reassessed their private label 
strategy. Presently, both small dairies and 
Arla Foods supply private label products to 
the retail sector. 
COOP Danmark 
36.8%
Dansk Supermarked 
31.7%
Dagrofa SuperGros 
19.8%
Reitan 
4.7%
Aldi 
3.3%
Lidl 
1.5%
Others 
2.3%
Figure 16. Market structure in the Danish food retail sector, 2010.
Source: Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen, (2011), p. 14
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2.5.3 Sweden
The Swedish dairy industry has been geared 
to serve primarily the domestic market. 
Exports of dairy products have been low as 
domestic sales have accounted for 90-95 % 
of the turnover of the industry.  
The focus on the domestic market is 
inherited from the pre-EU era when Swedish 
food markets were protected from foreign 
competition by high import duties. Before 
1990 the generous agricultural policy used 
to support the income of farmers with heavy 
subsidies. Dairy cooperatives divided the 
market in geographic terms and a special 
income redistribution system prevailed both 
across dairy farmers and the cooperatives 
(Nilsson and Ollila, 2006). 
The costly agricultural policy was abol-
ished in 1990 by a parliamentary decision, 
which phased out the subsidies. Unlike 
Austria and Finland, which also joined the 
EU in 1995, Sweden decided not to apply for 
any transitional arrangements or economic 
support for its agriculture (Nilsson end Ollila, 
2006). Thus, farmers and processors in the 
Swedish dairy supply chain encountered 
the challenges thrown by the EU common 
market, fierce competition of imports and a 
sharp decline in milk prices. 
A dairy farm in the Jönköping region.
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 109 115 117 118 127 127 125 136 140 156a
Sales (billion EUR) 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9b
Gross operating surplus 
(million EUR)
62 130 107 169 143 97 114 70 .. ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)a
8.2 8.2 8.1 6.5 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.4 5.9 5.6
Processed milkc 
(billion kg)
3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 2. 2.9 2.8
Table 8. Main indicators of the Swedish dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a SCB, Statistics Sweden; b Estimate. c Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade.
The structure of the dairy industry did not 
change significantly in the first few years of 
EU membership. Arla had become the domi-
nant company of the industry already in the 
1980s and in 2000 it merged with Danish 
MD Foods resulting in the Danish-Swedish 
dairy cooperative Arla Foods. The compa-
ny’s main geographical focus was southern 
and central Sweden. Out of the three 
middle-sized cooperatives Skånemejerier 
covered Skåne in Southern Sweden, while 
Milko and Norrmejerier operated north of 
Stockholm (Sigbjörn 2012). The status quo 
of the spatially divided market fell apart 
gradually in the mid-2000s, when cooper-
atives also started to compete within each 
others’ traditional geographic areas in the 
fresh dairy product groups (Nilsson & Ollila, 
2006).
Apart from a few small acquisitions 
the industry structure remained the same 
throughout the 2000s, and the shares of milk 
deliveries accounted by the main players 
did not change notably between 2004 and 
2010 (see Table 7). Subsequently, a series 
of significant changes began. First, Arla 
Foods took over Milko in November 2011, 
then French dairy giant Lactalis emerged 
on the market to acquire Skånemejerier. 
One of the conditions of the latter deal 
was a guaranteed milk price set to that 
of Arla’s for several years. The first year 
result under foreign ownership appears to 
have improved the financial performance 
Milk deliveries (in %) Sales (in million EUR) Employees
2004a 2010b 2012 2011c,d 2012c,d 2012c,d
Arla Sverige 66.3 64.2 72.0 1 643 1 756 3 483
Skånemejerier 11.7 12.3 14.4 399e 414e 590
Milko 11.6 10.0 - - - -
Norrmejerier 6.0 6.8 7.3 199 211 470
Falköpings Mejeri 2.2 3.3 3.5 65 71 80
Gefleorten mejeriförening 1.3 1.2 1.1 36 41 109
Gäsene mejeriförening 0.6 0.6 0.7 .. .. 25
Others 0.4 1.7 1.0 .. .. ..
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 ..
Table 7. The leading companies in the Swedish dairy industry.
Sources: aNilsson and Ollila, 2006, p. 85, b Lukkarinen J. & Öberg Å. (2012), p. 7, c Veckans Affärer 500 tabell, d annual reports
 of the companies, e Ingvarsson 2013.
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of Skånemejerier as loss making turned to 
clear profit (Ingvarsson, 2013).
Norrmejerier follows as the third largest 
dairy company in Sweden. It has a diversified 
product mix, and its suppliers and primary 
consumption markets are concentrated in 
the northern regions of Sweden, although 
specific products are sold throughout the 
country. The company is owned by 570 
farmers and has three processing plants.
Three dairies Falköping, Gefleortens and 
Gäsene are smaller in size, but the first one 
has managed particularly well to expand its 
market share in a shrinking industry. Their 
strategy is to specialise into niche markets 
such as organic dairy products or special 
cheese.
Arla has continuously streamlined 
production and reduced the number of 
processing plants since its merger with MD 
Foods. A lot of factories have been closed 
and production has been concentrated into 
fewer locations to improve efficiency, econ-
omies of scale and competitiveness. A new 
investment of a milk powder facility was 
completed in Vimmerby in 2004. 
Economies of scale is also an important 
issue in cheese production. The objective 
of concentrating manufacturing capacity 
is to reduce production costs, so that cost 
competitiveness would get closer to that of 
German competitors. Falkenberg dairy with 
a capacity of about 25 000 tons of cheese 
was already closed in 2013 mainly due to 
the lack of milk supply. The production 
moved to Taulov in central Denmark where 
the annual capacity is 75 000 tons. 
Arlas’s structural package for 2014-15 
published lately (in October 2013) shows 
how quickly and radically rationalisation 
plans can change. Falkenberg will actually 
reopen and the dairies in Göteborg and 
Skövde will close completely (Berglund 
2013). Göteborg dairy’s diversified pro-
duction will be moved to Jönköping while 
Falkenberg will continue to manufacture 
Skövde’s cottage cheese. According to 
the plans the production in Falkenberg will 
Farms are scattered in Northern Sweden, where milk is collected over relatively long distances.
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increase so much that the plant will become 
the largest cottage cheese manufacturing 
unit in Europe. By the end of the structural 
package in 2015 Arla will have only 11 pro-
cessing plants in Sweden.
The ultimate objective with rationali-
sation processes is always to deliver im-
provements in terms of capacity utilisation 
and labour input. Large dairies which have 
several locations have practiced such a 
streamlining strategy in nearly all European 
countries. It has always caused pain to the 
affected local regions, but is usually accept-
able on the national level as it improves the 
effectiveness and international competitive-
ness of the particular companies and the 
domestic industry. The issue is much more 
delicate when a company has production 
facilities in several countries and rationalis-
es on all its markets at the same time.9 The 
process is even more delicate when owners 
of the company are scattered over in the 
same involved countries as is the case of 
Arla. Moving production capacity across 
the border becomes a sensitive matter of 
balancing owners’ interest and capacity 
across countries. The latest example of 
such a decision is Arla’s plan to invest about 
40  million EUR into a brand new research 
and development facility in the vicinity of 
the headquarters and concurrently reduce 
R&D staff in Sweden. 
Cooperative ownership and vertical 
integration
The Swedish dairy industry has long been 
dominated by cooperatives in which member 
farmers own the processing facilities. Lactalis’ 
acquisition of Skånemejerier changed at once 
the hegemony of cooperatives as the second 
largest actor became a privately owned com-
pany. The member farmers of Skånemejerier 
became contracting suppliers. 
9 Even if the dairy is multinational having production facilities in many countries, but it is owned by private capital, the 
decision making is straightforward. The decisions of the investor-owners always have to be accepted.  
The dairy plant in Falkenberg, Southern Sweden.
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The other transaction that reduced 
the dominance of farmers-owned cooper-
atives in the chain was the cooperative 
retailer COOP’s purchase of Grådö mejeri, 
although this was less significant in 
terms of the size of the market affected. 
The Swedish competition authorities ex-
cluded Grådö mejeri from the Arla-Milko 
merger in 2011. COOP acquired the dairy 
to ensure own production of a range of 
private label dairy products. The retail 
company expects that dairy products 
from Grådö will cover 20 % of their liquid 
milk sales. This transaction in fact did 
not reduce cooperative ownership in the 
chain, but the case is unique. There are 
very few precedents of a retail company 
investing downstream into its own food 
manufacturing. 
Relations to the retail sector
The Swedish retail sector is rather concen-
trated, as the four leading companies have 
a combined market share of 93  %. ICA 
accounts for almost half of the retail sales 
in Sweden and also has retail chains in 
Norway and the Baltic countries. 
ICA was originally owned by the partici-
pating retailers, (entrepreneurs of the indi-
vidual units). In 1999 Dutch Ahold bought 
50  % of the company and later another 
10 %. However, it sold its entire share back 
to the original Swedish owners in May 2013. 
The company runs four chains of different 
retail concepts, Nära (convenient stores), 
Supermarkets, Kvantum and Stormarknad 
(hyper-markets).
COOP is the consumers’ cooperative 
retail chain, while Axfood and Bergendahls 
are owned by private capital. The two for-
eign chain established their store network 
in the 2000s in Sweden. Lidl arrived in 2003, 
while Danish Netto in 2002 (Lindow 2012).  
A few years back, private label category 
only accounted for a small share, under 
10 % of total sales of dairy products for most 
retailers. ICA’s PL cheese sales accounted 
for 12 % and dairy products in general for 
7  % in 2011 (Berge & Larsson, 2013). In 
the 2010s a real race began amongst the 
Swedish retailers to increase this share. 
The reasons for the more ambitious growth 
can be related to global trends and to the 
success of the business model adopted by 
discount retailers. 
Private labels 
have usually been 
perceived as a threat 
to the dairy industry 
due to the lower 
margins that they 
generate for the 
manufacturer. Thus, 
for a long time Arla 
was rather reluctant 
to be involved in the 
production of pri-
vate label products. 
However, last year 
an agreement was 
made with ICA to de-
liver fresh milk under 
the name of the larg-
est retailer. Coop’s 
purchase of Grådö Figure 17. Market structure in the Swedish food retail sector, 2011.
Source: Lindow 2012, p. 22.
COOP 
20.8%
Axfood 
14.6%
Bergendahls 
7.2%
Netto 
2.2%
ICA 
48.1%
Lidl 
3.1%
Others 
2.7%
Vi 
1.4%
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dairy indicates that retailers are ready to 
take the initiative themselves to boost their 
PL supply. Axfood and Bergendahls have also 
made contracts with various Swedish dairy 
companies (Skånemejerier and Falköping) 
to manufacture their private label products. 
Lidl has contracts with Arla and Falköping for 
its PL fresh milk, however long shelf-life milk 
is imported from Germany. 
Most retail chains strive to enter private 
label contracts with more than one dairy 
company. One reason is to maintain the con-
stant competition between suppliers. When 
ICA increased its scope of private label prod-
ucts, the country origin of the products has 
become more diverse e.g. drinking yoghurts 
as well as cream originate from Austria 
while cheese is imported from various coun-
tries. Nowadays, the share retail sales of 
fresh milk products sold under private labels 
varies between 10 and 20 % in Sweden. It is 
expected that this proportion will stabilise 
around 25 % in the future (Karlsson, 2013). 
Profitability has remained rather low in 
the entire industry due to the inner competi-
tion and the challenge of cheaper imported 
and private label products. 
Consumers’ loyalty towards domestic 
products is high only in the case of liquid 
milk. For other products, such as yoghurt, 
cream and cheese, consumers consider 
price to be the most important factor and 
purchase imported goods to a large extent. 
Institutional kitchens have not either 
shown any particular inclination to choose 
domestic dairy products over foreign equiv-
alents. 
Although preferences towards domesti-
cally produced food does not appear very 
strong, Swedish consumers seem increas-
ingly interested in other characteristics of 
food products, such as an organic mode of 
production or whether the food is produced 
by local manufacturers. Both characteristics 
have gained popularity in general, but for 
dairy products the greater emphasis on 
local production has favoured primarily 
small-scale dairies and the processing activ-
ities of milk farms.
A large poster by a supermarket entrance draws the 
customers' attention to nearby suppliers. Retailers 
in Sweden sometimes promote regional food 
production in a more pronounced manner than they 
promote products of domestic origin. 
Retailers are keen to increase their direct impact on food production. Rapid spread of private label foodstuffs 
and on-site baking units can be observed throughout Europe. COOP's acquisition of Grådö dairy, however, is a 
unique example of vertical integration in the dairy supply chain initiated by a retailer.
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2.5.4 Finland
Finland’s dairy industry is predominantly 
cooperative based just like in its Nordic 
neighbours, Sweden and Denmark. Its 
history is interwoven with that of Valio, 
the leading dairy company, which was 
established well over 100 years ago, in 
1905. Valio was originally an umbrella 
organisation for milk farmers’ cooperatives 
with the objective of exporting butter, but 
it soon developed to be the main supplier 
of dairy goods on the domestic market. As 
more and more regional cooperatives joined 
the company, Valio’s dominant position in 
the market rose steadily. Its share of milk 
deliveries has varied between 80 and 90 % 
since the 1960s (Perko, 2005). 
Finnish agriculture operated in a heavily 
subsidised and protected market environ-
ment before it was liberalised in preparation 
for EU membership in the early 1990s. 
Structural change in the dairy industry, 
involving some corporate restructuring and 
rationalisation of Valio’s processing plants, 
also occurred before Finland’s EU entry, and 
the network of processing plants did not 
change significantly afterwards. Currently 
the company has 15 plants throughout 
Finland and is owned by 18 regional cooper-
atives of milk producers.
The second largest processor Ingman 
Foods used to be a family-owned dairy de-
livering products all over Finland and having 
dairies in different parts of Finland. Arla 
Foods bought 30 % of the company in 2007 
and the rest in 2008. Arla Ingman provides 
the full assortment of dairy products in the 
Finnish market. The largest part of their as-
sortment originates from Finland from their 
own processing plants and the cooperative 
and private dairies with which they coop-
erate. A part of their production - primarily 
cheese - is imported from Denmark.
The rest of the market actors are much 
smaller in size. Some of the independ-
ent cooperatives, such as Satamaito or 
The majority of milk farms can be found in Central, Northern and Eastern Finland.
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Maitokolmio, focus on regional markets or 
manufacture private label products for the 
retail sector. 
Hämeenlinnan osuusmeijeri packages 
fresh milk procured by its own members and 
imported from Sweden. Marketing of their 
products is organised in collaboration with 
Arla Ingman. 
Kaslink Foods is a privately owned man-
ufacturer of ESL (Extended Shelf Life)- or 
UHT- (Ultra High Temperature) milk and 
cream and other foodstuffs. The company 
specialises in the production of private label 
products for retail chains.
Additionally several small-scale dairies 
specialise in niche markets such as delica-
The headquarters of Valio in Helsinki.
2005 2012
Revenues 
(million €) Employees
Revenues 
(million €) Employees
Milk intake 
(million kg)
Cooperative 
members/
suppliers
Valio 1 578.7 4 199 1 749a 4 600 1 865 8 000
Ingman Foods/
Arla Ingman
270 902 343 284 280 510b
Hämeenlinnan 
Osuusmeijeri
46.3 71 64c .. 110c 170
Maitomaa 31.8 54 38 50 75 120
Kaslink Foods .. .. 37 70 .. ..
Satamaito 29.3 54 30 .. 45 240
Maitokolmio 21.7 51 33 71 34 120
Source: annual reports and websites of the companies. a Revenues from Finnish activities, total revenues of Valio totalled 
2000 million EUR in 2012. b The number of suppliers. In 2012 the total number of suppliers including the members of 
cooperating dairies amounted to 800 (Kilpailuvirasto 2012, p.9)  c Figures for 2011.
Table 9. The leading companies in the Finnish dairy industry.
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tessen, functional or regional dairy products. 
The biggest of these are Juustoportti, Riitan 
Herkku, Jokilaakson juusto, Kuusamon juusto 
and Ålands mejeriet.
The concentration ratio (CR4) of the 
industry calculated from sales revenues de-
creased slightly from 92 % to 88 % between 
2005 and 2012. Market shares differ from 
the industry shares of the companies due to 
the high volumes of exports and imports.
 
Ownership and vertical integration
Cooperative ownership of milk farmers 
is the dominant form of ownership in the 
Finnish dairy supply chain. Approximately 
98  % of Finnish milk farmers are owners 
in Valio, regional cooperative dairies or 
milk purchase cooperatives. Valio is a joint 
stock company, which is owned by the co-
operatives of milk farmers. 
Due to the two stage organisation of milk 
supply and processing, ownership structure 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 53 56 55 48 56 52 53 53 57 57 
Sales (billion EUR) 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.5a
Gross operating surplus  
(million EUR) 
90.2 95.6 110.4 95.5 91.1 85.3a 117.3 132.9 121.8a ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)
5.4 5.3 5.2 4.6 5.1 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.5 ..
Milk processedb 
(billion kg)
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Table 10. Main indicators of the Finnish dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Tilastokeskus; b Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade.
in the Finnish dairy industry is slightly more 
fragmented. Farmers’ cooperative owner-
ship is also the major ownership form in 
the industry, albeit smaller than at the milk 
collection stage. 
Foreign ownership in the dairy industry 
has increased over the past few years. 
Besides Arla Foods’ subsidiary the two 
largest ice cream factories have also been 
purchased by foreign companies. Nestle 
bought Valio ice cream already 2003 and 
Unilever bought Ingman Ice Cream 2012. 
The share of domestic private ownership is 
a few percent in the industry’s total equity. 
Some of the small scale dairy companies 
are family businesses or run and owned by 
private entrepreneurs.
Relations to the retail sector
The Finnish retail sector measured by the 
combined market share of the largest four 
60
Figure 18. Market structure in the Finnish food retail sector, 2012.
Source: AC-Nielsen.
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Others 
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companies is as 
concentrated as the 
Danish and Swedish 
ones. However, 
CR2 – the combined 
market share of the 
leading two chains 
– is the highest 
in Europe. 
S-Group, the 
consumers’ co-
operative, is the 
equivalent of the 
COOP chains else-
where in the Nordic 
countries. Kesko is 
owned by private 
investors and 
listed on the stock 
exchange. The joint 
market share of 
these two retail companies surpassed 80 % 
in 2012.
The Finnish retail sector has undergone a 
turbulent time since the start of the millen-
nium; market shares have changed rapidly 
and concentration has increased. S-Group 
increased its share from 29  % in 2000 to 
over 45 % in 2012, first with the buy-out of 
some competing chains, then with organic 
growth. It took over the leading position 
from Kesko in 2005. Suomen lähikauppa 
(formerly Tradeka) shrank from 12 % to 7 % 
in twelve years.   
Lidl arrived to Finland in 2003 and man-
aged to increase its market share to 5.5 %, 
although this success was required the 
Finnish subsidiary chain to soften notably 
the original hard discount store concept of 
the company.
Valio has taken care of logistics by itself, 
and, due to its market position, had relative 
strength in negotiating contracts with re-
tailers. There has been tough competition 
on the fresh milk market. Market positions 
have changed during the past years due 
to more competition in all dairy product 
categories. 
Consumption patterns
The main trends of consumption are similar 
to the changes perceived in the other coun-
tries. The consumption of liquid milk has 
gradually decreased on the long run, with 
a concurrent increase in the consumption of 
cheese and other fermented dairy products. 
Like in other Nordic countries a milk fat con-
sumption turned into growth in the second 
half of the 2000s after decades of continuous 
decline. This tendency can be observed in 
the consumption statistics of whole fat milk 
and butter. Traditional sorts of cheese have 
also gained in popularity at the expense of 
lighter low fat alternatives. 
A megatrend on consumers’ market 
has been the fast progress of private label 
products of the retailers. It appeared for 
several dairy product categories already in 
the middle of 2000s. While the Finnish origin 
of fresh milk is regarded as very important 
by consumers, loyalty to domestic origin is 
much weaker in the case of other processed 
products. Private label cheese has been 
originated from Estonia, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands whereas yoghurts are 
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imported from Estonia, Austria etc. The 
country of origin is labelled appropriately for 
most of the PL dairy products in Finland.
Imported dairy products in general 
gained a stronger foothold in the second 
half of the 2000s. Finnish dairy manufac-
turers have lost a considerable share of the 
fast increasing cheese market. In fact, the 
consumption of domestic cheese has not 
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Figure 19. Consumption of dairy products in Finland, 1990-2012.
Source: Tike, Ravintotase.
changed much over the past decade, in 
volume terms it stagnated around 60 thou-
sand tons. Therefore, importers have fully 
taken advantage of the increased cheese 
demand. The quantity of imports has over 
tripled between 2002 and 2012 from 19 to 
61 thousand tons. Private label cheese ac-
counts for only part of the increase. Cheese 
assortment has broadened with high value 
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Figure 20. Domestic and imported cheese consumption in Finland, 2002-2012.
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special ripened cheese types, which are 
often supplied under the manufacturers’ 
brands. 
The quantity of imported yoghurts has 
remained moderate compared to the pro-
gress of cheese, although a steady increase 
was also recorded for yoghurts. Volumes of 
foreign yoghurts increased sixfold between 
2002 and 2010 from 6 to 36 thousand 
tons, but have stabilised for the past three 
years. The share of imports was the highest 
(29 %) in 2010. Preliminary results for 2013 
suggest that their share has stayed at 28 % 
(TNS Gallup, 2014). Two big groups make 
up the imports, the retailers’ private label 
products and the yoghurts of a strong pri-
vate manufacturer, Danone.
Fresh milk was the last bastion of man-
ufacturers’ branded products to be pene-
trated by the retail sector. Private label milk 
has become one of the most inexpensive 
options in most of the retail chains. Its share 
has increased remarkably from its 10  % 
level in 2011 (Kilpailuvirasto, 2012, p. 9). 
Lidl sells exclusively private label milk and, 
due to its low price, has acquired a higher 
share of the fluid milk market than their 
general approximated 6-7 % market share 
of the retail sector. S-Group and Kesko have 
also reported dynamic growth of their PL 
milk, and have stated that they expect to 
obtain a 20 % market share with their own 
brands in the near future. Arla – reluctant 
to be involved with private label products 
in their home markets in Denmark and 
Sweden for a long time – has been an active 
private label milk manufacturer in Finland. 
Other suppliers are the smaller cooperatives 
(Pöntinen 2013), e.g. Maitomaa has been an 
active private label supplier.   
Imports of fresh milk have stayed at 
a much more modest level compared 
to cheese and yoghurts. Until 2008 milk 
import was almost negligible. Milk has 
been imported in increased volumes from 
Sweden to be packaged and processed in 
Finland since 2009. According to the records 
of Finnish Custom Board the volume of 
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Source: own calculations based on database of Tike and Tullihallitus.
Figure 21. Domestic and imported yoghurt consumption in Finland, 2002-2012.
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%
Swedish milk import has varied between 
47 and 52 thousand tons in 2010-2012. 
This represents about 2 % of the milk pro-
duced in Finland. Approximately half of the 
imported milk is packaged as drinking milk 
for consumers. The total fresh milk market 
amounts to approximately 700 million litres 
(Kilpailuvirasto, 2012, p. 35 and TNS Gallup, 
2014) so the share of imported milk pack-
aged for consumption has had around 4 % 
market share. Some smaller amount of UHT 
milk has also been imported to Finland, but 
the total consumption of UHT milk is insig-
nificant in Finland compared to fresh milk.
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2.5.5 Estonia
The Estonian dairy industry has been rather 
fragmented ever since the decentralisation 
process that took place at the beginning of 
the 1990s. Foreign companies showed high 
interest in Estonian dairies and purchased 
several companies during the privatisation 
process, so that over 60 % of the aggregate 
equity was owned by foreign investors 
by the end of the 1990s (Jansik 2001). In 
the 2000s foreign investors divested or 
left the industry one after another and by 
now the only considerable professional for-
eign-ownership is that of Valio. 
The dairy processing industry has tradi-
tionally been export oriented as output has 
always surpassed domestic consumption. 
Therefore, the changes in the export markets 
usually have repercussions on the domestic 
market. Even after the bankruptcies caused 
by the Russian rouble devaluation crises in 
1998 the structure of the dairy industry was 
rather fragmented. In 2002 about 90  % of 
the raw milk was procured by the eight large 
processors of roughly similar sizes, so that 
the concentration ratio CR4 measured in 
terms of raw milk procurement was as low 
as 42 %. Even ten years later, in 2012 the 
four leading companies still accounted for 
only 58 % of milk purchases. 
The pace of consolidation appears higher 
when it is analysed in terms of the turnover 
of the leading companies. In 2001 the sales 
revenues of the four largest companies to-
gether accounted for 42 % of the industry’s 
total sales, whereas in 2012 that share was 
already 74  %. The notable difference be-
tween the two concentration figures in 2012 
is attributable to the special characteristics 
of the Estonian dairy supply chain, i.e. the 
fact that recently over a fifth of Estonian 
milk is collected and taken out of the country 
as raw milk.  
Valio Eesti is the subsidiary of Finnish 
Valio concern and is currently the biggest 
of Estonian manufacturers by turnover. 
The company has its own trademark that 
includes a wide array of dairy products, e.g. 
milk, sour milk, cream, sour cream, yoghurts, 
cream cheese and cottage cheese. Valio also 
acquired the majority stake of the biggest 
Estonian cheese manufacturer, Võru Juust at 
the end of 2003. The two subsidiaries were 
formally merged to one company as of the 
beginning of 2014.
Tere is nowadays the second largest 
accompany, it has a diverse assortment of 
consumer products. The company closed 
its plant in Tallinn in 2013, and production 
is continued in the two remaining plants in 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 28 31 30 31 36 31 28 27 24 22a
Sales (million EUR) 238 309 306 326 376 383 307 339 377 364a
Profit (million EUR)a 9.3 0.2 1.1 10.6 21.6 15.3 15.0 11.2 5.9 17.2
Number of employees 
(thousand)
2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.1a
Milk processed b
(million kg)
487 539 559 548 559 551 606 553 564 520
Table 11. Main indicators of the Estonian dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Statistikaamet; b Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade, Estonian companies used 77 % 
of the milk produced in Estonia in 2012.
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Viljandi and Põlva. The company has very re-
cently started to produce some lactose-free 
products. Tere is owned by the Finnish sub-
sidiary of Nordea Bank. Maag Piimatööstus 
is the successor of former Rakvere Piim and 
Jõhvi Piim. The company provides a range 
of consumer products including milk, fer-
mented products, cheese and butter under 
the Farmi brand name. The parent company, 
Maag Grupp als has a considerable share in 
the meat market.
Dairy farms make up the largest group 
of owners via their cooperative ownership. 
E-Piim is the biggest cooperative in the 
country that owns three dairy processing 
plants, one producing milk powder and 
butter and the other producing cheese. The 
current production of cheese totals 8400 
tons. In 2013 E-Piim installed a modern 
powder producing equipment in Järva-Jaani 
ownership
Sales revenues (million €) Milk collection (million kg)
2008 2012 2008 2012
Valio Eesti foreign 90.7 99.2 65.6 79.2
Tere bank 94.4 80.3 57.2 65.4
Piimandusühistu 
E-Piim 
cooperative  n.a. 49.3 96.7 86.9
Maag Piimatööstus private 25.8 40.5 32.0 38.0
Estover Piimatööstus private 14.0 24.2 7.3 8.2
Saaremaa 
Piimatööstus
cooperative 26.5 23.2 32.2 35.5
Table 12. The leading companies in the Estonian dairy industry.
Source: Toiduainetööstuse TOP, Äripäev, Tööstus 2009 and 2013; Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet (PRIA).
including the demineralization technology 
for whey. This processing line is unique in 
Baltic States.
Saaremaa Liha- ja Piimatööstus is an-
other example of a farmer-owned processor, 
which has two major orientations: dairy and 
meat processing. The company covers the 
area of Saaremaa island and collects milk 
from local farmers, who are the main owners. 
The primary line among dairy products is 
cheese.
Estover is a specialised cheese manu-
facturer and distributor with its main plant 
located in Rannu, Kaarlijärve. Recently they 
also acquired the Vigala cheese plant. The 
company is owned by private domestic 
capital.
Efficiency is a challenge for processors 
due to the wide assortment of consumer 
products, such as yoghurts, on a relatively 
Cheese 
manufacturing 
in a 
cooperative 
owned dairy.
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small market. The series are small, and there 
are frequent shifts to new flavours, which 
raises costs. The competitive advantage of 
the Estonian dairy industry can be main-
tained to the extent that raw milk remains 
cheaper than in Sweden or Finland.  
There is not a very sophisticated set of 
equipment in the Estonian dairy industry 
compared to Finland. The Estonian industry 
is capable of manufacturing basic dairy 
products, such as cheese, yoghurts, butter, 
SMP, but for a long time there was no pro-
duction line for lactose-free products. The 
production of lactose-free cheese has started 
recently opening new market opportunities. 
Technology utilised by the Estonian dairy 
industries is of different age, powder produc-
tion equipment is the oldest while packaging 
lines represent the most recent technology. 
Cheese manufacturing equipment has also 
been replaced mostly over the past decade 
(Värnik et. al. 2011). 
The cost share of labour is bigger in 
Estonia than in the old member states 
around the Baltic Sea. The cost advantages 
have prompted several Estonian dairies to 
participate in the private label bids of the 
Nordic retailers. Among others, Tere and 
E-Piim have manufactured private label 
products for Finland, Denmark, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
Cooperative ownership and vertical 
integration
The majority of milk is purchased from 
large farms, which makes procurement 
more straightforward than in the other two 
Baltic countries. Milk is directly transported 
from the farms to dairy processing com-
panies. Contracts with the milk suppliers 
are formulated for a period of one year 
and define supplying practices, supply-
ing schedules and quality requirements. 
Prices are revised every month. 
The 2009 economic crisis gave a further 
impetus to the cooperative movement in the 
Estonian dairy farm sector. Milk production 
decreased due to declining demand for 
dairy products on the domestic and foreign 
markets. However the results were not as 
dramatic as, for instance, in Latvia and no 
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Source: Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet (PRIA) data.
Figure 22. Milk collection by farmers’ cooperatives and private companies in Estonia.
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big bankruptcies happened among the 
Estonian milk farms. During the time of lower 
milk demand, dairy processors did not need 
more than 60  % of the milk produced and 
the farms coped with that situation by mar-
keting the rest of their production directly. 
Finally, farms ended up buying milk powder 
manufacturing services from the processors 
and exported the powder themselves. Later, 
they responded by forming cooperatives to 
market milk themselves. Later on cooper-
atives were the sales channels which have 
allowed them to decide whether to sell the 
raw milk to domestic or foreign proces-
sors. 
 The private dairies’ milk collection 
amounted to roughly the same volume 
upon accession to the EU and during the 
recent quota year. During the second half 
of 2000s dairies collected slightly less and 
the rise over the past two-three years can be 
attributed mostly to the growing purchases 
of ELPA I.E. (an intermediary company which 
had gained 8 % of the milk market by 2012). 
Some of the cooperatives, such as 
E-Piim or Saaremaa, process the milk them-
selves while other farmers’ cooperatives 
are purchase and sales organisations. Milk 
is sold to the processors both in Estonia and 
abroad. Before EU accession, Estonian dair-
ies utilised all milk produced in the country. 
In 2005-07 already 10 % of the raw milk was 
exported and the export share increased to 
23 % by 2012. There is a notable structural 
difference between the milk exports of the 
mid-2000s and the recent ones. Earlier dairy 
processing companies exported raw milk, 
while now raw milk export is organized by 
primary producers, so the processors have 
lost control over the raw milk by now. The 
largest exporters of milk are cooperatives 
such as EPIKO or intermediaries like ELPA 
I.E. 
The biggest cooperatives E-Piim, 
Saaremaa and EPIKO have investigated the 
opportunity to set up joint cooperatives in 
the future and convince their members to 
invest into modern processing equipment. 
Most recently E-Piim and Saaremaa have 
continued with a joint proposal, while Epiko 
announced cooperation with Maag at the 
end of 2013 (Stadnik 2013). A new process-
ing facility would allow the export of raw 
milk to be reduced and the Estonian dairy 
industry to increase its presence on the pro-
cessed dairy products’ markets (Lättemäe, 
2012). The plan faces challenges since 
farmers and agricultural cooperatives may 
be reluctant to tie a lot of capital into new 
processing capacity as opposed to prompt 
More than one third of Estonian dairy cows belong to herds of over 600 cows. 
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high milk prices. Furthermore it is unsure 
how the competition authorities would react 
to such consolidation in the industry. The 
possible support for such a new processing 
capacity has been included to the new Rural 
Development Program of Estonia.
The national dairy strategy of Estonia de-
clares that farms should have the potential 
to produce one million tons of milk annually, 
as opposed to the current level of 721 000 
tons, but it would require an increase in the 
number of dairy cows. However, the current 
milk farm structure of the country makes 
this objective realistic. The strategy also 
adds that this should be followed by the 
development of dairy processing in order 
to ensure higher value added in the chain 
(Värnik et. al. 2011).
Relations to the retail sector
Contracts between the dairy processors and 
retailers are usually made for one year at 
a time, but prices are negotiated more fre-
quently. The leading three dairy companies 
provide the retailers with a wide range of 
consumer products. Small dairies also have 
access to the large retail chains if they offer 
niche or culinary products. For instance, 
Vigala piimatööstus sells special Italian 
cheese to the retail chains, Nantecom is also 
present in the chain with their specialised 
quark dessert and Saidafarm supplies most 
of the retailers with organic curd.  
Dairy companies have relatively few pos-
sibilities to increase their margins through 
high value added products. For example 
about 80 % of all liquid milk is the regular 
2.5 % fat milk, nearly 20 % is full fat (3.5 %) 
milk and only 0.5 % is sold as special milk 
(e.g., low fat, fat free, lactose free). Recently 
even unpacked non-pasteurised organic 
farm milk has been sold from large contain-
ers in the shops. Farmers intend to raise con-
sumption by setting up vending machines Fresh cheese made on an organic farm.
The cooperative movement has gained strength among Estonian dairy farmers. 
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in some shops of 
ETK with proper 
product and trace-
ability information/
labelling. 
The structure 
of the retail sector 
is moderately con-
centrated. The five 
leading chains ac-
counted for 80 % of 
the turnover of the 
retail sector in 2012. 
ETK (Eesti 
Tarb i jateühistute 
Keskühistu) is the 
central organisation 
of 19 regional con-
sumer cooperatives. 
Its history dates 
back to 1902 and ETK is the only viable 
consumer cooperative retail chain in the 
Baltic countries that has survived up to the 
present time. The company runs 264 units in 
three different chain concepts: Maksimarket, 
Konsum and A & O. 
Rimi – owned by the Swedich ICA – is the 
second largest retail chain in Estonia with 
84 retail units, of which 13 are hypermarkets, 
18  super-markets and 53  discount stores 
called Säästumarket.
Maxima, the Lithuanian retail chain, 
operated 70  units in three different size 
categories in 2012. Selver is a domestic 
retailer which opened its first outlet 
in Tallinn in 1995. Currently Selver has 
41 retail units, of which 13 are operated in 
the capital city. 
Prisma Peremarket is the subsidiary of 
the Finnish S-Group. It runs 9 hypermarkets 
in Estonia.
Consumer loyalty towards domestically 
produced food is supposed to rise with 
an annual campaign in which shelves of 
Estonian-made foodstuffs are marked with a 
flag in the retail units. The yearly campaign 
has run for the fourth time in a raw and most 
of the foreign-owned retail chains participate 
in it (Kaukvere 2013). Consumers appear to 
show loyalty towards domestic foodstuffs 
especially in three product groups: dairy, 
meat and bakery products.
Figure 23. Market structure in the Estonian food retail sector, 2012.
Source: own calculations based on Kaubanduse TOP, 10.10.2013.
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2.5.6 Latvia
The Latvian dairy industry was split among 
several equally strong enterprises in 
the 1990s. Although some consolidation 
happened in the 2000s, such as Limbažu 
Piens’ take over by Rīgas PK, the basic 
fragmented structure has prevailed up to 
now. In fact, the size of the market leaders 
has shrunk in the industry in recent years. 
The declining market shares of the leading 
companies highlight some of the problems 
experienced in the Latvian dairy industry. 
The companies are small by international 
standards, which makes it difficult for them 
to exploit economies of scales and compete 
with efficiently run and much larger rivals. 
The high share of conventional products 
such as butter, over-diversification into 
various consumer products, frequent shifts 
among production series and low capacity 
utilisation are a few of the challenges that 
several dairy companies face. 
Market difficulties have translated into 
financial difficulties in recent years. The 
gross operating surplus has been quite low 
for many years and corporate profitability 
has been rather poor for the individual com-
panies. In 2003, three of the five leading 
companies achieved profitability to sales 
revenues ratio of only minus 2.5-4 %.
The problems have also been reflected 
in the frequent change of owners at the 
companies. In the 1990s, ownership of 
several dairies was allocated to farmers as 
a result of privatisation, e.g. Valmieras Piens, 
Rīgas Piensaimnieks and Tukuma Piens 
were primarily owned by dairy farmers for 
a long time. As farmers sold their shares, 
the ownership structure of the companies 
changed rather frequently to include finan-
cial investors, private investors, and even 
politicians. An illustrative example is that of 
Rīgas Piensaimnieks, whose majority share-
holding changed in only the recent years 
from Estonian investors to a US investment 
companies and later an offshore company. 
No matter how competent the management 
of a company, a repeated change in owners 
and interests may well distract the achieve-
ment of long term strategic aims. 
After a boom in domestic income the 
Latvian dairy industry was severely hit by 
a reduction in domestic demand in 2008 
and the years afterwards. The structural 
production problems of dairy manufacturers 
coinciding with declining income resulted 
in a loss of market shares domestically. 
Processors generated more income from 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 51 42 48 53 49 42 44 47 48 48
Sales (million EUR) 237 309 306 326 376 383 307 339 377 398
Gross operating surplus 
(million EUR 
23.1 22.9 32 27.2 29.5 23.1 17.1 24.5 21.6 ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)
4.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.2 3.0 3.0 ..
Milk processed b 
(million kg)
434 468 478 531 538 502 437 494 465 506
Table 13. Main indicators of the Latvian dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Latvijas statistika; b Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade.
71
the export markets. Some of the dairies 
complained that the increasing margins of 
food retailers forced them to concentrate on 
exports as opposed to the domestic market 
(BNN, 2011).  
In recent transactions, two of the leading 
companies Rīgas piena kombināts (RPK) and 
Valmieras piens were purchased by Russian 
investors, who then merged the two com-
panies in the summer of 2012. RPK used 
to direct its exports towards the Russian 
markets. Valmieras piens is a dairy with a 
fully diversified production portfolio, which 
includes all kinds of consumer products 
from liquid milk to fermented products and 
cheese. After the merger the company was 
renamed Food Unions. In 2013 it announced 
that it was stopping cheese production in 
order to concentrate its activities around 
other products such as ice cream (BNN, 
2013). 
Tukuma piens produces more than 180 
different dairy products including yogurts, 
cottage cheese and conventional products 
such as butter and cream. The company 
collects about 50  000 tons of milk from 
about 215 milk suppliers located mainly in 
the Kurzeme and Zemgale regions. Rigas 
piensamnieks produces high value-added 
consumer products such as curd cheese 
desserts. It exports about one-third of its 
production. 
The new processing facility of farmers, 
Latvijas piens (Latvian milk) started man-
ufacturing in the end of 2012. During the 
first eight months of 2013, it has already 
achieved a turnover of 24 million EUR, which 
makes the company one of major players 
among dairies at once. 
The concentration ratio CR4 was 56 % in 
2007 and even declined to about 50  % in 
2011. Despite the very recent consolidation 
observed in the industry, concentration can 
still be considered moderate by internation-
al comparison. One reason for that is the 
emergence of the new cooperative owned 
dairy in the industry in 2012.
Milk collection
Many Latvian milk farms have invested sub-
stantial amounts into farm expansion. An 
investment boom took place in the middle 
Sales revenues (million €) Employees 
2011
Milk intake 
(million kg)2002 2007 2011
Rīgas Piena Kombināts 51.4 84.2 81.1 555 132
Valmieras Piens 25.9 46.8 36.2 305 83
Rīgas Piensaimnieks 24.2 36.8 27.2 247 25
Tukuma piens 13.5 25.9 34.7 225 45
Preiļu siers 10.1 43.6 36.8 281 80
Limbažu piens 7.8 - - - -
Table 14. The major Latvian dairy companies.
Source: Dienas bizness, Top 500 Latvijas lielakie uznemumi 2003, 2008 and 2012, company websites, Chevalier et. al.
Figure 24. Milk exports of Latvia.
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data. Note: milk 
exports in the chart include only the bulk unpackaged milk 
of under 6 % fat content within the CN 0401 group.
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of the 2000s and the economic crisis of 
2008-09 hit the Latvian economy particu-
larly hard through foreign-owned banks. 
Many of the expanded dairy farms had just 
taken tremendous loans, which could not be 
repaid before the recession hit.  
During the hardest times of 2008-2009, 
dairy manufacturers encountered serious 
difficulties in selling both domestically and 
on export markets. The resulting cash-flow 
problems delayed payments to milk farms 
by up to 60 days, and some of the most in-
debted farms went bankrupt simply because 
they could not serve their debt. Prices for 
milk dived in 2009 and, due to the sluggish 
demand from domestic processors, farmers 
were forced to seek direct sales channels. 
One of the solutions was to restart direct 
sales of milk in urban areas. Although a 
receipt printing machine was compulsory 
for farmers practicing direct sales, non-com-
pliance was also tempting since it offered a 
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Source: Lauksaimniecības datu centrs.
Figure 25. Milk collection by farmers’ cooperatives and private companies in Latvia.
Private companies
Cooperatives
442
452 422 391 390 394
422
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
150 178
212 204
236
268
296
73
possibility of generating revenue without 
paying the proper VAT. For many farmers, 
this quick source of revenue improved the 
acute cash-flow problem at the hardest of 
times. 
Another alternative sales channel was 
the export of milk to Lithuanian processors. 
Exports already started to expand in 2006 
and the processors’ reluctance to purchase 
milk triggered further growth in 2008. By 
that time, farmers became stronger so that 
they also actively sought export opportuni-
ties either directly or through cooperatives. 
In 2011-12, export demand for raw milk 
grew again, as Lithuanian processors 
offered better prices than domestic ones, 
so that in 2012 over 36 % of the collected 
milk was sold to the southern neighbour 
country.  
In eastern Latvia, where milk farms are 
still extremely scattered, Preilu siers has 
to collect milk from thousands of farms. 
However, to counterbalance this relative 
handicap, the company is also able to 
purchase the raw material at a particularly 
low price. In these regions, milk collection 
points were set up to facilitate procurement. 
Looking forward, it seems very unlikely 
that small farms in this area will have any 
opportunities to modernise and expand 
production in the future.
Cooperative ownership, vertical 
integration
As farms expanded, they started form-
ing purchase and sales cooperatives in 
the 2000s. In the registry of the Latvian 
Agricultural Data Centre, out of 67 milk pur-
chasing enterprises, 36 were already coop-
eratives in 2013. The share of cooperatives 
in domestic milk collection has risen steadily 
and exceeded 41 % in 2013. 
Farmers have united into cooperatives 
in order to reach better prices for a higher 
volume of milk. Some cooperatives have 
mostly large farms while others welcome 
all farms regardless of their size. However, 
usually business minded milk farmers are 
the ones who tend to join cooperatives. 
The current large and middle-sized family farms grew gradually from small farms over the past two decades.
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Sales and purchase cooperatives sell 
their milk to both domestic and Lithuanian 
dairy manufacturers. They also negotiate 
price discounts with input suppliers through 
joint purchases. There have even been some 
cases when a member farm on the verge of 
bankruptcy was saved by its co-members 
via temporary financial arrangements to 
cope with a crisis.  
Farmers’ cooperatives already acquired 
some processing capacity by the middle 
of the 2000s. Some of those cooperative 
dairies, such as PKS Straupe, offered 
various products, while others were rather 
specialised, such as Trikāta KS which mainly 
produces cheese. 
The difficult market situation and 
problems in supply chain management in 
2008 and 2009 led milk farmers to take the 
initiative to establish a more significant pro-
cessing capacity. Hence, the construction of 
a green-field investment project, worth over 
10 million €, started in Jelgava in September 
2011 and the factory was completed by 
Vacuum 
packaging 
of cheese.
Milk pretreatment room in the Jelgava plant of Latvijas piens.
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the end of 2012. Some of the Latvian dairy 
processors fiercely criticised the project 
because of the political support farmers 
received from the government. Dairy manu-
facturers were unhappy about the develop-
ment of new capacity in an industry where 
the capacity utilisation rate of the existing 
processors was already rather poor (BNN 
2011a). Farmers contributed 1.2 million € of 
their own capital and the rest of the project 
was financed through loans from the EU and 
private banks. 
The new company Latvijas piens is owned 
by three cooperatives: PKS Dzēse, Trikāta 
KS and Piena partneri KS. Altogether about 
600 dairy farms constitute the membership 
of the owner cooperatives and provide the 
milk supply. They produce over 90 thousand 
tons of milk annually, or 18 % of all the milk 
processed in Latvia in 2012. Production at 
Latvijas piens has been expanded gradually 
in 2013, the plant’s pasteurisation capacity 
is 100 000 tons and it is also capable of 
manufacturing 27 000 thousand tons of milk 
powder and 10 000 tons of cheese annually. 
Farmers and agricultural policy makers 
have always regarded the coopera-
tive-owned dairy industries in other Nordic 
countries as a desirable model of vertical 
integration that should be replicated. This 
was reflected in the regulative framework 
of dairy industry privatisation in the 1990s, 
in which farmers enjoyed preferential treat-
ment. At the time, most farms were not 
strong financially to hold on to their owner-
ship of the privatised dairy manufacturers. 
By 2010, however, the economic situation 
of farmers had strengthened so much that 
they were able to set up their own process-
ing facilities, which has brought them one 
important step closer to the Nordic model of 
cooperative-based dairy supply chains.
Relations to the retailers
Distribution of dairy products is conducted 
through contracts with the trading com-
panies. The Latvian wholesale and retail 
sectors are still formed of several chains 
of various size and geographical cover-
age, which gives medium and small size 
dairy processors opportunities to access 
the market. On the other hand, the large 
dairies may have contracts with several 
chains and many operate logistic or distri-
bution points across the country to better 
supply the regional retailers. 
Despite the fragmented market struc-
ture, retailers enjoy a dominant position in 
the dairy chain in both Latvia and Lithuania. 
They negotiate only on price, while all the 
other terms of the contracts are imposed on 
the supplier without much discussion. It is 
extremely hard to get into the chains with 
conventional cheese types (tilsiter or edam), 
because there are so many processors 
providing those. Therefore, niche prod-
ucts or speciality products represent the 
best options for small companies. A fancy 
packaging or speciality product can be a 
Cheese is 
packaged for 
delivery to the 
retail units.
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door-opener e.g. into 
foreign retail chains. 
In bulk cheese 
production, the 
economies of scale 
or cost-efficient 
solutions of the large 
processors would 
definitely make com-
petition very difficult 
for small dairies. 
The structure of 
retail trade is mod-
erately concentrated 
in Latvia, as indicat-
ed by a CR4 concen-
tration ratio of about 
61  % in 2011. The 
two leading com-
panies (Swedish-
owned Rimi Latvia and the Lithuanian 
Maxima chain) both control about 27 % of 
the market. The third company, Palink, is 
also the subsidiary of a Lithuanian retail 
chain.
Altogether foreigners account for about 
60  % of the Latvian retail market. Some 
Latvian experts have identified a threat of 
the Lithuanian dairy supply chain taking 
ever greater control of the Latvian chain. 
Lithuanian dairy processors purchase 
Latvian milk and the processed products 
flow back to Latvia through the sales 
channels of the Lithuanian-owned retail 
companies, either as branded or private 
label products. 
The retail sector includes plenty of mid-
dle-scale chains apart from the two leading 
ones. There is a dozen of retail chains, with 
each one holding one to two percent of the 
retail market. Even independent village 
shops account for a considerable share in 
the rural areas of Latvia.
Figure 26. Market structure in the Latvian food retail sector, 2012.
Source: own calculations based Dienas bizness, Top 500, 2013.
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2.5.7 Lithuania
The dairy sector has always been the 
flagship of the Lithuanian agrifood sector 
and an important export-earning segment 
of the economy. Due to its role, the dairy 
sector has always received a lot of atten-
tion from the country’s politicians and, 
consequently, held a strong position in the 
process of agricultural development. 
The major figures indicate that the 
Lithuanian dairy industry has developed 
impressively over the past decade. Sales 
have been export driven and have grown 
two and a half times in ten years in nominal 
terms. Profitability in the Lithuanian dairy 
sector has also been high. Gross operating 
profit as a ratio of sales revenues has been 
among the highest – along with Poland – in 
the comparison of the eight countries. The 
trend has been in line with the performance 
of the four leading companies, which have 
achieved profit to sales ratio of 3-5  % be-
tween 2009 and 2012. The most spectacular 
growth was achieved in terms of the volume 
of milk processed, an increasing part of 
which was sourced from the neighbouring 
countries. 
The structure of the Lithuanian dairy 
industry has changed radically for the 
past two decades. At the beginning of the 
1990s the decentralised privatisation in 
the Lithuanian dairy industry created about 
50 dairy processors, none of which had a 
dominant position, so market power used 
to be relatively evenly distributed among 
the companies. After an intensive wave of 
mergers and acquisitions – and bankrupt-
cies – three companies emerged from the 
consolidation by the turn of the millennium. 
Together they dominated the industry, 
accounting for about 88  % of total milk 
deliveries.10 Rokiškio sūris, known primarily 
for its cheese production, acquired dairy 
companies mainly in Eastern Lithuania. 
Pieno žvaigždės emerged in 1998 after the 
merger of three dairy companies. The third 
group, Žemaitijos pienas, comprised dairy 
companies in Western Lithuania. At that 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 39 33 36 33 69 69 44 40 44a 42a
Sales revenues 
(million EUR)
394 487 518 589 804 856 726 808 984a 1020a
Gross operating surplus 
(million EUR)
33.1 10.1 45.2 74.7 101.7 24.0 71.1 62.7 79.1a ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)
10.5 10.9 9.6 9.1 9.3 8.7 8.1 7.6 7.6a 8.3a
Milk processed b
(million kg)
1 025 1 140 1 241 1 409 1 485 1 561 1 429 1 457 1 539 1 658
Table 15. Main indicators of the Lithuanian dairy industry, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Statistics Lithuania; b Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade. Note: some national sources
report lower figures for the number of enterprises and the number of employees, see e.g. Stalgiene 2013, p. 39.
10 Industry concentration (CR4) in the beginning of the 2000s based on turnover figures was slightly smaller than 
on the basis of milk purchase shares, because there were also four ice cream manufacturers operating in the dairy 
industry.
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time only a few medium-sized dairy com-
panies preserved their independence, but 
two examples of those are Vilkyškių pieninė 
and the former milk conserve manufacturer 
Marijampolė pieno kombinat. 
Later the dominance of the three major 
companies weakened as other dairy man-
ufacturers reinforced their shares in the 
industry. Vilkyškių pieninė, an old dairy spe-
 Company
Sales revenues (million €) Profit (million €)
Profit to 
sales (%)
2002 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012
Rokiškio sūris 107.2 162.3 160.4 199.3 230.7 10.0 4.3
Pieno žvaigždės 75.7 180.3 179.6 203.0 222.7 9.9 4.4
Žemaitijos pienas 72.7 108.0 125.6 143.2 145.0 7.9 5.4
Marijampolė pieno k. 3.4 70.4 87.7 94.0 104.8  .. ..
Vilkyškių pieninė 13.3 46.1 70.7 84.0 85.7 2.0 2.3
MGL Baltija .. 16.9 26.4 27.0 20.3 0.1 0.5
Pienas LTa .. 3.5 34.8 43.9 40.0 1.1 2.7
Pieno putaa .. 4.5 6.6 8.7 8.3  0.02 0.2
Litamilk .. 9.1 19.5 14.5 16.8  .. ..
Varenos pienelis  .. 14.3 9.8 7.4 9.5 .. ..
Table 16. Financial figures of the major Lithuanian dairy companies.
Source: Verslo žinios, Liepos 7 d., 2003, Verslo žinios, TOP 1000, 2010-2012. Note: a purchasing and sales cooperatives of milk farms.
cialising in cheese production, generated 
good profit and used the earnings primarily 
for expansion. In a few years they have 
acquired other smaller processing plants 
in their area. Marijampolė pieno kombinat, 
after having shrunk to a small size, has 
recovered from its financial and market dif-
ficulties to challenge the leading companies 
with the help of growing export sales. Due 
Packaging in the 
cheese factory of 
Rokiškio sūris.
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to the strengthening of middle-sized manu-
facturers, the turnover-based concentration 
(CR4) dropped from 83 % in 2005 to 69 % 
in 2012.
Currently all the five big companies have 
several processing plants: Rokiškio sūris 
has three, Pieno žvaigždės four, Žemaitijos 
pienas three and Vilkyškių pieninė also three. 
Marijampolė pieno kombinat has five plants. 
It produces canned milk in Marijampolė and 
skim milk powder in Kalvarija, while the 
other three plants are smaller. 
Despite impressive growth in the past 
decade, the capacity utilisation of the 
processing facilities has occasionally been 
rather low around 60 %. Consequently, the 
Lithuanian dairy industry could, in principle, 
produce nearly twice its current volume 
output. The target level of raw material to 
be processed was declared upon EU acces-
sion to be 2.5 billion kg. It is still 1.5 times 
larger than the actual volume processed 
in year 2012. Capacity utilisation also has 
a seasonal nature. Especially processors 
using relatively more milk from small farms 
tend to have more excess capacity in the 
winter. 
Four big companies are listed in the stock 
exchange and are all in majority domestic 
ownership. Rokiškio sūris is mainly owned 
by its management while Pieno žvaigždės 
and Žemaitijos pienas are owned by various 
Lithuanian private individuals and compa-
nies. Foreign ownership is rather modest in 
the industry. Ingman ledai used to be owned 
by Finnish Ingman foods but it was moved to 
Dairy companies collect their milk from thousands of small farms. This hundred-year-old log-structured barn 
gives shelter to a few cows and calves.
Inside the log barn.
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Unilever ownership when Unilever acquired 
the Finnish parent company in 2011. MGL 
Baltija, a milk powder manufacturing com-
pany, used to be in German ownership, but 
currently the company has Swiss owners. 
Lithuanian experts of the dairy sector 
consider that there are many factors that 
contribute to the overall impressive perfor-
mance of the Lithuanian dairy supply chain, 
including:
1. Cheap production factors. Lithuania 
has one of the lowest average milk prices in 
the EU. Additionally, cheap labour force is 
available for farms and manufacturers.
2. Feeding is based on cheap grass 
and there is a favourable climate, precipi-
tation is sufficient, and there is no need for 
irrigation. The soil quality is reasonable and 
fertility is maintained with natural manure.
3. The Lithuanian dairy industry has 
specialised in cheese and companies also 
concentrated some of their recent invest-
ments into cheese manufacturing.
4. Export marketing and establish-
ment of various export sales channels. 
(1)  Lithuanian dairy products hold an 
important place or play a growing role in 
the markets of Russia, the Asian countries 
such as Kazakhstan and the Caucasian 
countries. In the Russian market prices are 
good and there is a traditional reputation of 
Lithuanian cheese. (2) On the EU common 
market the main competitive factor for 
cheese is its price. It is the basis for private 
label products but in some cases industrial 
cheese is exported to EU countries like Italy 
and France, where it is repacked and sold 
with a good margin as branded products. 
Milk churns drying in a dairy farm of fifteen cows.
Small farms use portable milking equipment.
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Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Agriculture.
Figure 27. Milk collection by farmers’ cooperatives and private companies in Lithuania.
2004/05
Private companies
Cooperatives
1067 1038
1091 1107 1136 1045
928 918 944
2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
72 164
207 240 246 230
350
399
416
(3)  Lithuanian manufacturers are also 
exploring the possibilities to regain their 
foothold in the US market.
Lithuanian companies have accumulat-
ed valuable export sales experience during 
the past two decades, but the geographical 
concentration of their cheese exports to 
Russia makes them vulnerable. Russia is a 
volatile market where from one day to an-
other unexpected changes can occur, caus-
ing substantial damage to sales revenues. 
The underlying factor can be an economic 
shock, as happened in 1998, which affects 
all exporters. Russia has also applied import 
barriers related to hygienic conditions of 
livestock products originating from various 
countries. The Lithuanian dairy companies 
were adversely hit by a temporary ban 
on Russian imports already in September 
2009, but the second ban prompted lately 
by political motives in October 2013 has 
presumably had even more severe effects, 
since it was released only in December. 
These events highlight the economic and 
political risk of concentrating an industry’s 
exports towards Russia.
Milk purchases
A few years ago dairy manufacturers took 
care of milk collection themselves. Before 
the accession the milk collection system 
received subsidies from the Lithuanian gov-
ernment. Recently milk collection has been 
shared among three groups of companies: 
(1) dairy processors, which still collect their 
own milk, (2) milk cooperatives and asso-
ciated member farms, and (3) milk trading 
companies. Previously processers organised 
most of the milk collection but they have 
partially outsourced it to the new milk col-
lecting and trading companies.  
In 2012 there were 44 dairies, but the 
number of milk purchasers was as high as 
75. The situation has created competition 
in milk purchase but, in some cases, also 
increased costs such as those related to 
quality assurance. Samples are taken at 
the point of milk collection, as in previous 
years, by the first-stage milk purchasing 
companies, but processing companies also 
take additional samples to monitor quality 
(double checking). Milk collection has also 
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been scattered in geographic terms, since 
nowadays companies buy milk all over 
Lithuania and there is no territorial division 
among milk purchasers. Due to this fact even 
the most remote farms have a choice to sell 
their output to several milk purchasers.
Milk prices in Lithuania do not include 
collection and transportation costs. The 
number of collection stations is estimated 
to be approximately one thousand. For big 
farms the purchase price paid for milk may 
be 5-6 euro cents above the average, i.e. 
about 34 cents instead of 28.
The purchase strategy differs 
for the three main types of 
milk buyers. Dairy companies 
usually pay a low price so 
that they can recover the 
costs of transportation 
and the collection sta-
tions they run. Milk 
cooperatives do the 
same organisational 
work, maintaining 
some collections 
points, operat-
ing a fleet of trucks, 
even collecting from small farms di-
rectly and delivering the bulk milk to 
the processors. Still, often they can 
provide a better price to their mem-
bers. Some even provide the farmers 
with financial benefits. Milk trading – 
buying and reselling – companies are 
only interested in maximising their 
own profit. 
Dairy manufacturers strive to 
spread risk with multiple channels 
of milk purchase. This is one of the 
ultimate reasons why they still 
maintain their own milk collection 
system. Apart from the regular milk 
use, a manufacturer may also have 
an exceptional demand for a large 
quantity of milk. Such a case may be 
a one-time order of several hundred 
tons of milk powder that the com-
pany has to deliver in a given time 
e.g. half a year. In such a case the company 
may make milk supply contracts with big 
cooperatives and traders for this period of 
time, but depending on market conditions or 
prices the supplier can easily terminate the 
contract after one month. 
Cooperative ownership, vertical 
integration
Cooperation among milk farmers has 
strengthened in Lithuania. The primary moti-
vation for establishing the cooperatives was 
the endeavour to achieve better prices. The 
cooperative movement is also granted some 
financial incentives. After EU accession, 
support for milk collection was removed, but 
cooperatives still enjoy some support in the 
form tax exemptions and direct subsidies. 
This support complies with EU rules and can 
amount to up to 5  % of annual sales reve-
nues. The support is phased out in five years 
after the establishment of the cooperative, 
and the maximum amount of overall support 
cannot exceed 1.4 million Litas. 
In 2012 the two major cooperatives were 
Pienas LT and Pieno puta (Table 16). The first 
one unites large milk farms while the latter is 
formed primarily of small ones. The overall 
influence of cooperatives has been growing 
as they have become stronger especially 
since 2010. Similarly to what happened in 
the other Baltic countries, dairy processors’ 
milk purchase volumes and prices dropped 
drastically due to market difficulties in 
2009, which resulted in more activity from 
cooperatives. 
The investment of Pienas LT shares many 
similarities with that of Latvijas piens in 
the northern neighbour: it is a green-field 
investment in the dairy industry by the 
strongest milk farmers’ cooperative. Pienas 
LT’s dairy processing plant is currently under 
construction in the Kaunas Free Economic 
Zone. It has enjoyed political support and 
part of the financing originates from EU 
funds, as it has happened with its Latvian 
counterpart. 
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Pienas LT has so far sold its milk to 
Lithuanian processors or exported it to 
Poland. Sales revenues of the cooperative 
totalled 40 million EUR in 2012. The pro-
duction potential of Pienas LT members 
suggests a strong viability of the new 
investment. The value of the new process-
ing plant is about 29 million EUR and it is 
scheduled to be ready by the end of 2014. 
The initial annual processing capacity will 
be 240 million kg of milk which can later be 
extended to 440 million kg. Obviously, pro-
cessing companies do not like new entrants 
in the industry. The green-field capacity has 
received much criticism from the existing 
dairy manufacturers, many of which have 
excess capacity at the moment. The owners 
of the new plant comprise 211 members of 
Pienas LT, individual farmers, companies 
and smaller cooperatives. The factory is 
planned to produce and export milk protein 
used in the food and pharmaceutical indus-
tries (Januškevičiūtė 2013). 
Although milk production is still domi-
nated in Lithuania by micro-farms, the con-
struction of the new processing plant directs 
attention to the strengthening of large milk 
farms in the country. There are two distinct 
groups of big milk farms in Lithuania:
(1) Family farms, which increased their 
size from a few cows to over 50 or even 
100 heads. These have constantly grown, 
bought new animals, started employing 
outside workforce and invested into build-
ings and new technology. They also had an 
access to EU money.
(2) Agricultural companies, the succes-
sors of the old kolhoses/sovhoses have always 
been big. They mostly use the technology and 
buildings inherited from the previous regime, 
although some have modernised. The attitude 
towards innovation and modernisation may 
not be as self-evident as in business-minded 
family farms, which achieved their dynamic 
growth steadily over 15-20 years. In general, 
it is much more difficult to renovate an old 
farm (e.g. arrange a new milking system, 
set up a manure removal system etc.) than 
to build a completely new shed. Still, the 
milk yield is very high in some agricultural 
A truck collecting milk from a cooperative member. Several dairy cooperatives have been established recently 
in Lithuania, and Pienas LT has primarily big farms in its membership.
84
companies. Agricultural companies hold 
about 45 thousand dairy cows. In 2012 their 
average milk productivity was 7160 kg/
cow compared to the average of the family 
farms, 4940 kg/cow. In fact, the agricultural 
companies which have survived so far are 
very likely to stay in business in the future. 
There is even some partial foreign owner-
ship in three or four of the farms.
There are also other examples of vertical 
integration in the Lithuanian dairy supply 
chain. The owners of Pieno žvaigždės and 
Vilkyškių pieninė also own a few big dairy 
farms. In these cases, however, the level 
of vertical integration remains rather low. 
Another example is Norfa, the fourth biggest 
retailer chain that has a dairy called Rivona 
in Alytus. Rivona supplies a wide range of 
fresh dairy products exclusively to Norfa.
Relations to the retail sector
The Lithuanian retail sector has very strong 
domestic chains. Both VP Market and Palink 
started their business in the 1990s with 
the same concept of introducing western 
style retail chains to Lithuanian consum-
ers. Since Western-European chains did 
not immediately show particular interest 
in the Lithuanian grocery market – as 
it happened in Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia or Hungary – the Lithuanian owned 
retail chains had room and time to get a 
solid foothold on the market.  
Both VP Market and Palink have expand-
ed their network of retail units rapidly. VP 
Market’s Maxima group runs five different 
retail chain concepts in Lithuania: conven-
ient stores, supermarket, hypermarkets and 
a cash & carry chain called Bazė. Altogether 
the group had 499 retail units in 2012. Palink 
runs 228 stores under three retail chains: IKI, 
IKIUKAS and CENTO. 
Both retail companies have expanded 
abroad. The Maxima group has gained a 
large market share in Estonia and Latvia and 
acquired some smaller chains in Poland and 
Bulgaria. Palink has a subsidiary in Latvia.
The third largest chain, Norfos mažmena, 
was established in 1997 and by 2012 had 
132 stores. The company runs its outlets in 
five size categories (S, L, XL, XXL and Hyper) 
under the name Norfa. Rimi Lietuva is the 
fourth biggest chain and the only one under 
foreign ownership since it is the subsidiary 
of Swedish ICA. Rimi Lietuva consists of 17 
Big family farms in Lithuania have reached their current size as a result of gradual development since the 
beginning of the 1990s
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Figure 28. Structure of the Lithuanian food retail sector, 2012.
Source: own calculations based on VŽ Verslo Klasė, TOP 1000, 2013.
Palink 
20.8%
Norfos 
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11.5%
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Maxima 
38.9%Others 
24.0%
hypermarkets and 22 
supermarkets. 
Retailers have 
contracts with all 
companies. Supply 
contracts are long 
term (sometimes even 
for 4-5 years) but the 
price is renegotiated 
twice a year. Retailers 
may demand partic-
ipation in sales cam-
paigns (e.g., three for 
the price of two) and 
costs are passed on to 
suppliers. Due to the 
large market power 
of the retailers, rela-
tively smaller profit 
can be realised in the 
domestic market, as opposed to a notably 
larger profit rate in the export markets.
The small dairies cannot sell to large 
retailer chains because output volumes are 
not enough to ensure product availability in 
all retail units. Therefore, small companies 
sell to smaller chains such as Aibe or small 
independent village shops. 
Retailers’ payments have always been a 
problem. They have often been late and long 
delays e.g., three months occurred often. At 
present, however, a government decree 
requires all agricultural and food products 
to be paid within 30 days. The retailers now 
abide by this rule, but they interpret the 
beginning of the 30 days in their own way: 
it is not the day of delivery to them, but 
the date they sell the product. In the case 
of some long shelf-life products like cheese, 
the difference can be significant and up to 
30-40 days.
The Lithuanian retail concern Maxima is 
the largest company in the Baltic retail 
business.
86
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of companies 779 774 723 736 682 724 656 663 604  ..
Sales revenues 
(billion EUR)
3.4 3.9 4.7 5.0 5.9 6.1 5.0 6.1 6.6b 7.2c
Gross operating surplus  
(million EUR)
281.3 312.9 342.5 352.7 526.8 420.4 468.6 498.2 .. ..
Number of employees 
(thousand)
48.1 46.2 45.2 44.3 42.8 41.7 41.8 41.3b 39.9b ..
Milk processed d
(billion kg)
7.5 8.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.8
Table 17. Main indicators of the Polish dairy industrya, 2003-2012.
Source: Eurostat; a Note: Figures include both dairy manufacturing (NACE 1051) and ice cream manufacturing (NACE 1052). In 
Poland, ice cream manufacturing is dominated by microenterprises, while bigger enterprises make up the dairy manufacturing 
industry. b Central Statistical Office of Poland (GUS); c Rzeczpospolita d Processed milk is corrected for cross-border milk trade.
2.5.8 Poland
Preparation for joining the EU’s common 
agricultural market started already in the 
1990s with a massive wave of investment 
seeking modernisation and compliance 
with EU requirements. Modernisation of 
the dairy farms has been accomplished 
with the help of EU and national support. 
Until 2003 the SAPARD program played an 
important role in supporting investment. In 
the 2000s it coincided with the moderni-
sation program of the Polish government 
that provided cheap loans. As a result 
of the modernisation investments, the 
capacity and scale of production also in-
creased in the dairy industry.  
The Polish dairy industry has apparently 
taken great advantage of the country’s EU 
accession in 2004. Compared to the pre-EU 
period, sales revenues have doubled and 
even real term sales have risen by 58  %. 
The gross operating surplus has remained at 
eight percent of sales, which is among the 
best and most stable performances of the 
countries in the peer group. 
The volumes of milk processed have 
also swelled steadily, hence indicating a 
strengthening of the market position. The 
growth analysis of real term sales revenues 
(in Table 29 on page 137) unveils that the 
Polish dairy industry has enjoyed constant 
and significant growth on the large domestic 
market. Domestic sales increased by 2.75 % 
annually between 2000 and 2011, so the 
domestic market has contributed 60  % of 
the dairy industry’s total growth.
The dairy industry is rather fragmented 
in Poland. Although the leading companies 
are strong, none of them controls more than 
11 % of the aggregate sales revenues of the 
industry. In 2009 the concentration CR4 was 
32 % and CR8 was also as low as 45 %. Two 
years later, the concentration ratios had 
not changed. Both the aggregate output of 
the industry and the sales revenues of the 
market leaders have increased at similar 
pace. Domestic experts anticipate slow con-
solidation and consider the mergers of the 
domestic leaders rather unlikely in the near 
future.
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Sales 
(million €)
Sales 
(million €)
Milk intake 
(million kg)
Number 
of milk 
suppliers
Average delivery 
per supplier 
(kg/day)
Sales 
(million €)
2009 2010 2011
Mlekpol 439 638 980 14 000 192 715
Mlekovita 508 626 740 10 000 203 707
Polmlek 324 426 550 20 000 75 437
Danone 361 438 100 700 391 410
Lacpol 185 576 900 25 000 99 316
Lowicz 196 263 480 7 000 188 303
Zott Polska 191 160 120 800 411 232
Piatnica 113 136 130 2 500 142 170
Hochland 
Polska
153 188 120 2 500 132 159
Bakoma 95 114 65 2 000 89 125
Spomlek 66 125 160 8 000 55 108
Gostyn 73 120 175 1 500 320 93
Table 18. The leading companies in the Polish dairy industry.
Sources: Rzeczpostpolita TOP 2000, Forum Mleczarskie, IERIGZ and company websites
Milk purchases
Milk purchases by dairy companies shrank 
drastically through the years of economic 
reform in the early 1990s. Restructuring 
and privatisation of the formerly state 
owned companies and a severe decline 
in consumers’ income pressed down milk 
deliveries to dairies. The income drop, 
difficulties in the market and pronounced 
economic uncertainty even affected the 
output of cooperative-based dairies, which 
however continued to be owned by farmers. 
In 1995 as little as 52 % of total milk pro-
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duction was processed by dairy companies, 
while almost half of the milk was consumed 
on the millions of producing farms or 
sold directly, either on local markets or 
through various other channels. 
During the past two decades the signif-
icance of home supply and direct sales has 
declined gradually and by 2012 the share 
of milk delivered to dairies had increased to 
nearly 78 %. In 2010 the share of self-supply 
of Polish households amounted on average 
to 13 % for milk, 6 % for cheese and 8 % 
for cream and sour cream, while the shame 
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Source: Eurostat data.
Figure 29. Milk use structure in Poland, 1989-2012.
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1990
shares for farming families were 74 %, 37 % 
and 47  % respectively (Seremak-Bulge et. 
al, 2012). Some farms manufacture fresh 
cheese and there is still a local market for 
milk and other dairy products. 
A milk collection network already op-
erated before 1990 and thousands of milk 
collection points were still functioning in the 
countryside in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
The multiplicity of collection points was a 
necessity due to the small size of milk farms 
and the lack of cooling capacity on farms. 
In the 2000s the number of milk collection 
points shrank as expanding farms invested 
into their own cooling equipment. Dairy fac-
tories first outsourced the collection points 
to logistic enterprises before gradually 
phasing out the whole activity. At present, 
dairies manufacturers either procure the 
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Buildings have been built by three generations, 
the first one being over a hundred years 
old. Currently buildings are used for cows, 
equipment and if need be other livestock. 
Occassionally Polish dairy farms 
get additional income from meat 
production.
milk directly on their own, or purchase the 
milk collection services from entrepreneurs 
or specialised firms. Milk collection stations, 
however, still operate in regions where milk 
is purchased from very small farms. 
 The geographic scatter of milk farms is 
one of the main weaknesses of the Polish 
dairy supply chain. Several dairy man-
ufacturers procure milk from thousands 
of small and medium-scale farms. The 
foreign-owned companies tend to get their 
milk from large farms, e.g. Danone and Zott 
suppliers deliver on average 400 kg milk 
a day, which is two to three times larger 
than the corresponding average for many 
domestic competitors (see Table 18). 
Cooperative ownership and vertical 
integration
Cooperative movement started in the Polish 
dairy sector already a hundred years ago and 
the number of cooperative-owned dairies in-
creased fast. The period covering the 1950s 
to the 1980s brought a gradual consolida-
tion, but at the end of the previous regime 
in 1989 almost a 100  % of the milk was 
purchased by cooperative dairies.  
During the restructuring and privatisa-
tion process, private owners acquired about 
20-30 % of the assets of the industry. Foreign 
investors arrived early in the 1990s and 
have increased their presence ever since. 
The biggest investments have been made 
by Danone, Hochland, Zott, Bongrain and 
Lactalis. All these foreign-owned companies 
have also contributed to the dynamism of 
dairy exports. Additionally, Milkiland, the 
international dairy concern of Russian-
Ukrainian origin acquired some production 
capacity. Arla divested from Poland by sell-
ing its cheese plant to Polmlek in 2011.
Apart from the foreign-owned companies, 
the largest dairy manufacturers in private 
domestic ownership are Polmlek, Lacpol and 
Bakoma. The first two are concerns which 
consist of several processing plants across 
the country. Polmlek has eight factories, 
while Lacpol has eleven. Both companies 
belong to the market leaders of the Polish 
dairy industry.  
Feed mixing equipment.
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Due to the progress made by private-
ly-owned manufacturers, the share of 
cooperatives in milk procurement declined 
to about 80 % by 2005, while their share in 
the sales of the industry was estimated to 
be 70 % in the same year (Seremak-Bulge 
et. al, 2005, p. 116). Dairy cooperatives are 
still very strong and the leading ones, such 
as Mlekovita and Mlekpol, have invested 
heavily in a continuous process of modern-
isation. They have also initiated actively 
some consolidation in the industry. 
The ownership of Polish dairy cooper-
atives is rather bitty, the biggest coopera-
tives having several thousands of members 
whose ownership, however, feels very 
distant. These companies are directed by 
a group of managers with individual farm 
owners having little word on strategic de-
cisions. The smaller the cooperative, the 
more influence farmers feel they have on 
the dairy’s activities.
Nowadays there is also a new type of 
horizontal integration of producers, espe-
cially among the suppliers of the private 
dairies. In these groups, farmers who have 
big herds and proper cooling facilities 
negotiate jointly the price of milk with a 
processor, but the milk is taken by the dairy 
manufacturers directly from the farms.
Mlekovita is one of the leading Polish dairy cooperatives.
Foreign owned dairies have had important spill-over 
effects of spreading new management and marketing 
techniques since the mid 1990s in Poland.
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Relations to retailers
As elsewhere in the region, retailers in Poland 
tend to transfer risks to suppliers by making 
them repurchase unsold goods, imposing 
marketing and logistic fees, or charging the 
cost of promotion campaigns. Consumers 
prefer small retail outlets in Poland and the 
units of discount store chains because of 
convenience and price level. 
As a rule, when negotiating with retail 
chains, dairies have little bargaining power. 
There are some exceptions, usually when 
the dairy holds a relatively high market 
share for a particular narrow product seg-
ment (e.g. cottage cheese of OSM Piatnicza).
In addition to the quality standards that 
are widely in use, retailers tend to have 
their own quality requirements, although 
those are also regarded by suppliers as just 
another way for retailers’ to extract excess 
profit from them. The requirements involve 
regular checks of production processes and 
the quality control argument facilitates an 
insight to the manufacturers’ cost structure.
Although the market share of private 
label products has recently grown in 
Poland, PL sales are still much lower than 
in the other Central and Eastern European 
countries. Private label products accounted 
for 18 % of sales in 2012 compared to 28 % 
in Slovakia, 25  % in Hungary, or 20  % in 
the Czech Republic (GFK 2013). The small 
market share of private label products rate 
in Poland can be attributed to the fragment-
ed structure of the retail sector. 
The share of private label products 
in Poland varies considerably by retail 
concept. In 2012, discount stores already 
offered 56  % of their goods under their 
own private labels, while the proportion 
was only 10 % for hypermarkets and 18 % 
for supermarkets. Manufacturer brands are 
expected to lose market shares as private 
labels are forecast to increase their shares 
to 62 % in discount stores, 12 % in hyper-
markets and 22 % in supermarkets by 2015 
(GFK 2013). 
Some dairy manufacturers with strong 
brands and good market positions are not 
willing to manufacture private label prod-
ucts at all (Wieczorkiewicz, 2013). Private 
label, however, is a relevant option for those 
cooperative dairies, which struggle with 
excess capacity. For private label products, 
the retailer sets the appearance (images, 
text, font). The producer is fully responsible 
for the packaging and getting all the neces-
sary permissions from the national and EU 
authorities. Retailers usually do not want to 
take this responsibility themselves. 
The role of wholesalers within the chain 
has decreased, as wholesalers source prod-
ucts from small dairies and serve primarily 
individual small retailers. The largest retail-
ers are chained and take care of their own 
supply through direct contracts with the 
largest dairies.
Retailers have strong negotiating power 
despite the rather fragmented market struc-
ture. The retail sector of Poland has changed 
substantially over the past two decades. It 
was restructured in the economic reforms of 
the early 1990s like elsewhere in the former 
socialist countries. The retail chains of the 
soviet era disappeared and foreign retail 
companies settled in the country one after 
another already in the 1990s. 
The period between 1995 and 2007 
witnessed a boom of hypermarket construc-
tions, as the concept proved to be a cost 
effective way of delivering rapid growth 
in market shares. Increasingly affluent 
consumers also favoured the big units with 
wide assortments. Several foreign chains 
such as Tesco, Metro, Auchan and Carrefour 
created and expanded their network of 
hypermarkets.
The recession brought changes in shop-
ping and consumption patterns very similar 
to those experienced in the other countries. 
Discount stores have gained in popular-
ity since 2008. Their sales have increased 
10-20 % annually, which represents a much 
faster growth rate than that of the other 
retail formats. The two leading chains of the 
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discount store concept, Lidl and Jeronimo 
Martins, have strengthened their market 
positions considerably. This new trend is 
largely attributable to the reduced income 
level of Polish consumers as a result of the 
economic recession.  
On the other hand discount stores 
themselves have also improved their 
services and assortment. Due to the 
dense network of relatively small outlets, 
discount store chains have managed to 
offer the benefits of convenient stores in 
the suburbs of large cities and the centres 
of small provincial towns or sometimes 
even in the bigger villages of rural areas. 
The biggest rivals have recognised the 
business potential of the concept and re-
sponded promptly by setting up their own 
discount store chains. At present, already 
nine of the 20 biggest retail companies in 
No Company Names of the chains Retail concept
Sales (million EUR) Country of 
ownership2008 2009 2010 2011
1
Jeronimo 
Martins
Biedronka discount stores 3638 3883 5061 6138 Portugal
2 Tesco Tesco Tesco 
Extra
hypermarket, 
supermarket
2591 2341 2682 2610
Great-
Britain
3 Carrefour
Carrefour, 
Carrefour 
Market
hypermarket, 
supermarket
2434 1894 2278 2171 France
4 Lidl Polska Lidl discount stores 1025 1179 1527 1820 Germany
5 PSH Lewiatan
Market, 
Minimarket, 
Supermar-
ket, Lewiatan 
Partner
franchise .. .. 1707 1772 Poland
6
Makro Cash & 
Carry
Makro cahs & carry 2200 1998 2164 1754 Germany
7 Auchan
Auchan, Simp-
ly Market
hypermarket, 
supermarket
1564 1375 1565 1584 France
8
Kaufland Polska 
Markety
Kaufland supermarket 1009 1046 1266 1373 Germany
9 Real sp i spólka Real hypermarket 1500 1464 1415 1273 Germany
10
Grupa 
Muszkieterów
Intermarche supermarket 816 756 904 1019 France
11 Selgros Sp.
Selgros Cash 
& Carry
cash & carry 824 700 791 824 Germany
12 POLOmarket Sp POLOmarket supermarket 626 601 744 801 Poland
13 Zabka Polska Zabka
convenience 
stores
521 490 586 686 Poland
14 E.Leclerc Polska E.Leclerc hypermarket 602 527 630 643 France
Table 19. The major companies of the Polish retail sector.
Source: Rzeczpospolita, Polskie przedsiębiorstwa lista 2000; Figurska J. & Rybarski M. 
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Poland operate a discount or convenience 
store chain. 
The structure of the Polish retail sector 
is extremely fragmented: there are still 
over 350  000 retail units throughout the 
country, of which 90  % are smaller than 
100m2. The geographic distribution of the 
population is rather scattered, with 40  % 
of the 38 million inhabitants living in rural 
areas. Small grocery stores have also sur-
vived in the towns. 
Foreign chains ran 11 700 outlets at the 
beginning of 2011. Those chains operate 
most of the hyper- and supermarkets, which 
represent the largest retail units in the coun-
try. In 2012 there were 434 hypermarkets and 
1998 supermarkets, which compares to 30 
and 1 300 in 1996, respectively. The number 
of discount stores reached 2 920 in 2012, of 
which Biedronka stores totalled 2083, Lidl 
450, Netto 276 and Aldi 64 (GFK 2013).
Although foreign chains have acquired 
significant positions in Polish retail, the 
sector still has several big and equally pow-
erful competitors. Many companies have 
been attracted by the large market, but it 
has been a challenge for them to gain large 
market shares. Therefore, concentration 
stays below the level observed in other 
European countries: CR4 was only 26 % and 
even CR8 was as low as 38 % in 2011.
The list of leading companies illustrates 
the dominance of foreign-owned chains and 
confirms the relatively even distribution of 
market power. However, the recent sales 
figures show the growth of discount stores. 
Biedronka (Jeronimo Martins) and Lidl have 
managed to almost double their sales in 
four years while other chains dominated by 
hypermarkets and supermarkets grew more 
moderately over the same period.
The sector concentrates constantly 
as the large chains increase their market 
shares at the expense of small individual 
shops. The market leaders also expand via 
mergers and acquisitions, e.g. Metro Group 
sold its hypermarket chain to Auchan at the 
end of 2012, which moved in the ranking 
list to second place with this transaction. 
At the same time, additional foreign chains 
become interested in the Polish market: in 
2012, VP Market acquired a small chain of 
21 outlets in Eastern Poland, a transaction 
which is considered to be only the first step 
for the Lithuanian company of a growth 
strategy in Poland. However, concentration 
in the Polish retail sector has been and re-
mains very slow.
Biedronka is the leading discount store chain in Poland.
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PRODUCTIVITY3
3.1 General approach and methodology
The competitiveness of an industry such 
as the dairy sector is achieved when indi-
vidual companies within that industry are 
able to sell goods or services at a price 
and quality that compare favourably to 
those of competitors. Competitiveness 
therefore relates closely to the concept 
of productivity, defined as the efficiency 
of the process by which firms (or sectors) 
transform inputs into outputs. Indeed, for 
entire countries or large sectors of an 
economy, some prominent economists 
consider that competitiveness is just 
“a funny way of saying ‘productivity’” 
(Krugman, 1994, p. 32). In a similar vein, 
the UK Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs concluded its review 
of competitiveness indicators for the 
food chain industries by stating that “at 
root, competitiveness should be viewed 
as being about economic efficiency or 
productivity” (DEFRA, 2002). Against this 
background, the objective of this section is 
to assess productivity levels and productiv-
ity growth in the dairy chains of the eight 
countries of the Baltic Sea region. 
The productivity of a firm or sector is 
simply defined as the ratio of outputs 
(e.g., yoghurt, butter) to inputs (e.g., 
labour, milk) (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 2). 
While the value of the index is uninforma-
tive by itself, its rate of change measures 
the growth in output that is not explained 
by the growth in inputs and therefore di-
rectly captures how the efficiency of the 
production process changes over time. 
This is why the results of a productivity 
analysis are often presented in the form 
of growth accounting that decompos-
es output growth into its component 
parts, including productivity growth. In 
turn, productivity growth can be broken 
down into various sources: 
• Technological change, defined as the 
process by which new technologies are 
adopted by firms.
• Changes in technical efficiency, 
defined as the ability of a firm to 
produce maximum output with a fixed 
quantity of inputs, given the state of 
the technology. In effect, that a firm 
is technically efficient means that it 
3.1.1 Productivity growth versus productivity level
96
does not ‘waste’ any of its production 
factors.
• Changes in allocative efficiency, de-
fined as the selection of input mixes 
that produce a given quantity of output 
at minimum cost (given the input prices 
that prevail) and, if multiple outputs are 
produced, the choice of an output mix 
that maximises revenue from a given 
quantity of inputs (given the output 
prices that prevail).
• Changes in scale efficiency. For instance, 
in an industry characterized by rela-
tively large fixed costs and increasing 
returns to scale, restructuring towards 
larger firms would deliver productivity 
growth.
Each of those four sources relate closely 
to the operational and strategic decisions 
that businesses have to make, such as 
the choice of outputs to produce, level 
of investments in tangible assets (e.g., 
machinery), or choice of size of operation. 
Hence, productivity growth represents a 
first competitiveness indicator. However, 
just as the productivity of a sector can be 
analysed at different points in time, it can 
be compared at one point in time across 
different countries, and here as well differ-
ences in productivity levels can have mul-
tiple causes, including differences in tech-
nologies, scale, output mix, input mix and 
technical efficiency. Our analysis therefore 
compares both productivity growth and pro-
ductivity levels of the dairy sectors in eight 
countries of the Baltic Sea area. 
3.1.2 Partial versus Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
If the production process involved a single 
input and a single output, calculating pro-
ductivity levels would be straightforward, 
but this is unfortunately never the case in re-
ality, where firms combine multiple produc-
tion factors in order to manufacture a whole 
range of products. Hence, the problem of 
measuring productivity becomes one of ag-
gregating inputs and outputs into appropri-
ate indices. This can be achieved by applica-
tion of various methods that differ in terms 
of accuracy, ease of implementation and 
data requirements, but two types of meas-
ures can be usefully distinguished: 
• Partial productivity measures, which 
simplify the problem of aggregating 
inputs and/or output by focusing on 
only one of each (e.g., milk for outputs, 
labour, dairy cows or land for inputs). 
The main advantage is the ease of calcu-
lation and interpretation, but it comes at 
the cost of accuracy. For instance, a high 
level of labour productivity can reflect 
high efficiency resulting from the use of 
a superior technology, but it can also be 
due to the inefficient substitution of cap-
ital for labour. In a similar vein, at the 
level of a farm, high milk yields can be 
sub-optimal if they are achieved through 
an inefficient use of costly feeds. It is 
therefore clear that partial productivity 
measures can provide a misleading 
indication of overall productivity when 
considered in isolation. 
• Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measures, 
which integrate all inputs and all out-
puts in the calculation. 
3.1.3 Measuring productivity
The analysis is based on a combination 
of partial productivity and TFP indices. 
Partial productivity measures are often 
self-explanatory but, at the farm level, the 
selection of specific indicators is guided 
by the literature on technical change and 
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development in agriculture of Hayami & 
Ruttan (1991). Specifically, labour produc-
tivity (Y/L) is partitioned into output per 
dairy cow (Y/C) and the number of dairy 
cows per worker (C/L) according to the 
relationship: Y/L=Y/C*C/L. The advantage 
of this decomposition lies in the sources of 
growth in each of the partial productivity in-
dicators: an increase in output per dairy cow 
(i.e., milk yield) reflects mainly biological 
innovations, such as genetic improvements 
or the amelioration of feed composition. On 
the other hand, the number of dairy cows 
per worker changes mainly with mechanical 
innovations, such as the labour requirement 
of milking machines or automation of other 
production processes such as feeding, 
cleaning, maintenance etc. 
A variety of methods are available for 
the measurement of TFP growth. When 
prices of all outputs and all inputs are avail-
able, that information can be combined with 
quantity data in order to produce traditional 
indices, such as Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher, 
and Tornqvist indices. Coelli et al. (1998) 
demonstrate that the Tornqvist index has 
superior economic properties and it is 
therefore used in this analysis. Formally, it 
is constructed from an output index and an 
input index:
∑
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where xi,t denotes the quantity of input i 
used in period t; wi,t is the price of that 
input; yk,t denotes the quantity of output 
k produced in period t and sold at a price 
pk,t. 
In spite of the cumbersome notations, 
these expressions have a simple interpre-
tation once it is recognized that, for any 
variable v, ln(vt /vt-1) is the growth rate of v 
between t-1 and t. 
The total growth rate of inputs ln(Inputt /
Inputt-1) is therefore a weighted average of 
growth rates of individual inputs ln(xi,t/xi,t-1), 
with the weights equal to the average cost 
shares of the inputs i. 
Similarly, the total growth rate of outputs 
ln(Outputt/Outputt-1) is a weighted average 
of growth rates of individual outputs ln(yk,t /
yk,t-1), with the weights equal to the average 
revenue shares of each output j. 
TFP growth, defined as the growth in 
ouput not explained by growth in inputs, 
is therefore calculated as the difference 
between the two previous expressions:
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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3.2 Data and construction of variables
3.2.1 Dairy farming
The analysis of productivity of dairy farms 
relies on the aggregate data provided 
by the European Commission’s Public 
Database of the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN)11. For the eight countries of 
the Baltic Sea region included in the study, 
the information extracted from the data-
base pertains to the TF14 grouping entitled 
“Specialist milk farm” (i.e., group 41 for the 
old classification based on gross margins 
before year 2004, and group 45 for the 
new classification based on standard output 
thereafter). The study covers the period 
from 1995 to 2010, from the time Finland 
joined the European Union to the latest 
year for which the FADN data is available. 
The database being run by EU institutions, 
it only contains information from member 
states and this means that for the relatively 
new entrants, the data is only available 
from the year of EU accession (2004 for the 
three Baltic States and Poland). 
Detailed information is available on the main 
aspects of the production process. Output 
values at current prices are recorded for 
milk, crop productions and beef/veal, which 
makes it possible to calculate the revenue 
shares β in equation (2). The corresponding 
quantity indices entering the definition of 
the output index (2) for crop productions 
and beef/veal are then calculated by de-
flating the current value figures, using the 
deflators in the EUROSTAT database.12 For 
milk, information is available on the number 
of dairy cows as well as milk yield, and it is 
therefore possible to infer a physical quanti-
ty of milk produced.
Input values are recorded for the main 
variable production factors, namely fertil-
isers, commercial feeds, pesticides, energy 
and seeds. The issue of family labour, which 
represents typically an important factor 
of production that is not directly paid, is 
addressed as follows. An average wage 
rate is calculated as the ratio of the wage 
bill to the quantity of paid labour, which is 
then applied to the input of family labour in 
order to infer the total cost of labour (family 
as well as hired). Capital inputs are more 
difficult to take into account because what 
should enter the productivity calculations 
are the flow variables, i.e., the productive 
services and associated costs provided by 
all the capital goods, although the database 
only records capital stocks for four classes 
of assets: land, buildings, machinery and 
livestock. Hence, for each asset class, we 
build the cost of capital as the sum of de-
preciation costs and opportunity cost of the 
investments. The first component is calcu-
lated assuming linear depreciation over 20 
years for buildings, seven years for machin-
ery, and five years for livestock, while land is 
assumed not to depreciate. The opportunity 
cost of capital is calculated as the interests 
that would have been earned by a near 
risk-free investment of the same value. The 
corresponding interest rate is approximated 
by the yield on long-run government bonds, 
as given by the European Central Bank 
database.13 By adding the depreciation 
and opportunity costs of the four classes 
of capital goods, one obtains the total cost 
of capital which is then used to calculate 
the cost share in the total input index (1). 
The growth in the quantity of capital in (1) 
is then calculated by using deflated values 
of buildings, machinery and livestock, while 
11 Available online at: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/index.cfm.
12 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/agriculture/data/database, categories Agricultural prices and 
prices indices – Price indices of agricultural products (2005=100).
13 http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn3146
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the physical quantity of land (i.e., surface 
area) is used for that asset.
The examination of cross-country pro-
ductivity levels using DEA only requires 
data on input and output quantities. Those 
are calculated in the same way as for the 
construction of the Tornqvist-Theil indices. 
However, the frontier used as a reference 
for benchmarking is built from FADN data 
of Finnish dairy farms, as explained when 
presenting the results.
3.2.2 Processing sector
The data collection for the analysis of 
the dairy processing sector proved more 
challenging than for the farm sector be-
cause Eurostat does not provide all the 
necessary information to calculate TFP 
indices. However, in order to establish a 
comparison across the entire Baltic region, 
labour productivity was calculated for 
all eight countries as follows.  
EUROSTAT’s Structural Business 
Statistics, subsection DA155 (manufacture 
of dairy products) provided data on gross 
output, value added at factor cost and the 
total number of employees in the sector, 
allowing calculation of labour productivity 
using current prices. The short-term business 
statistics then provided indices of producer 
prices (PPIs) to convert current price values 
into constant price equivalents. In doing so, 
we used the PPI for dairy manufacturing 
whenever possible, and otherwise chose an 
alternative as close to that sector as possi-
ble (e.g., food manufacturing).  
In order to calculate a TFP index for 
some countries, substantial effort had to 
be devoted to retrieving the data directly 
from National Statistical Institutes, with 
variable levels of success. Throughout this 
entire report dairy industry is presented and 
analysed by using NACE group 155 (Rev. 
1.1) or 105 (Rev. 2.). The figures include 
both "operations of dairies and cheese 
making" (1551 or 1051) and manufacture 
of ice cream (1552 or 1052). Since in most 
countries the latter is quantitatively very 
small, the decision was made to keep the 
analysis at the level of the entire dairy man-
ufacturing sector. It also ensured compara-
bility because the 3-digit NACE classification 
was available for all countries. Eurostat data 
were used primarily for the calculation and 
the dataset was updated with the most 
recent business structure statistics of the 
national statistical institutes. 
Output for all countries is only reported 
annually in nominal terms as total produc-
tion value and value-added (i.e., revenue 
minus intermediate consumptions). In 
order to calculate real output, a deflator is 
therefore required but, unfortunately, statis-
tical institutes seldom release statistics on 
producer prices or wholesale prices in dairy 
manufacturing. 
Alternatively, it is possible to use 
the component of the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) corresponding to the category 
‘cheese, dairy and eggs’ or the Producer 
Price Index (PPI) for the whole food man-
ufacturing sector (DA15). Neither option is 
entirely satisfactory, as the transmission 
of prices from manufacturers to retailers 
of dairy products is most likely imperfect, 
while sectoral specificities imply that pro-
ducer prices in dairy manufacturing may 
change differently from producer prices 
in other food sectors. Eventually, PPI for 
food manufacturing was used for all those 
countries where PPI for dairy industry was 
not available.
On the input side, labour is measured as 
the total number of hours worked by paid 
employees, and the corresponding cost is 
calculated by summing wages/salaries and 
the social costs borne by the employer. The 
nominal value of intermediate inputs is 
constructed as the difference between total 
production value and value added, which is 
then deflated. Given that milk is the main 
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intermediate factor used in dairy processing, 
the farm price index of milk was used for 
that purpose. 
Capital stock series are not available but 
can be built from statistics on investment in 
tangible assets using the perpetual invento-
ry method:
where Kt denotes capital stock in year t, It 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ (4) 
is investment in year t, and δ is the rate of 
depreciation. National statistical offices only 
report the nominal value of investments in 
any given year, which needs to be deflated. 
For most countries nominal and real term 
investment data of the food industry was 
ordered from the statistical institutes. The 
deflator was constructed by using these two 
series. The annual depreciation rate is set 
at a conventional value of 10  %, as used 
3.3 Results for dairy farming
3.3.1 Partial productivity measures
The analysis of partial productivity meas-
ures is summarized in Table 20 and Figure 
31-Figure 33. The performance of dairy 
farms in terms of labour productivity varies 
tremendously across countries. For instance, 
focusing on the latest year available (2010), 
one hour of labour on a dairy farm produced 
on average 255kg of milk in Denmark but 
only 58kg in Finland and 15kg in Latvia – a 
variation of a factor 17. Hence, on the basis 
of that indicator, Finnish dairy farms are not 
very competitive, lagging behind those in 
Denmark, Sweden and Germany. The new 
entrants have much lower levels of labour 
productivity than Finland, although Estonian 
farms outperform Latvian, Lithuanian, and 
Polish farms by a large margin.  
The positive trends visible in Figure 31 
and the growth rates reported in Table 20 
indicate that labour productivity has been 
increasing rapidly in all countries. The 
speed of growth over the 1995-2010 period 
in the four old EU member states varies 
from 3.7 % for Germany to 7.9 % for Finland. 
However, those differences in growth rates 
for this group of countries are not enough to 
significantly change competitive positions: 
Denmark is the clear leader throughout the 
period, Sweden and Germany have rather 
similar levels of productivity, while Finland 
lags behind. Turning to the situation of the 
new entrants, Estonia stands out from its 
large growth rate of labour productivity 
(+13  % annually), which is significantly 
larger than the Finnish rate over the 2004-
2010 period, and the labour productivity 
gap between Finnish and Estonian farms has 
therefore decreased. By contrast, there is 
no evidence of the other three new entrants 
catching up in terms of labour productivity, 
with Polish farms displaying particularly low 
rates of growth of that indicator.
for instance by Berghäl (2006, p. 27) in his 
analysis of productivity growth in Finnish 
ICT manufacturing. Because the initial 
capital stock in 1995 is unknown, for the 
old member states the perpetual inventory 
method is applied from 1970s onwards so 
as to minimise the approximation. For the 
new member states the inventory method 
was applied starting in the 1990s.
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Milk farms have invested heavily in Estonia over the past ten years. The investments 
started with SAPARD and continued with the rural development funds. As a result, 
over 50  % of dairy cows are kept in farms, which have invested into modern milk 
production technology and buildings. Usually new buildings were built and new milk-
ing, cooling and feeding equipment was installed in those farms. Many of the smaller 
farms could not meet the hygienic requirements of the EU and quitted milk produc-
tion. The investing farms increased their size and took over the market share left by 
the exiting small farms. This accelerated the concentration process of milk farms. 
The investments were initiated by the government due to the hygienic requirements 
of the EU, so many of the investments had to be completed before EU accession or during 
a certain transition period.  Commercial banks got interested in issuing agricultural loans 
at the same time, in the early 2000s, when public money started to flow into the sector. 
This facilitated the financing of investments. 
The primary aim of the investments – besides hygienic considerations – was to raise 
the average milk yield of cows. Over the past decades the breeding composition of dairy 
cows in Estonia has changed considerably from brown to Holstein. While Estonian red and 
Holstein had almost equal shares of the entire herd in 1995, by 2010 the share of Holstein 
had grown to 77 %. Additionally, a standard share of 0.5 % of Estonian native breed has 
been kept as genetic reserve since the 1960s. 
Nowadays, animals are kept and fed all year round indoors. Before year 2000 about 
90 % of the farms used grazing and 10 % used total mixed ratio (TMR), but for large mod-
ernized farms the shares have now been reversed. While most of the farms do grazing 
to some extent, it’s physically difficult have several hundreds of milking cows grazing 
because there’s not enough grasslands in the vicinity. Therefore, usually small farms 
or those not so interested in high milk yields, keep their herd in the fields grazing for a 
longer time. The aim of milk farm investment was to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
The average yield in Estonia has been growing rapidly, indeed, but it should also be 
acknowledged that costs have increased as well.
Estonian milk farms, particularly the 
large prospering ones, have clear plans for 
further growth. An ambitious objective was 
announced in the National Dairy Strategy 
to increase Estonian milk production to one 
million tons by 2020 from the current 721 
thousand tons. 
Banks consider dairy farming to be a 
secure sector to which to lend money. The 
value of the main collateral, i.e. land, has 
been growing and the good conditions and 
future prospects of milk production appar-
ently convince the financial sector that 
further investment in milk farming makes 
economic sense. 
Text box: 
The case of Estonia - Milk farms as the most powerful 
segment in the supply chain
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3.3.2 The parallel between farm structure and labour productivity
The positions and slopes of the labour 
productivity curves suggest a relation to 
the initial farm structure and the speed of 
concentration over time. Denmark’s initial 
position was 44 cows per farm in 1995 while 
Sweden, Germany and Finland had 27, 25 
and 12 respectively. The average farm size 
increased in Denmark at a fairly moderate 
Foreign investors have also set their eyes on Estonian dairying. Two main groups of 
foreign owners have emerged so far: (1) farmers, who settle down in Estonia to manage 
milk farms, and (2) financial and professional investors. The first group includes several 
nationalities but mostly farmers from Finland, while the second involves Scandinavian or 
even Austrian capital, as the latest investments associated with Trigon and Vaklak Group 
illustrate. The total share of foreign-owned farms in milk production is estimated to be as 
high as 20-25 % by some local experts.
Estonian milk farms continue concentrating, and the largest share of production 
originates from large holdings or agricultural companies with over a thousand dairy cows. 
They have formed strong cooperatives over the recent years to control milk procurement 
and sales. Eventually those farms decide whether they sell their milk domestically or to 
foreign processors. Their proposed new processing capacity would further increase their 
dominance.  Markets in Estonia are developing in a unique manner from the point of view 
of milk farms and as compared the situation in other new member states in the EU: milk 
farmers have become in Estonia the most powerful segment of the national dairy supply 
chain. 
Figure 30. Average farm size development.
Source: Eurostat.
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Figure 31. Evolution of labour productivity in dairy farms.
Source: Eurostat.
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pace until 2000, when the pace of milk farm 
structure development accelerated, follow-
ing precisely the same pattern as observed 
in the labour productivity curve.  
Average farm size development of 
Sweden and Germany also resemble the 
development of labour productivity of the 
two countries. Sweden set off with a slightly 
higher average farm size in 1995. The two 
countries’ farm structure developed at 
a relatively similar rate in the first half of 
the 2000s the process finally accelerated 
in Sweden in the last five years leaving 
Germany slightly behind, again precisely 
the same pattern as observed in the case of 
labour productivity development. 
Finland started with a much lower level 
average farm size and the farm structure 
has changed at a steady albeit rather 
modest rate throughout the entire period. It 
reached the 1995 level of Sweden by 2010 
– almost exactly the same way it did in the 
case of labour productivity development.
The similar evolution of milk farm struc-
ture and labour productivity is due to the 
close relation of farm size and the technical 
organisation of work in various typical dairy 
farm size categories. 
In the case of new EU member states 
the initial positions in average farm size 
and the speed of farm structure changes 
also explain the different pace of labour pro-
ductivity   development. A similar parallel 
can be identified concerning the rankings 
of two indicators within the group of the 
new member states and in relation to the 
positions of the old member states.  
Prior to their accession to the EU in 2003 
Estonia had over three times higher starting 
level of average farm size compared to Latvia, 
Poland and Lithuania. The pace of concen-
tration has also been much sharper than in 
the other three countries, again an identical 
development to that of labour productivity. 
Apparently, the rapid farm concentration has 
been behind the fast catching up of Estonia’s 
labour productivity towards the old member 
states, while a much slower concentration 
process seems to be responsible for the 
slower catching up of other countries. 
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There is, however, one exception to 
the numerous similarities between farm 
structure and labour productivity evolution. 
Estonia’s 27 cows per farm already exceed-
ed the average farm size of Finland of 24 
cows in 2010. In terms of labour productivity 
Estonia’s catching up is obvious but as of 
yet there has not been a flip in the ranking 
positions. This can be explained by the 
substantially different wage levels between 
the old and new member states. Salary 
differences between the two groups of 
countries may be three to fivefold. The 
inexpensive labour costs do not force 
large Estonian dairy farms to reduce their 
labour inputs radically. As the other side 
of the coin lower salaries impose a severe 
challenge on the Estonian dairy farms to 
find professional skilled labour force. Low 
wages often cause lack of motivation and 
non-efficient work. 
3.3.3 The two components of labour productivity
As discussed in the methodology section, 
labour productivity has two components, 
milk yields and labour requirements per 
dairy cow, which we now investigate. 
Figure 32 shows that there are important 
differences in yields across countries, but 
that three groups of countries can be de-
fined at the end of the period: 
• The yield leaders include Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden. For those 
countries, a dairy cow produces on 
average roughly 8500 kg of milk.
• Germany and Estonia form an in-
termediate group of countries, with 
yields around 7500 kg per dairy cow.
• The “laggard” countries - Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland - display yields 
around 5 000 kg per dairy cow.
Milk yields are clearly increasing over time 
(Figure 32 and Table 20) but the speed of 
the growth is limited, usually under 2 % an-
nually. The exception is Estonia, which man-
aged to close its yield gap with Germany 
after joining the EU. From 1995 to 2010, 
the Finnish, Danish, and Swedish yields 
converged and the calculations suggest 
that growth in yields beyond 8 000 kg is 
becoming increasingly difficult. In particular, 
one notes that yields have not increased 
much among the yield leaders over the 
last four years of the study, and Table 20 
also shows that for all four old EU member 
states but Sweden, growth in yields over 
the period 2004-2010 was significantly less 
than over the period 1995-2010.  
Hence, one can postulate that the bio-
logical innovations supporting yield growth, 
such as better genetics and improved 
feeding, are reaching a phase of marginal 
decreasing returns. This means in particular 
that improving performance on Finnish dairy 
farms through yield increases is becoming 
more and more difficult. On the other hand, 
as exemplified by the Estonian experience, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Poland probably have 
the potential to raise their productivity con-
siderably through the achievement of higher 
yields.
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Milk yield is the natural productivity indicator that has received much attention both 
by breeders and economists. It is indisputable that high milk yields contribute to the 
economic well being of farms via high milk production volumes and income. The indicator 
is easy to calculate, interpret and its growth is a matter of proud for individual farms and 
national dairy sectors. The undesirable side effect to high milk yields is, however, low 
fertility of cows. 
The trade off between yield and fertility was realised a long time ago. Pryce et. al. 
2004 reviews a great number of scientific articles that verify the negative correlation. The 
fact that the same genetic features are responsible for a higher yield and lower daughter 
fertility affects all dairy breeds. Nevertheless, breeding programs of the past decades 
have too intensely focused on increasing milk yields. Fertility or resistance to diseases 
did not receive so much emphasis in the selection criteria. This especially applies to the 
breeding programs of Holstein, which breed has been taking up dominant positions in 
Northern European stocks of dairy cows.  
The negative correlation between milk yield and fertility also came up in the farm 
interviews of this project regardless of the country. An endeavour for high yields tends 
to press down the average age of cows, and the average lactation periods remain well 
below three. Several farms mentioned that cows have to be replaced after their first or 
second lactation due to fertility problems. 
Although often overseen, fertility is an important contributor to the economic perfor-
mance of dairy farms. It costs a lot to replace a young cow either by purchasing a heifer 
or by raising one. Some of the largest farms are apparently not concerned about the costs 
of frequent replacement because they “raise sufficiently many heifers in a cost efficient 
way”, so they keep on focusing on milk yields by eliminating cows below a threshold milk 
productivity level. This requires a constant supply of heifers, which only the largest farms 
can afford. Many other farms, however, have to take the challenge of fertility-yield trade 
off very seriously.
In Sweden – as well as in some other countries – record levels in the total milk pro-
duced by one cow in her lifetime is becoming a tightly monitored indicator and a subject 
of farmers’ proud. Heikkilä et al. (2008) showed that, due to high replacement costs and 
increasing milk yields by lactation, optimal timing for replacement is well over the third 
lactation. Both Ayrshire and Holstein breeds reach their maximum production capacity by 
the fifth lactation period.     
A peculiar feature can be observed in the milk productivity trends of Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland (see Figure 32 on page 108). As soon as they exceed the average 
milk yield of 8000 kg/cow, the steady growth has flattened out. The declining marginal 
increase may be attributable to numerous reasons in farms such as success in the timing 
of inseminations, in the prevention of udder inflammations, and in the feeding of animals. 
Better management and careful skilled labour play key roles in achieving higher milk yield 
level on a farm basis. On the country level, the Finnish average milk yield growth may 
have stayed moderate due to structural reasons, many highly efficient high yield farms 
have recently quitted production and the new expanded farm units have not reached the 
productivity level of established farms yet.
In any ways, breeders and economists agree that breeding programs should equally 
take into account fertility and milk yields in the future. Especially in the current situation 
when Northern European dairy farms have increasingly shifted to a monobreed dairy cow 
stock with their constant pursue of higher milk yields.   
Text box: 
The trade off between milk yield and fertility
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 Germany Denmark Sweden Finland Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland
Milk yield
Level (kg of milk/dairy cow)
1995 5538 6392 7630 6865
2004 6747 7900 7955 8165 5653 4629 4476 4682
2010 7493 8537 8329 8592 7318 5450 5213 5056
Annual growth (%)
1995-2010 2.0 1.9 0.6 1.5
2004-2010 1.8 1.3 0.8 0.9 4.4 2.8 2.6 1.3
Labour requirements
Level (hours/dairy cow)
1995 127 69 140 321
2004 93 46 111 222 258 341 404 319
2010 83 33 85 148 163 264 340 290
Annual growth (%)
1995-2010 -2.8 -4.7 -3.3 -5.0
2004-2010 -1.8 -5.3 -4.4 -6.5 -7.3 -4.2 -2.8 -1.6
Labour Productivity
Level (kg of milk/hour)
1995 44 92 55 21
2004 73 170 72 37 22 14 11 15
2010 90 255 98 58 45 21 15 17
Annual growth (%)
1995-2010 5.0 7.0 4.0 6.9
2004-2010 3.7 7.0 5.4 7.9 12.6 7.2 5.6 2.9
Table 20. Partial productivity of dairy farms.
Labour productivity is also dependent 
on labour requirements, measured by the 
number of hours of labour per dairy cow in 
Figure 33 and Table 20. The results indicate 
that this component is much more impor-
tant than yields in explaining differences 
in levels and growth of labour productivity. 
For instance, in year 2010 a Lithuanian 
dairy cow required on average ten times 
more labour than a Danish cow, and it 
is clearly in that dimension that Finnish 
farms are performing poorly compared 
to their competitors, with a requirement 
of 148 hours per dairy cow in 2010. This 
is more than four times the corresponding 
figure for Danish cows, and nearly twice 
the labour requirements for German and 
Swedish cows. It is also worth noting that 
Estonia is also catching up with Finland in 
that dimension. 
Changes in the structure of milk farms 
have direct impacts on both components of 
labour productivity and this is what ultimate-
ly explains the peculiar similarities between 
the evolution of average farm size and 
labour productivity. As a general rule larger 
family farms tend to pay more attention to 
milk output per cow than smaller ones. It 
especially applies in the new member states 
to the expansion of tiny farms with few cows 
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to more market oriented production units 
with 10 to 60 cows. 
The quick catch up of Estonian milk farms’ 
labour productivity to the German level is 
also attributable to the special patterns of 
Estonia’s dual milk farm structure and its 
concentration. Estonia has a few thousands 
of “small” herds with less than 10 cows, 
but over three fourth of the dairy cows are 
held in large herds of over 100 head. Most 
of the large herds feature extremely high 
labour productivity by international stand-
ards. Concentration is quick because the 
rapid exit rate of small farms, which results 
in the much higher weight of large farms. 
Consequently, labour productivity improves 
very fast. 
Average farm size affects the labour 
requirement per cow through the special 
features of the organisation and utilisation 
of work at dairy farms. Up to 60-100 cows 
dairy farms can in principle be operated 
with the bare utilisation of labour input from 
the owner-farmer and his family members 
Dairy farms include a lot of fixed work 
phases regardless of the number of animals 
such as general management of the farm, 
maintenance of fixed assets and servicing 
of the equipment. Even feeding and milking 
involve phases such as cleaning of the 
milking equipment or transport of feeds on 
the farm, which require the same amount of 
work for 20 or 50 cows. The bigger the herd, 
the less work is needed per unit of output, 
Milking on a German farm.
Mobile manure scraper on a latted floor.
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because the marginal use of labour is sharp-
ly decreasing for an additional milk cow. 
In the farm size categories of over 80 
cows technological development and the 
replacement of labour with capital have 
driven labour productivity growth to en-
tirely new levels. One milking robot usually 
serves a 70-head herd, but single robot is 
rarely installed on expanding farms. Milking 
robots have determined the stages of farm 
Figure 32. Evolution of milk yields.
Note: Milk productivity trends are calculated on the basis of the FADN data set and may deviate from the ones published by 
the national statistical institutes. 
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expansion into discrete 70, 140, 210 etc 
units. If robots are to be used, most usually 
two or several of them are installed in ex-
panding farms, which radically decreases 
the amount of labour needed for one cow. 
Similarly feeding, cleaning and manure 
removal have been automated to a great 
extent in the new investments of over 150 
cows. These technological aspects explain 
the sharp labour productivity development 
in Denmark, where the average farm size 
jumped from 50 to over 130 cows in just 
about ten years. 
Expanding farms achieve higher labour 
productivity in all countries due to higher use 
of capital and better organisation of work. 
The technology installed in the expanding 
farms of Germany, Sweden and Finland is 
the same as in Denmark. Nevertheless, it 
is the intensity of new investments and the 
number of expanding farms that determine 
the pace of farm structure concentration 
and concurrently the pace of labour devel-
opment growth. This explains the different 
patterns of labour productivity growth 
across the countries. 
Farm structure development has been 
relatively easy to forecast, because the 
tendency is rather steady – unless a sharp 
turning point occurs for some reason, which 
was the case in the mid 2000s in Denmark. 
Given the strong relation between the two 
indicators, labour productivity growth can 
also be forecast with fairly high accuracy. 
Expectations concerning the milk farm 
structure changes suggest that Estonia will 
overtake Finland in the next few years and 
will approach Germany and Sweden within 
10 to 15 years. Labour productivity of the 
Polish, Latvian and Lithuanian dairy sectors 
will continue to rise very slowly, in fact the 
gap between them and the old member 
Milking robots on a Danish farm.
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states will most probably widen in the next 
one or two decades due to the heavy weight 
of small farms and their relatively slow 
quitting rates. Concurrently, the quitting 
rates in the old member states, especially 
in Sweden and Finland is expected to speed 
up in the coming years – partly for policy 
reasons. In Finland, e.g. the age limit of a 
quitting farmer is planned to be extended 
from 56 to 59 years and the quitting subsidy 
eventually phased out. As a result, labour 
productivity in Finland and Sweden is sup-
posed to set off to a sharper growth than 
in Germany. However, in exchange for the 
faster labour productivity growth the quit-
ting wave will also imply a further decline in 
milk production volumes which the German 
milk farm sector will not suffer from. Due 
to an almost complete halt in farm invest-
ments in the Danish milk farm sector over 
the past three years, the labour productivity 
curve will flat out close to its current level.
Milking is very 
labour intensive in 
small farms.
In Europe, structural change in dairy farming has been fastest and most radical in 
Denmark. Within only seven years from 2000 to 2007, the share of farms with more than 
100 dairy cows increased from 27 % to 75 %, while average herd size almost doubled 
from 57 to 101 cows per farm. Further, that trend shows no sign of ending, as the latest 
figure for year 2013 gives an average of 164 cows/farm.
Extremely fast structural change and enormous investments have boosted labour 
productivity growth, so that the Danish milk sector now belongs to the most modern ones 
in the world. However, there is another side of the coin to this success story. Fast structur-
al change took place at a time of economic boom by relying heavily on investments made 
possible by financial innovations but, in the wake of the latest financial and commodity 
crises, this has resulted in the severe financial vulnerability of many expanding farms. 
Agriculture has traditionally been considered a stable sector in Denmark with little 
fluctuation in asset values and steady demand. During the years of economic boom 
before 2008, access to bank loans was made easy and banks competed fiercely to fi-
nance farm expansion in the dairy sector. According to some farmers, banks provided 
such easy access to loans that they contributed to the survival of badly managed farms, 
and the bankruptcy rate of farms fell notably in the mid-2000s. 
Text box: 
Danish dairy farms in a financial grasp
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The overheated period of investment stopped with the crisis of commodity prices in 
2007-2009 and the global financial crisis in 2009. First grain prices rocketed in 2007/08, 
hence increasing feeding costs. Then global milk prices reached their peak in 2008 just 
to experience the following year their sharpest dive in decades. Fixed farm assets such 
as land, equipment and buildings got overvalued in the middle of 2000s, and the bubble 
burst in 2009, resulting in a serious devaluation of farms.   
Several small and middle-size provincial banks fell victim to the sudden changes that 
brought about a high share of bad loans (Ward, 2011; Wienberg & Schwartzkopff, 2012). 
As a result of asset devaluation, loans to dairy farms were virtually frozen, which halted 
structural development and reduced trade of agricultural land and dairy farms drastically. 
Banks have now reduced their involvement in the agricultural sector, and new loan appli-
cations are scrutinised extremely carefully. Market entry has almost been non-existent for 
the past four years. The purchase of a dairy farm is currently out of the question, since no 
one has the starting capital nor access to loans to invest in the dairy sector.  
The combined devaluation of assets and discontinued access to bank loans resulted 
in an extremely difficult situation for retiring/quitting dairy farmers, who intended to cash 
in the assets accumulated throughout their lifetime. Adjustments in asset prices have 
reduced the value of farms to about 50-60% of their level in the mid-2000s, but even this 
lower price is impossible to realise in the face of sluggish demand. 
Danish dairy farms are extremely indebted, which is shown for instance by a low 
equity to assets ratio. The ratio has continuously declined over the past years, primarily 
because of the constantly increasing debt burden. On average own capital, or equity, 
made up 17 % of the dairy farms’ total assets in 2012, but for plenty of large farms the 
share of own capital was lower than 10 %. Equity also decreased in absolute terms due 
to the writing off of fixed assets such as milk quotas and land devaluation. The bigger the 
farm is the lower the equity to assets ratio gets. Investment needs have been enormous 
in farms with over 320 cows, so that debt accounts for almost the totality of assets. The 
farms with less than 80 cows tend to have been in operation for a long time and their 
share of equity is consequently much bigger.
Farms also differ in terms of profitability, a fact primarily due to management tech-
niques and 
organisational 
issues. The 
best third of 
farms achieve 
positive profit, 
while the 
worst third 
accumulate 
losses regardless of their size. 
The largest farms with over 320 cows have the toughest financial situation, as over 
half of them struggle with losses. These farms experienced a deep dive in profitability in 
the years following the financial crisis, but their average farm income ascended close to 
zero by 2012. Similarly the average loss of the worst third of farms also became smaller 
by 2012. 
There is still a huge discrepancy within the group of the largest farms. Besides man-
agement techniques this is attributable to the amount and differences in the composition 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Equity (in million DKK) 11.5 9.5 7.6 7.3 5.2 4.7
Total assets (in million DKK) 25.9 29.6 28.4 30.2 29.0 28.1
Equity to assets ratio (in %) 44.5 32.0 26.8 24.0 17.9 16.7
Average own capital and total assets of Danish dairy farms
Source: Andersen 2012 and 2013 (Produktionsøkonomi Kvæg).
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of their debt. Within the total debt of all 
Danish milk farms 65  % is flexible mort-
gage debt, 23  % is bank loans, while the 
rest is fixed rate mortgage debt and non 
interest bearing operating liabilities (e.g. 
debt to supplies, VAT payable). Repayment 
time for the mortgage loans ranges from 
10 to 30 years, their interest rates can be 
either flexible of fixed. About 85 % of farms 
have over 70 % of their mortgage debt with 
a flexible rate ( i.e. category F1 of quickly 
changing rates, bound to the 3m, 6m or 
12m Euribor). Furthermore, 56  % of dairy 
farms have their entire mortgage debt on 
flexible terms. These farms are considered 
to be in an extremely risky financial situa-
tion, so that the short term bank loans are 
given to them with an interest rate of up to 8-12 %. Some farmers have reached such a 
poor cash flow that they need revolving credit even for financing their interest payments. 
The ability to service this high level of debt creates a serious risk for many farms. 
Currently interest rates are relatively moderate and milk prices are favourable, but a 
sudden change in either of these parameters would prompt a set of domino effects. 
According to expert estimates, a three percent increase in interest rate would push about 
50 % of dairy farms out of business. 
 This raises the question of what would happen to milk production if a sudden financial 
crisis pushed plenty of large dairy farms into bankruptcy. Danish experts are convinced 
that even a series of bankruptcies would not disrupt milk production substantially. Since 
the assets of the bankrupt farms are owned by the banks, those would simply seize the 
assets, appoint a manager and, in the long run, resell the farm to a new entrepreneur. The 
Danish system is straightforward, with bankruptcies of farms being a part of everyday 
life. There is a functioning market for farms in Denmark, where taking over a farm from 
one’s parent only represents one option among many for the transmission of farm assets. 
In the end, however, a relevant question remains: are there sufficient skilled and moti-
vated entrepreneurs to manage and take over the assets of bankrupt farms from banks? 
Continuity in the management of large milk farms is an essential condition for the future 
success of the Danish dairy supply chain.
Source: Krog in Andersen, 2013, p. 37. 
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3.3.4 Total Factor Productivity
TFP growth 
TFP growth will be investigated with a 
growth accounting exercise first focusing 
on the old EU member states. Figure 
34 demonstrates graphically that in all 
four countries productivity of dairy farms 
has increased significantly from 1995 
to 2010, with the total increase ranging 
from 43  % for Germany and Sweden 
to almost 60 % for Finland.  
Although, overall, Finland displays the 
largest rise in TFP, differences among the 
four countries are small and vary from year 
to year, so that not too much should be 
read from the final ranking. In particular, 
we note that the increase in productivity in 
Finland has been very comparable to that 
in Denmark, and that in the last two years 
of the study period (from 2008 to 2010) 
Finland moved from third to first in terms of 
overall increase in TFP. Thus, TFP growth has 
been roughly comparable in the four coun-
tries considered here. Although dairy farms 
in Sweden and Denmark have experienced 
a sharp decrease in TFP in year 2010, the 
analysis suggests that this is only a tempo-
rary phenomenon. However, only the addi-
tion of more recent data will permit to check 
the validity of that conjecture. 
Table 21 provides the full growth ac-
counting results, from which it is clear that 
productivity growth in the four countries, 
although of a similar magnitude, has been 
achieved through different channels. Output 
per farm has expanded in all four countries, 
but the annual growth rate for Denmark 
(10.4 %) stands out as particularly high (the 
corresponding rate for Finland is only 6.4 %). 
We also note that growth in milk production 
in Finland accounts for a much larger share 
of total output growth than in the other 
countries (87 % versus 64 % for Sweden for 
instance). Thus, dairy farms in Finland are 
Figure 34. TFP growth in Finland, Sweden, Germany and Denmark, 1995-2010.
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Table 21. Growth accounting - Finland, Sweden, Germany and Denmark, 1995-2010.
Country Annual output growth (%) Annual Input growth (%)
TFP 
growth 
(%)
 TOTAL Milk Crop Livestock TOTAL Feeds Capital Labour Other
Germany 5.6 4.4 0.8 0.4 3.1 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.7 2.4
Sweden 7.4 4.8 1.9 0.6 4.9 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 2.4
Denmark 10.4 7.3 2.4 0.5 7.2 2.9 3.1 0.5 0.4 3.0
Finland 6.4 5.6 0.5 0.3 3.2 1.1 1.8 -0.1 0.3 3.1
becoming relatively more specialised than 
those in the other three countries.
The input side section of Table 21 reveals 
that a large share of the growth in output 
has been achieved by increasing the quanti-
ties of production factors, at an annual rate 
varying from 3.1  % for Germany to 7.2  % 
for Denmark. The countries with the highest 
output growth rates are also those with 
the highest input growth rates and there is 
therefore no ”miracle growth”. In all coun-
tries, other inputs are substituted for labour, 
but the relative contributions of feeds and 
capital to input growth vary. For instance, 
the contribution of capital investments to 
input growth is much larger in Finland than 
in Sweden, where the increase in feeds has 
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Figure 35. TFP growth in Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, 
2004-2010.
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played a quantitatively larger role. Denmark 
stands out by the importance of capital to 
input growth, which reflects the high level of 
investment by Danish dairy farms over the 
last two decades. 
We now present the results of the 
growth accounting exercise for the four new 
entrants over the period 2004-2010. The 
evolution of the TFP index presented graphi-
cally in Figure 35 indicates that the situation 
for those countries is not very stable, with 
important year-to-year variations in the pro-
ductivity of dairy farms. The shock of entry 
into the EU was followed by a decline in 
productivity, which stopped between 2006 
and 2008, followed by some productivity 
growth, but TFP actually decreased again 
in three countries 
in year 2010. The 
frustratingly short 
time series make 
it difficult to infer 
long-term trends.
Table 22 
presents the full 
growth account-
ing results for all 
eight countries 
from 2004 to 2010. 
Over that period, 
Finland had the 
second highest TFP 
growth rate, with 
farm productivity 
growing faster only 
in Denmark. TFP 
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Country 
Annual output growth (%) Annual Input growth (%) TFP 
growth 
(%)TOTAL Milk Crop Livestock TOTAL Feeds Capital Labour Other
Germany 5.7 4.0 1.2 0.4 4.0 1.6 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.6
Denmark 13.7 7.1 5.5 0.6 7.9 5.1 1.7 0.5 0.5 5.8
Sweden 4.5 4.4 0.0 0.1 3.2 1.4 1.1 0.5 0.2 1.3
Finland 6.7 5.9 0.6 0.1 2.6 1.1 1.3 -0.4 0.5 4.1
Estonia 6.1 4.5 1.2 0.4 3.6 2.7 1.6 -1.1 0.4 2.5
Latvia 0.8 2.6 -1.4 -0.4 -1.0 0.1 0.3 -0.8 -0.6 1.8
Lihthuania 7.3 4.1 1.7 1.4 7.7 1.0 5.9 0.5 0.1 -0.3
Poland 3.8 2.5 0.3 1.0 3.5 1.1 1.8 0.2 0.4 0.3
Table 22. Growth accounting and TFP growth for milk farms, 2004-2010.
growth was significantly larger in Finland 
than in the four newer EU members, and 
there is therefore no evidence that those 
countries are catching up in terms of TFP, 
as could have been thought at least for 
Estonia by focusing on partial productivity 
indicators. Overall, productivity growth does 
not seem to be slowing down in Finland: 
Over the 2004-2010 period, there is a gap in 
productivity growth rates between Finland 
and Sweden as well as Germany, but its 
significance should not be exaggerated 
as it depends heavily on the calculation 
for the last year of observations (i.e., and 
large decrease in TFP for both Sweden and 
Germany). Nevertheless, the finding gives 
an early indication that Finnish dairy farm-
ers may be in the process of catching up 
German and Swedish dairy farmers in terms 
of productivity.
TFP levels
The results of the DEA (Data Envelopment 
Analysis) exercise are presented in Table 23. 
DEA is a benchmarking technique that 
measures the performance of a unit (e.g., 
firm, sector, country) relative to that of a 
peer group. The result is expressed as an 
efficiency score representing the share 
of maximum achievable output actually 
produced by the unit, given the state 
of the technology, which is inferred by 
observations on other units of the peer 
group. Hence, a 100  % efficiency score 
indicates that the unit is efficient within 
the peer group: it could not produce more, 
given its use of inputs and the state of the 
technology. A score of less than 100  % is 
indicative of inefficiencies.  
Because a large number of observations 
are required to build the efficiency frontier, 
but that farm-level data were only available 
for Finland, and although that is not ideal, 
the peer group that is chosen is the set of 
dairy farms in the Finnish FADN. Two models 
are then considered: Model 1 includes the 
eight FADN country averages when esti-
mating the efficiency frontier and Model 2 
leaves them out. The countries were then 
compared using DEA and data for year 
2004 – the latest year for which the Finnish 
farm-level data was readily available. We 
must acknowledge that this is far from ideal 
and may distort the comparison, as consid-
erable structural change has occurred on 
Finnish dairy farms over the last ten years 
(i.e., in 2004 very few Finnish farms were 
comparable in size to Danish ones). This 
could also explain the large difference in 
the Danish efficiency scores between the 
two models, which reveals a relative lack of 
robustness of the results and hence invites 
caution when interpreting them.
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Table 23. Cross-country differences in productivity levels (DEA efficiency scores in %).
The results indicate that, as expected, 
Denmark is the clear productivity leader, 
although the size of the productivity gap 
depends on the choice of peer group. 
Among the old EU members, Finland has 
the least efficient dairy farms, although 
the cross-country productivity differences 
are not as large as suggested by the 
labour productivity indicator. For instance, 
the productivity difference between 
Finland and Sweden is a modest 11  % 
((70  %-63  %)/63  %), which is much less 
than the difference in labour productivity 
between the two countries reported in Table 
20. Nevertheless, the DEA results confirm 
that Finland suffers from a productivity 
deficit with respect to not only Denmark but 
also the old EU members of the Baltic Sea 
region (Sweden and Germany). 
More surprisingly, the analysis indi-
Denmark Germany Sweden Finland Lithuania Poland Latvia Estonia
Model 1 100 86 70 63 65 62 61 70
Model 2 152 86 70 63 65 62 61 72
cates that farm productivity levels were 
comparable in Finland and several new EU 
entrants (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) in year 
2004. Estonia achieved the lowest level of 
productivity, but this was before the TFP 
growth evident in Figure 35. Although this 
DEA analysis should be treated with cau-
tion, it suggests that the farm dairy sectors 
of the four new EU entrants considered in 
this study are reaching productivity levels 
comparable to those in Finland. One reason 
for the relatively better results of the new 
member states is the coverage of FADN 
data, in which only farms with economic 
size of over 4  000 EUR are considered. 
The result are distorted by ignoring the 
smallest farms, since due to their high 
weight they’d make a great impact on the 
productivity results of Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland.
3.4 Results for dairy processing
3.4.1 Partial productivity
Figure 37 and Table 24 report the levels of 
labour productivity in the dairy processing 
sector of the eight countries from 1995 
to 2010, using as indicator the deflated 
value of output per worker. The four new 
entrants stand out by their relatively low 
levels of productivity compared to the 
older EU members, but also by relatively 
high rates of productivity growth. For in-
stance, the productivity of workers in the 
Lithuanian dairy processing sector grew at 
the impressive annual rate of 10  % from 
2000 to 2010, but this growth was achieved 
from an initially low level: in year 2000, a 
worker in Lithuania was producing 13 times 
less than an equivalent worker in Germany. 
Hence, a process of convergence in labour 
productivity in dairy processing has started, 
with the relative “laggards” growing faster 
than the relative leaders. As a result, in year 
2010, the ratio of the highest level of labour 
productivity, for Germany, to the lowest 
one, for Latvia, had shrunk to seven. This 
also means that cross-country differences 
in labour productivity, while still large, are 
now smaller in the dairy processing sector 
than in primary production. 
On the basis of the labour productivity 
indicator, the Finnish dairy processing 
sector appears to be competitive. Although 
output per worker is significantly smaller 
in Finland than in Germany, the difference 
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disappears when expressing labour pro-
ductivity in terms of value-added (rather 
than output) per worker (Table 25, Figure 
36). This means that German dairy manu-
facturers use more intermediate inputs per 
worker than Finnish ones, which probably 
indicates a relatively higher level of pro-
cessing of the agricultural raw material in 
Finland. Unfortunately, the data required 
to calculate value-added per worker in the 
Danish dairy processing sector is not avail-
able after 1999.
Figure 36. Labour productivity in dairy processing - output per worker in 2010 prices.
Note: data is also presented in Attachment 2. 
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Figure 37. Labour productivity in dairy processing - value added per worker in 2010 prices.
Note: data is also presented in Attachment 3. 
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Focusing on the four older EU members, 
it is evident that growth in labour produc-
tivity has been much faster on farms than 
in the processing sectors. In the case of 
Finland, for instance, labour productivity 
grew 6.9  % a year on average in primary 
production (Table 20), while the correspond-
ing figure is only 1.3  % in the processing 
sector. The same pattern is visible in the 
three other Western countries, with Sweden 
standing out by the quasi absence of labour 
productivity growth in its processing sector. 
Hence, most of the productivity growth in 
the dairy chains of the old EU members has 
been achieved on farms, while this is not 
necessarily the case for the four relatively 
newer EU members. 
Labour input has typically been reduced 
in the dairy industries throughout Europe and 
together with the increasing real output it has 
resulted in some labour productivity growth 
everywhere. The share of labour input in the 
dairy industry’s cost structure is however 
quite modest, under 10  % for most of the 
countries in the comparison. Due to its small 
weight the labour input’s relative impact on 
total factor productivity is also rather low. 
3.4.2 Total Factor Productivty
The results of the growth accounting exer-
cise are presented in Table 24. Unfortunately, 
only seven countries are represented in the 
table because the required cost structure 
data for Denmark were not available. In 
the case of the four new EU members, 
satisfactory output data and price deflators 
could not be found prior to 2000 and the 
analysis therefore starts in that year. For 
the old EU members, the calculations are 
carried out from 1995, but the results of 
the growth accounting exercise are also 
reported in the table over the 2000-2011 
period to facilitate comparison across coun-
tries. The full time path of the TFP index 
is also depicted in Figure 38. 
The results of the TFP calculations are 
roughly consistent with those established on 
the basis of the labour productivity indicator. 
As for the processors in the old EU member 
countries, TFP in Finnish dairy processing 
grew at only 0.32 % annually over the full 
study period, which rate appears satisfacto-
ry in relative terms given that TFP actually 
decreased slightly in Germany and Sweden 
over the same period of time. In Finland, 
output of the dairy processing sector has 
been almost stagnant, but productivity has 
increased due to a slow and steady reduc-
tion in inputs – mainly labour and materials.
The finding that Finnish TFP growth 
in dairy manufacturing has been slow in 
Yoghurt production line in Arla Foods' Braband dairy 
in Århus.
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Cheese manufacturing in Germany. The production process is automated, and the German dairy industry had 
the highest labour productivity in the comparison.
absolute terms but relatively fast by EU 
standards matches the evidence gathered 
in a report investigating the productivity 
of the Danish food processing sectors 
(Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, 2011). The 
report shows that TFP growth in food pro-
cessing in the mature economies of the 
EU and the USA has typically occurred at a 
rate of less than one percent a year, with 
Finland ranking second in terms of that 
indicator in a comparison of 13 countries 
(Fødevareøkonomisk Institut, 2011, Table 2, 
p. 12). 
The slowly eroding market positions 
of the Swedish dairy industry have been 
responsible for the half percent annual 
decrease in TFP. Sweden is the worst per-
former of the compared countries, and the 
decrease in TFP is explained primarily by a 
decrease in real output (-1.17 % annually) 
only partially compensated by a decrease 
in inputs (-0.71  % annually). The Swedish 
dairy industry has never been strongly 
export driven and it has lost considerable 
shares on its primary operating area, the 
domestic market, due to a constant increase 
in imports. The reduction in material inputs 
has only exacerbated the downward trends. 
Dairy companies have struggled with the 
scarcity of milk supply, preventing them 
from utilising their processing capacity fully. 
Although 50 to 110 million kg of milk was 
imported from Denmark between 2009 and 
2011, that has not substantially solved the 
problem. Despite the potentially flexible 
solutions that the giant cooperative-based 
company provide between the two countries, 
the Danish farmers’ interest is to utilise most 
of their milk within Denmark and maximise 
earnings via the exports of processed prod-
ucts. When comparing the TFP growth rates 
in dairy processing and primary production, 
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it is also evident that the bulk of productivity 
growth in the dairy chains of the older EU 
members has originated on farms. 
When we extend the comparison to in-
clude the four new EU members, the results 
of the growth accounting exercise confirm 
the conclusion reached on the basis of the 
labour productivity indicator: productivity 
growth in the newer EU members is occur-
ring at a faster rate than in the older EU 
members, so that the former are steadily 
catching up with the latter in terms of TFP. 
However, the situation is not homogenous: 
the dairy processing sectors of Poland and 
Lithuania have experienced much faster 
productivity growth than those of Latvia 
and Estonia (3.66  % and 2.39  % versus 
1.49 % and 0.28 %). In the case of Poland, 
output growth (5.12  % annually) has out-
stripped input growth (1.40  % annually) 
by a large margin, hence suggesting that 
the sector has been particularly successful 
in adding value to the raw material that it 
processes and realising this value from the 
market.
The catching up process of new member 
states is apparently faster in the case of TFP 
growth in processing than in dairy farming. 
One can postulate that transferring tech-
nologies from the productivity leaders to 
the productivity “laggards” is easier in the 
manufacturing sector than in primary pro-
duction, due to the typical difference in the 
size of firms as well as the more pronounced 
reliance of the primary sector on biological 
processes dependent on country-specific 
agro-ecological conditions.
We note that output has also grown 
quickly in the two countries performing 
best, supporting the idea that productivity 
growth is more easily achieved in the dairy 
sectors that are expanding rather than 
shrinking. The findings in Table 24 verify 
that the development of the output index 
largely determines the TFP results, since 
input changes tend to remain relatively 
more moderate. 
Several factors explain the develop-
ment of the output index and resulting TFP 
growth for the four new EU member states. 
Figure 38. Evolution of TFP in dairy processing, 2000-2011.
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Annual output 
growth (%) Annual Input growth (%) TFP growth (%)
TOTAL TOTAL Materials Labour Capital
Period of 1995-2011
Germany 0.37 0.62 0.82 -0.16 -0.04 -0.25 
Sweden -1.17 -0.71 -0.27 -0.45 0.01 -0.46 
Finland -0.11 -0.43 -0.30 -0.13 0.00 0.32 
Period of 2000-2011
Germany 0.51 1.09 1.18 -0.06 -0.03 -0.57 
Denmark 1.48 .. .. .. .. ..
Sweden -1.41 -1.30 -0.82 -0.49 0.01 -0.11 
Finland 0.53 -0.20 -0.21 0.00 0.01 0.73 
Lithuania 5.29 2.83 3.19 -0.36 0.01 2.39 
Latvia 1.89 0.39 0.79 -0.46 0.06 1.49 
Estonia -0.68 -0.96 -0.78 -0.28 0.10 0.28 
Poland 4.87 1.75 1.91 -0.22 0.06 3.06 
Table 24. Growth accounting in dairy processing.
First dairy companies in Poland, Lithuania 
and Latvia have enjoyed the lowest milk 
prices in the EU. Due to the high share 
of milk in the cost structure of the dairy 
industry, this has granted a remarkable 
cost advantage to those countries. This, 
however, does not unveil the difference in 
growth among the three countries. Market 
performance is the most important factor 
that has explained the superb output and 
TFP growth of Poland and Lithuania. Poland 
has a vast domestic market, where dispos-
able income has grown almost constantly 
between 1995 and 2008. The Polish market 
provided adequate ground for a spectac-
ular growth for the widening assortment 
of highly processed fermented products, 
cheese and other dairy products of the 
domestic manufacturers. 
Numerous foreign dairy companies 
entered the Polish dairy industry already 
in the 1990s and early 2000s from France, 
Germany and Denmark. Although they 
have never captured considerable market 
shares in the Polish dairy industry, they 
introduced a wide assortment of high value 
added dairy products at once. Polish dairy 
manufacturers have enjoyed the spill-over 
effects of FDI by adapting the management 
and marketing techniques, product develop-
ment and other operational methods from 
the foreign-owned units. Strengthened by 
the volume growth on the domestic market, 
Polish manufacturers have become finan-
cially strong to conquer increasing shares 
in export markets, particularly in those of 
the other new member states, but their 
affordable dairy consumer products have 
also gained a foothold in the old member 
states. Another important precondition of 
the Polish success has been the abundant 
raw material available within the domestic 
market.
The Lithuanian success has had slightly 
different components. Since the domestic 
market is rather limited it’s been a necessity 
for Lithuanian dairy companies to concen-
trate on export markets. Nearly 50 % of the 
industry’s sales revenues originate from 
exports, a share comparable only to that of 
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Denmark. Lithuanian dairy manufacturers 
have shown astonishing capability since the 
1990s to quickly reorient their exports from 
Russia to US or to the EU depending on the 
changing political and economic environ-
ment between. 
By the EU accession it became clear that 
access to raw material is the biggest imped-
iment to further growth of the Lithuanian 
dairy industry. Until the mid 2000s the three 
Baltic countries’ dairy industry output indices 
developed hand in hand, but between 2005 
and 2007 Lithuania detached from its two 
neighbours. Lithuanian dairy manufacturers 
started to purchase milk from Latvia and 
Estonia creating a scarcity of raw material 
and fierce competition for milk in both coun-
tries. This very phenomenon of Baltic cross 
country milk trade explains the concurrent 
output growth of Lithuania and output de-
cline of Latvia and Estonia in the second half 
of the 2000s. By 2012 nearly one-fourth of 
the milk utilised by the Lithuanian dairy in-
dustry originated from the Baltic neighbours, 
while Latvia and Estonia exported 36 % and 
23 % of all their collected milk, respectively. 
With a slight exaggeration we can say that 
to a high extent Lithuanian output growth 
was possible at the expense of Latvian and 
Estonian growth rates.
This raises the question of why the 
Estonian and Latvian dairy industry has 
not been able to fight more effectively 
against their dwindling raw material base. 
Differences in industry structure and foreign 
trade provide the answer. By the turn of the 
millennium Lithuania’s dairy industry con-
solidated to three to five major companies, 
while dairy industries remained more frag-
mented in Latvia and Estonia. This resulted 
in a size difference of two to three times in 
favour of the Lithuanian companies by the 
early 2000s. A decade later the difference is 
still the same to the Estonian market lead-
ers and the gap even widened in relation to 
the biggest Latvian dairies. Apart from the 
financial strength, Lithuanian companies 
have managed to build their export chan-
nels for their dairy products e.g. to Russia. 
Latvia’s and Estonia’s dairy exports to 
Russia were impaired by political disputes 
(border and minority issues) up until their 
EU accession. Finally, although the three 
Baltic countries are small, Lithuania has 
the largest domestic market. As a result of 
these factors, Lithuanian dairy industry had 
a better and stronger initial state for growth 
at the point of the Baltic countries EU acces-
sion, and that strong starting position was 
only reinforced afterwards.
Our analysis reveals that, in terms of pro-
ductivity levels, Finnish dairy farms are lag-
ging significantly behind farms in Denmark, 
Germany and Sweden. Average productivity 
of labour employed on milk farms is at least 
four times less in Finland than in Denmark, 
and 40% less in Finland than in Sweden. The 
DEA results, which include all production fac-
tors in the comparison, confirm that Finnish 
dairy farms suffer from a productivity deficit 
relative to farms in the old EU members of 
the Baltic region, although the magnitude of 
the deficit is much less than suggested by 
the partial productivity indicator. 
Looking at the temporal evolution of the 
situation, we find that growth in farm-level 
production in the four older EU members 
has occurred through different channels, but 
that average annual TFP growth rates have 
been roughly comparable from 1995 to 2010 
across countries. Hence, there has been no 
“miracle growth”, in the sense that countries 
having experienced fast output growth have 
also expanded their use of inputs rapidly 
through investments and intensification 
of production. Altogether, the competitive 
position of Finnish dairy farms relative to 
their counterparts in Sweden, Germany and 
3.5 Summary of the productivity calculations
123
Denmark has not changed greatly over the 
last two decades. The innovations, invest-
ments and restructuring that have taken 
place on Finnish farms have delivered fast 
improvement in efficiency, but the problem 
from a Finnish perspective is that other older 
EU members of the Baltic Sea region have 
followed a similar course. Unfortunately, 
given that Finnish farms started running on 
this “technological treadmill” with a relative-
ly low productivity level, they remain lagging 
behind with regard to that competitiveness 
indicator. In fact, similar rates of TFP growth 
across countries imply that the absolute 
gap in productivity between Finland and the 
leaders is widening.  
When focusing on the more recent past, 
however, the results are more encouraging, 
as we find that since the UE enlargement in 
2004, TFP on Finnish farms has grown much 
faster than on German and Swedish farms. 
Altogether, Finnish farms may be in the 
process of raising their TFP levels to those 
of German and Swedish farms, while Danish 
farms seem in a league of their own in that 
competitive dimension. However, while ac-
knowledging the efficiency of Danish farms, 
it is also important to recognise that the de-
velopment of the Danish dairy sector, and 
in particular its heavy reliance on debt to fi-
nance investments, raises serious questions 
about its sustainability (i.e., once interest 
rates start increasing to levels considered 
normal by historical standards).
Cross-country differences in farm 
labour productivity are driven primarily by 
differences in labour requirements per cow, 
while differences in milk yields account for 
a much smaller share of the difference. This 
suggests that the key to high labour produc-
tivity in dairy is the farm structure and the 
adoption of mechanical innovations, while 
differences in adoption of biological innova-
tions (e.g., genetic improvement, feeds) are 
relatively less important. This is reinforced 
by the finding that yield growth has been 
relatively slow in the old EU members and 
appears to become increasingly difficult.
Extending the comparison to include 
the newer EU members reveals that dairy 
farms in those countries are lagging behind 
their counterparts in the old member states 
in terms of TFP and are not catching up. 
Although Estonian farms, which are on 
average relatively large, have recorded 
impressive increases in yields and labour 
productivity, this has been achieved more 
by substitutions of other production factors 
for labour than real efficiency gains.
The processing level of the Finnish dairy 
supply chain appears more competitive 
when benchmarked against the processing 
sectors of the older EU members, although 
TFP growth has been slow in absolute terms 
(only 0.7% per year). Hence, most of the 
productivity gains achieved in the Finnish 
dairy sector originate from farms rather 
than the industrial sector, and a similar 
situation is observed in the other older EU 
members. This contrasts with the results 
for some of the newer EU members, and 
most notably Poland and Lithuania, where 
TFP in dairy manufacturing has increased at 
more than two percent annually since those 
countries joined the EU. Hence, a process of 
convergence in productivity has started in 
dairy processing, with some of the newer EU 
members making quick progress towards 
the productivity levels observed in the older 
EU countries, including Finland. 
Given the increasing trade in processed 
dairy products across the Baltic Sea region, 
this represents a competitive threat to the 
dairy sectors in the old member states. The 
TFP growth of the Estonian dairy industry is 
similar in nature to the case of Latvian milk 
farms, productivity improved despite the 
shrinking output, because inputs have fallen 
even more severely. This sheds light on the 
difficulties of Estonian dairy companies to 
preserve their markets.
Results of the productivity calculations 
confirm that technology transfer to less pro-
ductive countries can be achieved much faster 
in concentrated industries by large actors than 
in fragmented sectors, such as milk farming.
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FOREIGN TRADE PERFORMANCE4
4.1 Foreign trade balance of milk and dairy products
The trade performance trends suggest 
that Northern Europe has a comparative 
advantage in dairy production, as output 
of milk and dairy products largely exceeds 
domestic demand. Foreign trade balance 
is a complex competitiveness indicator, 
which compresses the effects of exports 
and imports, in other words the competitive 
positions of the dairy industry both on the 
domestic and export markets.  
With the exception of Sweden, the 
foreign balance of trade in dairy products 
of the studied countries remained positive 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s despite 
a great deal of challenges and adverse 
market developments such as the set-back 
in the Russian markets at the end of 1990s, 
extensive economic and structural reforms 
in the Baltic countries and Poland, economic 
recession at the end of 2000s.
Production and processing capacity 
was modernised rapidly in the Baltic milk 
supply chains and the product-mix was 
shifted from conventional bulk products to 
more differentiated and higher value-added 
products such as fresh products, yoghurts 
and cheese. Income growth has induced 
increasing consumption of branded dairy 
products in the Baltic markets, where do-
mestic dairy companies have managed to 
maintain their market positions in the first 
years of EU membership. While the imports 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Germany 1 560 1 670 694 1 170 1 540 1 728 1 294 1 803 1 836 1 704 2 192 2 390 2 552
Denmark 1 163 1 188 1 133 1 122 1 096 1 146 1 158 1 209 1 334 1 268 1 458 1 512 1 530
Sweden -11 -29 -129 -134 -118 -143 -197 -191 -268 -319 -382 -451 -476
Finland 148 162 158 134 122 123 117 148 111 75 141 113 104
Estonia 32 42 42 19 55 68 80 104 98 67 102 119 115
Latvia 7 5 -3 -1 15 27 44 61 44 24 42 64 78
Lithuania 117 143 144 149 213 216 228 305 265 251 286 299 345
Poland 161 360 252 276 513 777 772 900 928 651 796 887 936
Table 25. Balance of trade in dairy products (million EUR)
Source: Eurostat foreign trade database. Note: calculations include HS codes 0401-0406, 2105 and 3501.
126
of dairy products increased sharply in sev-
eral Central-European new member states, 
the growth in imports in the Baltic countries 
and Poland has been more moderate.
In Finland the positive dairy trade 
balance has fluctuated and even declined 
slightly due to the growth in imports. In 
the Baltic countries, EU membership has 
brought about rapidly growing exports and 
a steadily improving dairy trade balance, 
which has been increasing even if the raw 
milk trade is ignored from the calculations. 
A shift towards highly processed and higher 
value-added or special products such as 
fresh dairy products and cheese can be 
noticed in the export structure.
4.2 Revealed comparative advantage
The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) 
or the Balassa index has been a commonly 
used indicator of trade competitiveness, 
which reveals the export efficiency of an 
entire branch of the economy, an industry, a 
specific product group or even a given prod-
uct. The formula of the index is: 
RCAij = 100(Xij /Xwj)/(Xit /Xwt) (5) 
where Xij is the export product j by 
country i; w denotes world export and t the 
export of all products (i.e., total export). If 
the index takes the value of over 1, the 
country is relatively specialised in the pro-
duction and export of that product. 
The concept has received much criticism 
due to its shortcomings and numerous arti-
cles have been devoted to improving it, such 
as Bowen (1983), Yeats (1985) and Vollrath 
(1991). The RCA indices cannot directly 
be compared among countries since their 
value depends on the size of the country 
and the export intensity of the rest of the 
economy. RCA values are therefore often in-
vestigated over time for a particular country 
and product group, but the changing trade 
performance of the rest of the economy will 
have a high impact on the dynamics of the 
index. For this reason RCA is often regarded 
more as a specialisation index rather than 
an indicator of competitiveness. 
Table 26. Balassa (RCA) indices of the dairy supply chains in the Baltic Sea countries.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Germany 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7
Denmark 6.9 5.9 6.1 5.8 5.8 6.0 6.0 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.1 6.0
Sweden 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5
Finland 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.0
Estonia 4.1 4.6 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.8 3.7 3.4 3.9 3.3
Latvia 3.8 3.3 3.0 3.3 2.8 3.7 5.8 5.2 4.7 3.9 4.5 4.9
Lithuania 9.3 7.6 5.9 5.3 7.0 6.7 7.1 7.6 5.7 6.5 6.3 5.8
Poland 1.6 2.1 1.5 1.4 2.1 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3
Source: own calculations using FAO and Eurostat statistical databases.
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RCA indices imply that seven of the 
eight dairy supply chains have comparative 
advantages due to their strong export activ-
ities. The indices shed light on the different 
degree of specialisation by country and the 
different development patterns over time. 
Denmark and the Baltic countries strongly 
specialise in dairy exports, whereas the 
level of specialisation is more moderate, 
albeit well above one, for Finland, Germany 
and Poland. 
The time series for twelve years in-
dicate a stable position of specialisation 
for the Danish and German dairy chains, 
while that position has been strengthen-
ing for Finland, Poland and Latvia. The de-
cline for Estonia and Lithuania becomes 
even more pronounced when the time 
series are extended back to 1995. Then 
the indicator was 10-12 for both countries 
due to the significant weight of the dairy 
industry and dairy exports in the early 
years of their independence. The initial 
high degree of dairy specialisation fell 
inevitably as other export-geared sectors 
expanded. 
Fresh cheese packed onto pallets for exports in a small dairy.
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GROWTH5
In the fast globalising world economy, 
growth has become a measure of success, 
or indirectly one manifestation of competi-
tiveness. An increase in competitiveness of 
the dairy sector also implies an enhanced 
ability to sell dairy products domestically 
or internationally. Hence, changes in output 
growth and competitiveness are intricately 
linked. Several indicators were selected to 
illustrate this linkage. The growth of milk 
production value captures the changing 
competitiveness of primary producers. The 
growth of dairy industry sales revenues de-
composed into growth rates on the export 
and domestic markets are performance 
measures of the processing segment of the 
chain. Finally, the growth of dairy exports 
gives information more specifically about 
the change in the competitive position 
of the sector internationally. 
5.1 Growth of raw material production
The growth of milk production volumes 
can generally be regarded as an indication 
of rapid changes in the structure of milk 
farms, favourable economic conditions for 
milk production and growing procurement 
markets. Milk production development can 
also capture the outcome of technological 
improvements although output growth 
by itself does not automatically imply 
increasing competitiveness. A timeframe 
of 1995-2012 was selected for the com-
parison, largely determined by the histo-
ry of the eight countries.15  
Milk production is also an indicator 
of the general well-being of milk farmers. 
Increasing milk production is a sign of a 
positive business environment, including 
a mix of favourable invisible or indirect 
factors such as subsidies, attitudes within 
the chain and in society at large, and very 
importantly, future prospects for produc-
tion. Conversely, a falling milk production 
is a symptom of a discouraging mix of 
factors for dairy farmers. The development 
is an average outcome which portrays 
the national aggregate levels, while the 
performance of individual farms may vary 
greatly.   
15 The tendencies will be clean of any possible sharp effects attributed to the EU accession of Finland and Sweden 
in 1995. Poland and the Baltic States experienced a severe structural crisis and fall in agricultural output in the first 
years of the transition period in the early 1990s. By 1995 the deepest recession of agriculture was over and production 
figures started to recover, except for milk in Lithuania and Estonia, where the deepest phase ended only in 2000. The 
period of seventeen years is also adequate for Germany and Denmark, where the development was monotonous and 
not affected by extreme changes or conditions.  
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The milk collected and sold for process-
ing was used in this comparison, because 
it constitutes the majority of production in 
the old member states and, even in the 
new ones, its weight has increased over the 
years. Direct sales of milk are primarily rep-
resented by minor milk farms, whose share 
in total production has diminished rapidly. In 
all eight countries the milk produced for col-
lection is going to shape production levels 
in the coming years. As far as collected milk 
is concerned, the eight countries have fol-
lowed different development paths, ranging 
from distinct growth to stagnation or even 
decline.
The fastest growth was detected in Latvia, 
where collected milk has more than doubled 
between 1995 and 2012. The main reason 
for this is that Latvia suffered from the deep-
est shock of the four transition countries in 
the 1990s. The structural disaggregation of 
milk production into two hundred thousand 
tiny units was a fundamental change, push-
ing down the volumes of collected milk. The 
share of milk delivered to processing within 
total milk production shrank from 76 % to 
just one-third between 1990 and 1995. The 
fragmentation of the milk farm structure 
was not as dramatic in any other countries. 
The re-concentration of milk farms and the 
emergence of middle and large-scale pri-
vate and family enterprises appear to have 
resulted in a remarkable growth, albeit from 
the record low levels brought about by the 
shock of the economic transition.
For most of the countries growth rates 
do not change significantly when investi-
gated over the shorter period from 2000 to 
2012. The two exceptions are Estonia and 
Lithuania, where production figures reached 
their nadir in 2000 and have grown ever 
since. For these two countries growth rates 
averaged about 3-4 % annually in the 2000s. 
Similarly to Latvia, an increasing part of the 
production originated from large or expand-
ing farms. 
Denmark and Germany are character-
ised by fair annual growth, which in fact 
has accelerated in both countries in recent 
years. The growth is fuelled by the strong 
demand of the industry and a rapid change 
in farm structure, which in Germany took 
place particularly in the North-western fed-
eral states.
 Sweden and Finland are the two 
countries where milk production has been 
declining and the tendency has reinforced 
over the recent years. The main explana-
Collected milk (thousand tons) Annual growth rate (%)
Average of 
1995-1997
Average of 
2000-2002
Average of 
2010-2012
1995-97/ 
2010-12
2000-02/ 
2010-12
Germany 26 917 26 817 29 515 0.6 1.0
Denmark 4 467 4 464 4 853 0.6 0.8
Sweden 3 259 3 271 2 858 -0.9 -1.3
Finland 2 355 2 446 2 266 -0.3 -0.8
Estonia 494 444 643 1.8 3.8
Latvia 348 395 669 4.5 5.4
Finland 2 355 2 446 2 266 -0.3 -0.8
Lithuania 1 321 967 1 318 0.0 3.2
Poland 6 649 7 151 9 390 2.3 2.8
Table 27. The growth of milk production.
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data.
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tion is the same: every year hundreds of 
dairy farmers quit milk production, and the 
growth of output on expanding farms is not 
enough to compensate the disappearing 
volumes. The lack of motivation for dairying 
is one of the fundamental reasons for the 
decline at national level, although there are 
regional differences. In both countries, new 
investments contribute to maintaining milk 
output in specific regions, which slows down 
the fast drop in others. This results in an 
intensifying regional specialisation of milk 
production. 
The subsidy schemes that support milk 
production and one of the highest milk pur-
chase prices in Europe have slowed down 
the reduction of milk production in Finland. 
Sweden’s sharper decline is a result of many 
factors. One of the most crucial one is the 
lack of a strong ambitious agricultural policy. 
In the other countries of the comparison, 
agricultural producers and policy makers 
jointly lobby for sustained domestic food 
production. In many countries the food 
supply chains are notable contributors to 
the economy and the food industry is the 
first or second largest branch of manufac-
turing. Furthermore, maintaining domestic 
food production is regarded as a commonly 
accepted basic imperative in the society. 
This common understanding of the need 
and significance of national food production 
prevails in the politics (including financial 
and economic policy), the press and among 
consumers. This public understanding of the 
society forms the basis for supporting ag-
ricultural producers and representing their 
interests within the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy. In Sweden this common understand-
ing of the society is weaker than elsewhere: 
simply put, there is a lack of public concern 
for the well-being and continuity of Swedish 
agricultural production. 
One rarely identified factor that affects 
the direction of milk production change is 
market entry. In Sweden and Finland enter-
ing milk production as a new entrepreneur 
is practically impossible, not only because 
dairy farming is a profession usually in-
herited from father to son, but because it 
requires a great deal of capital and personal 
motivation. 
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Milk production growth has been a critical prerequisite for the competitiveness of the 
dairy supply chain. Sweden’s declining milk production is an outcome of several reasons. 
Some of them are structural and cultural factors, which slow down the rate of invest-
ments and generation takeovers. Young farmers get a rather low start-up aid compared 
to the full costs of the takeover. They usually have not enough capital to finance the 
purchase of the farm on their own. Despite the long term business characteristic of milk 
production and high value of collateral, banks appear to be extremely cautious to grant 
loans for investments.  
Milk production growth is also hampered by a cultural factor. Farms are seldom 
sold, even if there are no successors to continue milk production. Instead of selling, the 
farm may be transferred to a meat production unit to retain it in the family’s ownership. 
“Wasting” the family property inherited through several generations would be considered 
inappropriate. This tendency impedes milk production growth in two ways. First, less 
milk is produced as the share of quitting dairy farms falls out and second, expansion 
of investing milk farms is impaired by the lower supply of land around if the quitting 
farms continue with meat production and they do not release their land to the market. 
By contrast, milk farms have been historically traded much more intensely in Denmark. 
Farming in general and milk farming in particular is less attached to specific families. 
Owners have less emotional ties and farms are often considered only a form of business 
there. This cultural distinction also explains the different pace of milk farm concentration 
(Olsson, 2010).
Farm expansion is also decelerated by land availability. Swedish dairy farms use a 
lot of rented fields which tend to be fragmented. The owners are often pensioners, old 
farmers. Some of them do not care so much about the rent fee, but they’re not interested 
to sell the land either. The scattered location of 
the small rented plots usually adds up to the costs 
of the milk farms. Another peculiar feature of the 
Swedish land market is the coupled sale of fields 
and forests. Land is often for sale in one package 
with an average ratio of abut ¼ fields and ¾ forest. 
In Southern Sweden crop farms also compete 
for land, so the price of good cropland can be as 
high as 30-50  000 €/ha there. Even in the forest 
dominated regions of Småland and Västergötland, 
there has recently been increasing competition for 
land from outside the agrifood and forestry sectors. Nowadays industrial and financial 
investors consider forest land a good and secure investment, so they have increased the 
demand for land with their purchases.
Swedish milk farms – and farms in general – struggle in an operational environment, 
where the political atmosphere is not as favourable or supportive as in the neighbouring 
countries. This is partly the outcome of the historic political development of the country. 
The fact is that many different types of supports have been cut from the milk farmers 
over the past decades, especially around the time of accession in the 1990s. At the same 
time the administrative burden has been increased with demanding compliance with 
Text box: 
“Mer mjölk” - a project to fight against falling milk production
Construction of a new cowshed in the 
Jönköping region.
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animal welfare or environmental requirements, in several cases stricter ones than the 
EU directives.   
Milk farms had 45 different administrative requirements or control measures, more 
than any other production branch in agriculture. Obviously livestock farms are more con-
trolled than crop farms due to registry, feeding and veterinary rules, but milk farms also 
face specific requirements in insemination or obligatory grazing period among others 
(Clarin and Karlsson, 2012, pp. 10-16).  
Costs of agricultural inputs including seeds, fertilisers, and feed have hampered the 
financial performance of the Swedish dairy farmers. One of the most expensive cost item 
is protein feed, especially because the more expensive non-GM soya has been used in 
Sweden. The strong Swedish crown does not alleviate the pressure on the cash-flow of 
the Swedish milk farms, either. Subsidies are calculated to member countries in EUR and 
in the best year i.e. when SEK was the weakest, farmers received 30 % more subsidies in 
local currency than today. 
In order to overcome the above impediments and fight against the trend of decreasing 
milk production, a project called “Mer mjölk” (More milk) was launched in the Jönköping 
region in 2010 by Svensk Mjölk, the advisory service and the farmers’ organisation. The 
primary objective was to raise milk volumes in three years by 20 % around Jönköping, a 
region which contributes 8.5% to the total Swedish milk production. It was realised that 
the key elements of increasing milk production is the successful generational takeovers, 
the involvement of young ambitious farmers in investments, and strengthening their 
belief in the sector as well as promoting the importance of milk production within the 
economy to the public.
The “Mer Mjölk” project in the Jönköping region began to give positive effects in the 
middle of 2013. After a decrease in milk production with 9 % between 2001 and 2011 the 
milk production started to increase again. The increase for the region was 1.6 % in 2013. 
During the last three years more than ten similar projects have been launched all over 
Sweden. The purpose with all projects is to accentuate how important the milk production 
is for different regions and for all of Sweden. Main ingredients in the projects are to sup-
port dairy farmers who want to develop and enlarge their dairy production. The support 
consists of giving inspiration and knowledge about management, profitability, important 
factors in the surrounding world, exchange experiences and making study tours to dairy 
farms which have been successful.
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5.2 Growth in dairy processing
The growth of the sales revenues of the dairy 
industry is an indicator of their performance 
on markets. It captures developments of the 
competitive position on both domestic and 
export markets at the same time. Indices 
for the sales revenues in current prices 
show a spectacular growth for the Baltic 
countries and Poland because the initial 
level was very low and production prices 
change much more radically than in the old 
EU members. Therefore, the annual growth 
rate of dairy processing is only appropriate 
to express in real terms, which brings rates 
of the eight country to a comparable basis. 
This indicator is the same as the growth 
rate of output presented in the productivity 
chapter in Table 24 on page 121. 
Although growth rate curves show 
the dynamics of national dairy industries, 
they do not reveal the significance of 
In both countries young entrepreneurs 
have numerous other options and there 
is no tradition of entering the business or 
buying and selling dairy farms. Letting the 
farm of ancestry end in the hands of outside 
investors would be considered a failure and 
shame in the family-line. On the contrary, 
the opportunity for entry is seen as an 
important driver of growth in Danish milk 
production, and trading milk farms is just 
as ordinary as selling any other business. In 
terms of market entry, Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania represent another case, where 
milk production has been a prospect for 
thousands of ambitious families, who move 
constantly from small to larger farm size 
categories. This way a high entry rate to the 
viable and big market oriented milk farms 
is guaranteed for the coming years. The 
milk sector has benefited greatly from these 
mass reserves of human capital in the three 
countries and farmers with expansion po-
tential form a nearly inexhaustible resource 
for future growth. 
It was pointed out in the section on milk 
supply that the availability of raw material 
is a crucial prerequisite for the competitive-
ness of the dairy supply chain. For Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland domestic production 
of milk constitutes the raw material basis 
for the industry. In the Baltic countries 
and in Central Europe, dairy companies 
also purchase milk from farms abroad (see 
section 2.2.3 on cross border milk trade). 
The growing volume of available milk is a 
condition for the growth of the dairy indus-
tries. Conversely, the declining raw mate-
rial supply is reflected in the falling output 
component of the TFP of the Swedish dairy 
industry. 
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Sales revenues (million EUR) Share in the Baltic Sea region (%)
2000 2011 2000 2011
Germany 20 945 25 717 64.7 59.5
Poland 3 228 6 567 10.0 15.2
Denmark 2 800 4 073 8.7 9.4
Sweden 2 755 2 793 8.5 6.5
Finland 1 899 2 380 5.9 5.5
Lithuania 341 969 1.1 2.2
Estonia 227 377 0.7 0.9
Latvia 170 324 0.5 0.7
Baltic Sea region 32 364 43 199 100.0 100.0
Table 28. Sales revenues of the dairy industry at current prices and their share of the total 
for the Baltic Sea region (EU members).
Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data.
each country in the region. Over eleven 
years the weights in the aggregate dairy 
industry output evolved in the Baltic Sea 
region. Germany’s share fell under 60 % 
by 2011 and the drop of 5 percentage 
points was conquered by Poland alone. 
The other changes were smaller: Sweden’s 
share declined by two percent points, 
approaching Finland’s share by 2011. 
Despite their vigorous growth, the Baltic 
countries remained quite modest in terms 
of their share of the dairy market even 
by 2011. Yet, assuming a continuation of 
average growth rates observed over the 
2000-2011 period, Lithuania would catch 
or overtake Finland and Sweden by 2025 
in terms of the size of the dairy industry. 
Poland’s share would expand to 22  %, 
while Germany’s share would further de-
cline to only 50 %. 
5.3 Dairy industry sales growth in the domestic 
versus foreign markets
Growth rates in the dairy industry sales rev-
enues capture the development of market 
output as a total. Sales revenues can be 
divided into domestic and export sales, so 
their contribution to overall growth can be 
separated. It was shown in the chapter on for-
eign trade performance that dairy industries 
of individual countries specialise into export 
markets at rather different rates.  
Export intensity within the sales reve-
nues of the dairy industry is another indi-
cator which shows the country’s relative 
specialisation into dairy production. Dairy 
industry companies are most oriented 
towards exports in Denmark and Lithuania, 
as nearly half of their production is sold 
abroad. Both countries have high export 
intensity, which has not changed notably 
over the study period. For Denmark, the 
share of exports was clearly lower between 
2003 and 2009. This can be explained 
by the temporarily lower domestic milk 
production in the mid 2000s, the effects of 
muslim countries’ boycott of Arla’s sales, 
the high milk prices in 2008 and the re-
duced international trade due to the global 
financial crisis in 2009. Lithuania’s export 
shares jumped through the years after EU 
accession in 2004 but were reduced by the 
financial crisis. 
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Several countries show a distinct 
growth in export intensity over the long 
run, the most prominent examples being 
Germany, Estonia, Latvia and Poland. 
Germany’s export share of sales has 
increased steadily, while Poland’s export 
share jumped sharply after the 2004 EU 
accession. At the same time dairy pro-
cessors have huge domestic markets to 
supply in these countries.
The export share of sales has increased 
steadily for the Estonian and Latvian dairy 
industries as both countries are small with 
limited growth opportunities on the do-
mestic market. Finland and Sweden have 
mature domestic markets for dairy products, 
although in Finland there is a clear speciali-
sation towards exports. 
Growth of real sales of the dairy indus-
try were identified in Table 24 as annual 
output growth, which can be decomposed 
into growth rates on the export and do-
mestic markets. Besides an understanding 
of export performance, this growth ac-
counting exercise sheds light on the dairy 
industries’ competitive positions on their 
domestic markets. Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland have mature markets 
for dairy products compared to those 
in the Baltic States and Poland, where 
the consumption of certain processed 
products such as cheese or yoghurts has 
risen noticeably with increasing income 
level. This, of course does not mean that 
consumption patterns do not change in 
the old EU member states. In fact, cheese 
consumption has grown in several of those 
countries. Even with no precise information 
on consumption development, the growth 
rates for the domestic market are indica-
tive of performance, as zero or negative 
growth rate suggest a loss of market share 
domestically.
Export performance is apparently strong 
across the region, since all eight countries 
have experienced positive growth on export 
markets, with the rate varying from 0.2 % 
for Sweden to 2.6 % for Lithuania. 
However, growth on the domestic 
market varies significantly across the 
Baltic Sea region. Dairy industries in 
Germany, Sweden and Estonia have lost 
Figure 39. The shares of export markets in dairy industry sales in 2000-2012.
Source: own calculations based on data from Eurostat and national statistical institutes.
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 Total growth rate (%) Growth rate on the 
domestic market (%)
Growth rate on the 
export markets (%)
Germany 0.48 -0.38 0.86 
Denmark 1.48 0.64 0.83 
Sweden -1.40 -1.58 0.18 
Finland 0.53 -0.01 0.55 
Estonia -0.68 -1.46 0.80 
Latvia 1.89 0.21 1.68 
Lithuania 5.29 2.61 2.61 
Poland 4.61 2.75 1.82 
Table 29. Growth accounting - growth rates of dairy industries in the Baltic Sea countries 
by domestic and export markets.
Source: own calculations based on the figures of Eurostat and national statistical institutes. Growth rates are calculated by 
using real term sales revenues.
some of their domestic market, even 
if this loss was not even visible in the 
foreign trade balance figures of Germany 
or Estonia due to their excellent export 
performance. The fact is that, for both 
countries, sales growth domestically 
has turned negative at the time of the 
economic recession and high milk prices 
around 2008. Similarly to Estonia, growth 
on the domestic market slowed down 
considerably at the same time in Latvia, 
although it did not turn negative. Both 
countries’ dairy industries lost market 
shares to foreign competitors, to a large 
extent from Lithuania. The dairy industry’s 
domestic sales have almost stagnated in 
Finland, which means that the growth in 
the cheese market was captured entirely 
by imported products.
Growth has been pursued on export 
markets and often the successful exports 
of one country to another weaken the latter 
one’s domestic market positions. These 
transactions crisscross the Baltic Sea even 
amongst the same countries. Competition 
has become fiercer and more straightfor-
ward. Ultimately, competitiveness on export 
markets, while a good thing, is not enough: 
it is of crucial importance for the national 
dairy industries to improve their competi-
tiveness on domestic markets by saving or 
strengthening their positions. The larger the 
home economy, the more important this 
objective becomes.
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INNOVATION6
Productivity is fundamentally a dynamic 
process driven by innovation as well as the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge. 
Hence, current productivity levels reflect 
to a large extent investment decisions that 
were made in the past. Looking forward, it is 
therefore important to assess whether the 
dairy sector is taking the necessary steps 
to ensure that it will maintain or improve its 
position relative to competitors in the short 
to medium term. Given that productivity 
growth is primarily driven by technological 
change, this means that particular attention 
should be paid to investments in Research 
and Development (R&D) as well as the rate 
of innovation in the sector.  
It is no surprise that the European food 
industry has invested in R&D much less than 
other manufacturing industries, such as the 
IT, car manufacturing or pharmaceautical 
sectors. What is more striking is that even 
in a global comparison of food industries, 
the EU ranks as one of the weakest in terms 
of R&D investments. As part of its competi-
tiveness report (FDE 2011, 2012) FoodDrink 
Europe has benchmarked R&D investments 
by the European food industry against those 
of its main rivals since 2008. Data for the 
2000s indicate that the EU food industry has 
not managed to catch up with global com-
petitors, even if the share of R&D expenses 
increased from 0.3 % to 0.5 % from 2000 to 
2008. By comparison, competitor countries, 
such as Japan, the US and Australia, spent 
already 0.6-1.0 % of their output on R&D in 
year 2008.
6.1 Innovation in the dairy industry
Data on R&D activities are scarcely avail-
able for the food industry and it is even 
harder to find comparable figures for the 
dairy industry. The latest figures date back 
to the end of the 2000s. The share of R&D 
expenses in value added was between 
0 % and 1 % for the food industry of most 
European countries. Only Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Norway and the UK reported higher 
shares in the Eurostat database. The da-
taset is deficient as data are missing for 
several countries and years. 
The dairy industry is an R&D intensive 
sub-sector of the food industry, since in 
all countries its share of R&D expenditure 
in value added is larger than for the whole 
of the food industry. Out of the eight coun-
tries subject to this report the highest R&D 
activity is observed in Sweden, then in 
Germany and Finland. Figures show a clear 
increasing trend in the latter two countries. 
R&D expenditure shares of value added in 
the new member states Estonia, Lithuania 
and Poland remain between 0 % and 0.6 % 
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the highest percentage being recorded for 
Estonia. 
The corresponding figures for select-
ed reference countries like France and 
the United Kingdom show that the dairy 
industry in the old member states is po-
Figure 40. Shares of R&D expenditure in value added in the dairy industry 
of countries around the Baltic Sea. 
Source: Eurostat.
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sitioned to the high end of European R&D 
intensity. Norway has exceptionally high 
R&D intensity in its food industry by inter-
national standards and the same applies 
more specifically to its dairy industry. The 
figures for the Baltic States and Poland 
Valio's research and development center in Helsinki.
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Figure 41. Shares of R&D expenditure in value added in the dairy industry 
of selected reference countries.
Source: Eurostat.
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6.2 Innovation on the corporate level
Since there are no recent statistics 
available on innovation in the dairy 
industry, another way of establishing 
a comparison is to use corporate data. 
However, it is usually only the biggest 
companies that report their R&D activities 
in annual reports. As a result, this type of 
analysis would be biased towards large 
companies and ignore potentially highly 
innovative SMEs, although this may not 
suggest that in terms of R&D intensity, 
those countries remain behind Hungary 
and Slovakia, which represent the group 
of new member states in the reference 
country chart.
Eurostat’s data on R&D intensity is not 
available after 2007 and even years before 
that, figures for some significant dairy man-
ufacturing countries such as Denmark and 
the Netherlands are missing.
In order to overcome industry level data 
deficiency, the research team at LEI took 
a different approach to analyse innovation 
in the dairy industry (Tacken et. al. 2009). 
They scanned three different innovation 
databases for dairy related innovation cases 
or new product launches. The number of 
innovation cases processed made up only 
part of the total population. It is really chal-
lenging to keep records of all cases since 
new products and organisational or techno-
logical improvements are done continuously. 
The other difficult issue is to translate the 
number of innovative cases into economic 
benefits. Various cases would contribute to 
the companies’ value added or profitability 
to different extent. The study mentions the 
puzzle thrown by the UK dairy industry: the 
UK accounts for the highest number of in-
novation cases, but this innovation intensity 
did not show in the economic performance 
figures. 
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Figure 42. Top 25 innovative companies in the dairy-related innovation 
database used by Tacken et. al. 2009
Source: Tacken et. al. 2009, p. 43.
Danone's research and development center in France.
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be crucial since large companies ac-
count for the majority of R&D. 
The LEI report also presented innovation 
cases across companies. In their sample, 
six companies out of the TOP 25 were from 
the Baltic Sea region: three from Denmark 
and one each from Germany, Sweden and 
Finland (Figure 42). These results were put 
side by side with the findings of a consultan-
cy report in which company executives were 
asked to name innovative dairy companies. 
Five out of the top ten companies in the 
questionnaire were also found in the rank-
ing list of the innovative database: Danone, 
Nestlé, Arla, Valio and Campina (Tacken et. 
al. 2009) 
Productivity is fundamentally a dynamic 
process driven by innovation as well as the 
generation and exploitation of knowledge. 
Hence, current productivity levels reflect 
to a large extent investment decisions that 
were made in the past. Looking forward, it 
is therefore important to assess whether the 
dairy sector in a country is taking the neces-
sary steps to ensure that it will maintain or 
improve its position relative to competitors 
in the short to medium term. Given that pro-
ductivity growth is primarily driven by tech-
nological change, this means that particular 
attention should be paid to investments in 
Research and Development (R&D) as well as 
the rate of innovation in the sector.
The construction of the new global research centre of Arla Foods will start in spring 2014. The centre will be 
located in Arhus and will provide premises for 120 researchers.
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CONCLUSIONS7
As globalisation proceeds, it is becoming 
clear that that competition within the 
agri-food sector has shifted to a rivalry of 
large multinational companies. On the 
global dairy market, an accelerating race 
characterises the activities of the 20-30 
leading concerns. For giant multinational 
companies, national and even more so local 
interests are subordinated to corporate 
strategies in a constant pursuit to improve 
capacity utilisation, labour productivity, 
economies of scale, or in one word their 
competitiveness. The geographical balance 
of plant closures and new investment 
across countries is a great challenge for 
any company, but the problem is even 
more pronounced when owner-suppliers are 
spread in several countries.   
Dairy supply chains play a significant 
role in the Northern European agri-food sec-
tors. Measured by output, both dairy farms 
and dairy processors are leading subsectors 
of agriculture and the food industry in most 
countries around the Baltic Sea region. 
Present and future competitiveness of the 
dairy supply chains are, therefore, of crucial 
importance for the overall prosperity of 
these countries’ agrifood sectors and relat-
ed economic activities and services.
Separate indicators vs aggregate score 
for competitiveness
The competitive development and positions 
of the dairy chains in eight countries were 
analysed in this study via five groups of 
factors, which are either direct indicators or 
determinants of competitiveness.  
Having examined the dairy supply 
chains with a wide set of indicators in five 
groups of competitive factors, the ques-
tions still remains: can the dairy chains of 
the eight countries be ranked in terms of 
competitiveness? Ranking is a fundamental 
objective of cross-country studies of com-
petitiveness in the literature. In the case 
of a single segment of the chain, such as 
milk farms or the dairy industry, ranking is 
feasible. In particular, by considering one 
competitiveness indicator at a time, the 
order of the countries can be derived fairly 
easily, even if those rankings remain partial 
and cannot capture the complexity and mul-
ti-dimensional nature of competitiveness. 
In some studies the set of indicators 
were aggregated into a single score in order 
to identify a clear ranking of countries. Thus, 
for food industries, Poppe et al. (2007) 
composed a rough competitiveness scale 
including five indicators and Tacken et. al. 
(2009) adapted the same methodology for 
measuring and ranking the competitiveness 
of dairy industries in European countries 
(p. 70). However, as far as the operation of 
the entire dairy supply chain is concerned, 
it is extremely hard to summarise the 
structural and industry-based indicators 
into a single summary score to compare 
the performance of countries. The various 
scales for fifteen indicators represent one 
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challenge, but the real problem arises from 
the weights to be placed on each indica-
tors. Even considering only one indicator 
such as productivity growth, we observed 
substantially different rankings of countries 
depending on the level of the chain that was 
analysed, i.e. dairy farms or dairy process-
ing. Since countries have different strengths 
in terms of structural, foreign trade and 
growth indicators, changing the weights 
would completely reshuffle the ranking 
order of a complex competitiveness score.
Ownership and industry structures, 
vertical relations within the chain
The originality of this study stems from 
its focus on the entire supply chain in its 
comparative assessment of the dairy sec-
tor’s competitiveness. All the segments of 
the chain and the links between the actors 
should be strong in order to shape a compet-
itive industry. Otherwise, the stronger actors 
of the chain tend to seek commercial alli-
ances with firms in neighbouring countries, 
which gives rise to serious tensions within 
the country. This can be illustrated with 
reference to the Baltic countries. Lithuanian 
dairy processing forms the strongest link of 
the national dairy supply chain, which cur-
rently imports almost a fourth of its raw milk 
from neighbouring countries. By contrast, in 
Estonia large corporate farms enjoy a much 
stronger position than national dairy proces-
sors and, as a result, often decide to export 
their raw milk. In the last five years a quarter 
of the milk produced in Estonia and a third 
of that produced in Latvia has been export-
ed to Lithuania for processing. 
The intense competition for raw milk 
in the Baltic countries highlights the im-
portance for the operation of the sector of 
ownership forms, long-term commercial 
partnership along the chain, and relative 
bargaining powers of the different actors. In 
all the countries included in the study, farm-
ers control a significant share of the dairy 
processing capacity through cooperative ar-
rangements. However, farmers’ motivations 
and ability to influence the operation and 
strategies of processors vary considerably 
across countries.
Cooperatives have traditionally been 
strong in the dairy sector in Northern 
Europe. That situation is the result of an 
evolution of over a hundred years old of 
ownership structure in the dairy supply 
chains in the old member states (i.e., the 
three Nordic countries and Germany). As 
for the new member states, ownership has 
changed over the past decades repeatedly 
and radically. In the Baltic countries, dairy 
companies moved under state control 
during the early part of the economic 
transition, but then were privatised in the 
1990s, when farmers were granted priority 
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to acquire shares of dairy processing plants. 
By the turn of the century, most dairies 
were bought by private investors until farms 
became strong enough to initiate them-
selves changes in the ownership structure 
of the processing level of the supply chain. 
In recent years, farmers-owned coopera-
tives have purchased an increasing share of 
total raw milk supply and, in a second step, 
have increased their ownership of dairy 
processing capacity. 
The process has been rapid and also 
supported by the policy makers. Similar 
intent to raise farmers’ ownership was seen 
in at least Latvia and Lithuania already at 
the time of dairy industry privatisation in 
the 1990s. With these recent changes in 
the Baltic countries the ownership structure 
in the eight countries of this comparison is 
about to have an important common charac-
teristic, the significant role of dairy farmers 
as drivers of vertical integration. The recent 
progress of Baltic cooperatives also shows 
that the traditions of cooperative movement 
have relevance in today’s modern capital 
allocation tendencies. 
The country cases in Chapter 2 suggest 
that the utilisation of industry capacity and 
scale of economics in particular is a marked 
explanatory factor of the competitiveness 
of dairy industry. The importance of scale 
of economies for cheese production is a 
technological fact. It is also shown indirectly 
by the rationalisation strategy of the largest 
dairies to phase out and close the small 
cheeseries and invest into the biggest ones. 
The significance of scale of economies is 
also verified by the productivity difference 
among countries, the ones that have a more 
fragmented industry structure or smaller 
average company size struggle against 
companies in more concentrated markets 
with bigger market shares and size. The 
latter ones can take advantage of larger 
scale series of production and better capac-
ity utilisation. Besides processing volumes 
a number of other factors contribute to the 
competitiveness of dairy companies, such 
as product portfolio, the geographical strat-
egy and spread on the markets, proficiency 
in sales and marketing and investments into 
innovation. 
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In the dairy supply chain, foreign trade is 
used in several countries as a psychological 
ace card in price or contract negotiations: 
farmers threaten processors to take their 
milk abroad, processors to buy milk from 
abroad, while retailers also threatens to 
sell imported goods instead of domestic 
ones. While this argument may often used 
in price negotiations, retailers are ready 
to favour domestic products if consumers 
express such preference. In most countries 
consumer loyalty is fairly strong for drinking 
milk, but less pronounced for the processed 
dairy products.  
As an interesting phenomenon some re-
tailers take their own countries’ dairy prod-
ucts to abroad either as private label prod-
ucts or under the manufacturers’ brands. In 
particular German and Lithuanian dairies 
have an increased access to export markets 
through the activities of their international-
ised retail chains. For discount store chains 
and their numerous private label products 
this may help the dairy industry companies 
in reaching volume, but margins remain 
low. There would be better opportunities for 
manufacturer to achieve higher margin with 
their own brands but consolidation of pro-
cessors has been lower than retailers, and 
competition against other manufacturers’ 
brands and the increasing share of private 
label has been fierce.
Across the Baltic Sea region, the most 
influential segment of dairy supply chains 
remains the retail sector. Following the 
recession in 2009, consumers’ purchasing 
power has contracted and the popularity of 
discount retailers has consequently risen. 
The stronger retailers have responded to 
the increased price sensitivity of consumers 
by developing their offerings of private label 
products in the cheese and yoghurt groups 
as well as by giving new a new impetus 
to their strategy to conquer shares  of the 
market for fluid milk. 
Productivity
Total factor productivity (TFP) measures 
the efficiency of the process by which 
production factors are transformed into 
finished products, and that indicator was 
calculated for both milk production on 
farms and the dairy processing industry. 
TFP is often regarded as a crucial indicator 
of competitiveness, because it depends 
both on the technical efficiency of pro-
ducers and their commercial ability to sell 
products on markets. The calculations for 
dairy processing indicate that productivity 
grows fastest in countries where firms are 
growing quickly. Cost reductions and rises in 
production efficiency alone do not result in 
significant productivity growth. 
TFP of milk farms has grown at similar 
speeds in Finland, Germany, Denmark and 
Sweden. The productivity advantage of the 
leaders has not shrunk significantly in the 
last fifteen years. Structural differences 
across countries account for the bulk of pro-
ductivity differences. Although production 
moves to larger farms in all countries, the 
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speed of this development varies. Currently 
the average milk farm is 31 dairy cows in 
Finland, as compared to 75 in Sweden and 
164 in Denmark. The Danish lead seems 
insurmountable, but fast structural devel-
opment in that country has been achieved 
through heavy investment and the resulting 
burden of debt that afflicts Danish milk 
producers makes them vulnerable to market 
fluctuations. 
The fact that productivity growth rates 
have developed hand in hand for the dairy 
farms of the four countries over the past 
fifteen years offers two ways of interpre-
tation. On the one hand dairy farms have 
achieved fairly similar growth, so their 
relative performance remains at the same 
level. On the other hand, given the differ-
ent absolute stages from which the four 
countries’ farmers started their productivity 
development in 1995, the initial differences 
did not change. The gaps did not close and 
the order in TFP levels remained the same, 
starting with the highest level in Denmark, 
followed by Germany, Sweden and Finland.
Among the four most recent EU members, 
TFP growth has been fastest in Estonia, as 
the relative importance of very small farms 
in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania has hindered 
structural development. The Latvian devel-
opment illustrates an interesting case of 
productivity growth in a contracting sector. 
Namely productivity can grow even if farm 
outputs fall, provided that the utilised inputs 
drop even faster. Obviously this type of pro-
ductivity growth is neither sustainable nor 
desirable for long term.
In dairy processing, the newer EU 
members are quickly closing their pro-
ductivity gap with the leading countries 
of the comparison group. Since the turn of 
the century, annual TFP growth has taken 
place at the average rate of 3.7% in Poland 
and 2.4% in Lithuania, or much faster 
than in Finland where the corresponding 
figure is only 0.7%. At the same time, TFP 
in German and Swedish dairy processing 
actually declined. 
Altogether, the evolution documented 
in this report is consistent with the view 
that transferring technologies and organ-
isational forms from productivity leaders 
to productivity “laggards” is easier in the 
manufacturing sector than in primary 
production, due to the typical difference in 
the size of firms as well as the more pro-
nounced reliance of the primary sector on 
country-specific agro-ecological conditions. 
A few large firms have apparently man-
aged to catch up with the foreign leaders 
in the dairy industry through deliberate 
investments, R&D efforts and marketing 
and sales operations. Conversely, in Polish, 
Latvian and Lithuanian milk farming speedy 
catching up will require intensification and 
concentration of thousands of currently very 
small farms. 
Ultimately, productivity – and competi-
tiveness – boils down to two basic compo-
nents: market performance and efficiency. 
Maintaining and increasing market shares 
domestically and on export markets is a key 
element of competitiveness, whereas the 
efficient use of resources (i.e., all production 
inputs) is the other key component. Those 
countries’ dairy supply chains, which per-
form well on both counts, are competitive 
and will remain so in the future.
Export performance and growth  
Climatic and natural conditions appar-
ently favour milk production in Northern 
European countries, and this is reflected in 
the foreign trade performance of the eight 
countries in the study. With the exception 
of Sweden, all countries have produced 
milk and dairy products over their domestic 
needs during the last two decades. They 
have shown various degrees of success 
on export markets, but they all have a 
clear specialisation in dairy production 
within their export portfolios.  
Geographical orientation is indicative 
of the strategy of dairy companies. Export 
of basic products to emerging markets is 
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the expression of a volume-based strate-
gy, while exports of special products with 
high value added to developed  markets 
reveals a value-creating strategy. Many 
companies apply a mix of the two strate-
gies. Spreading sales geographically onto 
several export markets is a powerful way 
to reduce risks.    
The more successful countries of the 
comparison group have managed to expand 
their sales both domestically and on export 
markets. Further, cross-country differences 
in productivity growth are closely asso-
ciated with the relative market positions 
of the countries of the Baltic Sea region. 
While Poland and the Baltic countries only 
accounted for 12% of the turnover of the 
region’s dairy industry in year 2000, that 
share reached 19% in 2011. Concurrently 
the market shares of the older EU members 
such as Germany and Sweden shrank by five 
and two percentage points respectively, and 
in the case of Finland that share decreased 
from 5.9% to 5.5%. In Germany, Sweden 
and Finland the positions of national dairy 
industries have weakened on domestic 
markets.
Further research
Several economic phenomena could be 
analysed further to explain the operation 
of the chain. Most of these can be explicitly 
studied and investigated by applying specif-
ic methodologies, but they would deserve 
further research on their own.  
Those topics include: the effects of policy, 
subsidies and taxing systems (incl VAT) on 
the operation of the chain; the importance 
of transaction costs; the distribution of 
income within the chain; contracting and 
supply chain management; risk manage-
ment and risk sharing in the chain; as well 
as multiplier effects and relations to the 
rest of the economic sectors e.g. banking 
sector, packaging by using input-output 
models.  
What’s next in the market?
World demand for dairy products is 
predicted to grow faster than supply as 
consumption expands steadily in emerging 
economies. The EU seeks to get its share 
of that growth, which will affect markets 
in, for example, China, Russia, the Arab 
world, and Africa. The removal of milk 
quotas in a year will profoundly modify 
allocation of production volumes across EU 
countries, as the large effects of the reform 
of the EU sugar policy, which took place a 
few years ago, may suggest.   
The quota abolition will speed up a 
broad process of structural change that 
has been ongoing for years, and increase 
the geographical concentration of agricul-
tural production in Europe. High grain and 
oilseed prices, and the resulting improved 
profitability of cash crop production, have 
attracted farmers in Central Europe to shift 
their focus to crop production. Concurrently, 
a milk production belt has been forming 
in the Northern coastal regions of the EU 
stretching from Ireland through to Brittany, 
the Benelux countries, and as far as the 
Baltic states to the East. Climate conditions 
have always favoured grazing and milk pro-
duction in those coastal regions. However, 
their relative importance in milk production 
Figure 43. Milk production belt in 
Northern and Western Europe.
Source: based on Lafougére (2012), modified by the authors.
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will increase further, because the range of 
profitable cash crops becomes narrower and 
average yields lower as one moves north-
wards. In many parts of this region, milk 
production is the best alternative among all 
farming opportunities. 
Geographical specialisation proceeds of 
course mainly in relative terms, with milk 
production gaining importance in coastal 
areas and crop production doing the same 
in Central Europe. This does not imply, 
however, the disappearance of milk farms 
outside of the “milk belt”, but production is 
increasingly shifting to this area within the 
continent. 
Some countries where production has 
been constrained by the quota system, 
such as Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Denmark and Poland, are eager to increase 
their production of milk. The importance of 
raw milk availability for the competitiveness 
of national dairy chains will rise in the future. 
With the expansion of milk production 
on farms, dairy industry can easily seize 
opportunities to conquer new markets. It is 
clear that the removal of milk quotas within 
the EU will boost production and exports to 
world markets, but a swing in world prices 
may also result in overproduction within 
the EU’s common market. In periods of 
low world market prices, a large amount of 
“excess” dairy production would flow within 
the internal EU market, threatening further 
the positions of those dairies which predom-
inantly operate domestically or within the 
EU. In this context, competitiveness of the 
sector also requires that its position on the 
domestic market be preserved.
The impact of public perception on 
competitiveness
Having discussed the results based on 
quantitative indicators, it should be 
stated that the competitiveness of the 
dairy supply chain is much broader than 
the technical or technological efficien-
cy of the actors in the chain.  
A number of qualitative determinants 
contribute to the effective functioning of the 
chain. A constant and thorough monitoring 
of eight countries’ dairy chains for the past 
three years leads us to the conclusion that 
these intangible determinants play a crucial 
role in explaining cross-country differences 
in competitiveness. Those determinants en-
compass historic, cultural and psychological 
factors, the public’s perception and view of 
the dairy industry, the operational and busi-
ness environment of firms, and relations 
among the segments of the chain.  
The role of psychological factors is not 
supposed to be ignored when it comes to 
the smooth operation of the chain and its 
competitiveness. Those factors affect busi-
ness relations among actors in the chain 
and are therefore woven into price agree-
ments and contract negotiations. As an 
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illustrative example, the threat of increased 
cooperation with foreign partners has been 
mentioned earlier. 
Agrifood chains enjoy broad acceptance 
and support by society in some countries. 
In those, a public consensus on the impor-
tance of the agrifood sector may have de-
veloped for different reasons. Sometimes 
favourable conditions (e.g., climate and 
soils) or historic developments resulted 
in a strong agrifood sector, which was 
then seen as worthy of broad public sup-
port. Alternatively, the scarcity of natural 
resources and lack of relevant business al-
ternatives that could contribute in a major 
way to the national economy may have 
generated public support for the agrifood 
sector. By contrast, in countries where 
other manufacturing or service sectors 
have traditionally carried the economy, the 
chance for strong public support remains 
much smaller.
Public support will be reflected in 
policy-making and politics, especially if 
agrifood sectors account for large shares 
of economic activity or employment. The 
influence and lobbying power of rural and 
farming populations and agrifood business-
es differ by country. The attitude and level 
of commitment of national agricultural and 
other general economic interests towards 
the dairy supply chain manifest themselves 
in a multitude of ways, including: the availa-
bility of financial instruments and allocation 
of resources to investment and moderni-
sation; the allocation of national resources 
to education, research and supportive 
infrastructure such as advisory services; 
and the encouragement of new businesses 
and entrepreneurs. It is also noticeable in 
cross-country differences in taxing systems, 
tax exemptions for farmers, corporate tax 
rates, and VAT rates for food, including dairy 
products. 
In the specific case of the dairy sector, 
the significance of the sector may vary 
across regions or even municipalities. 
The continuation of milk production in 
microregions is again largely determined 
by psychological factors. Even in Sweden 
and Finland, where milk production has 
been declining slightly, the business 
atmosphere and appreciation for milk pro-
duction may be radically different within 
a small area. The inspiring examples of 
young farmers investing successfully, the 
support of local authorities and the atti-
tude of local banks have strong influences 
that can explain why milk production may 
increase or decline even in neighbouring 
municipalities.
The attitude of the general public and 
consumers towards the dairy sector is an 
important element of the broad support 
towards the domestic dairy supply chain. 
General expectations are reflected by the 
level of public discussion of environmental 
issues, animal welfare, corporate responsi-
153
bility, food hygiene and safety. On the other 
hand, consumers’ positive attitudes manifest 
themselves by a certain level of loyalty to-
wards domestically-produced milk and dairy 
products, and less emphasis placed on prices. 
Actors of the dairy supply chains are ap-
parently more ambitious in countries where 
they are appreciated by consumers, the 
media and politicians because of their contri-
bution to the national economy and prosper-
ity of the country. Considerable and growing 
export earnings usually increase the legiti-
macy of and support for the sector.  
Moreover, in some countries a strong 
economic consensus has also been 
achieved. National dairy strategies with 
concrete objectives have been set up with 
the involvement of all actors in the chain 
together with advisory services, research 
centres and the government. Joint efforts 
of this type indicate a strong commitment 
to take advantage of future market op-
portunities and eventually have a great 
impact on the competitiveness of dairy 
supply chains. 
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Rank Company Country of headquarters Sales revenues (billion €)
1. Nestle Switzerland 23.4
2. Danone France 15.1
3. Lactalis France 14.0
4. Fonterra New Zealand 12.5
5. FrieslandCampina Netherlands 10.5
6. Dairy Farmers of America USA 9.4
7. Arla Denmark/Sweden/Germany 8.4
8. Deans USA 6.9
9. Saputo Canada 6.5
10. Meiji Japan 6.0
11. Unilever Netherlands/UK 5.8
12. Yili China 5.1
13. Morinaga Japan 4.5
14. Sodiaal France 4.5
15. Mengniu China 4.5
16. Kraft Foods USA 4.4
17. DMK Germany 4.4
18. Bongrain France 4.1
19. Schreiber Foods USA 3.5
20. Müller Germany 3.3
Attachment 1. The biggest dairy companies in the world ranked by their 2012 sales 
revenues.
Source: Rabobank. 
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Attachment 2. & 3. Labour productivity in dairy manufacturing.
thousand EUR of output per worker, at year 2010 price level
Year Denmark Germany Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Finland Sweden
1995 423 - - - - - 344 334
1996 431 - - - - - 342 353
1997 413 - - - - - 342 328
1998 429 - - - - - 324 316
1999 438 548 - 46 - - 349 341
2000 347 559 85 54 41 - 389 371
2001 366 584 107 61 47 - 407 334
2002 365 581 109 66 52 81 419 220
2003 420 573 116 75 54 79 426 373
2004 454 632 142 79 60 88 433 311
2005 456 657 142 86 71 111 442 306
2006 483 678 145 86 81 121 469 346
2007 486 710 162 87 99 141 470 345
2008 523 680 165 90 100 150 429 341
2009 513 658 146 85 94 120 415 322
2010 542 662 156 95 106 148 417 341
Average growth rate of labour productivity (%)
Period 1995-2010 1999-2010 2000-10 1999-2010 2000-10 2002-10 1995-2010 1995-2010
Value 1.7 1.7 6.3 6.9 10.0 7.7 1.3 0.1
thousand EUR of value added per worker, at year 2010 price level
Year Denmark Germany Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Finland Sweden
1995 59 - - - - - 46 48
1996 63 - - - - - 54 71
1997 62 - - - - - 55 52
1998 65 - - - - - 48 55
1999 68 69 - 11 - - 49 -
2000 - 71 9 15 7 - 49 44
2001 - 68 11 19 8 - 57 61
2002 - 72 13 19 8 15 59 41
2003 - 72 15 15 11 14 60 57
2004 - 81 11 14 12 14 65 60
2005 - 78 14 17 14 17 68 58
2006 - 80 19 15 19 18 68 69
2007 - 67 25 16 22 23 66 66
2008 - 63 23 16 13 22 58 53
2009 - 75 25 15 18 21 67 57
2010 - 66 22 17 17 24 69 54
Average growth rate of labour productivity
Period 1995-99 1999-2010 2000-10 1999-2010 2000-10 2002-10 1995-2010 1995-2010
Value 3.3 -0.4 8.7 3.8 8.7 6.0 2.7 0.8
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